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Abstract 
 
This research investigates the role of the Romanian press in reporting political corruption. It 
argues that as a part of a Romanian society tolerant to corruption, the Romanian press manages 
to report corruption but fails to be part of the solution to the corruption problem by holding the 
political elite to account. To demonstrate this, the thesis uses textual and contextual analysis 
by employing techniques and concepts from critical discourse analysis, political economy of 
the media and theories of media and democracy. To assess the role of the Romanian press 
reporting political corruption within the larger context of post-communist Romanian realities, 
the research comprises three case studies and interviews with journalists. The first case study 
focuses on the corruption case of one of Romania`s Prime Ministers, Adrian Nastase. The 
second case study focuses on the case of Dan Voiculescu, a powerful politician and media 
owner with strong connections with Romania`s communist past. The third case study is an 
overview of the corruption within the Romanian political realm. It shows corruption as a 
practice surviving decades and touching politicians irrespective of their political colour or side, 
Government or Opposition.  
The interviews provide an image of the internal state of the Romanian media: a mutually 
beneficial relationship shaped as barter between politicians and media owners, dodgy 
characters looking to protect themselves from being investigated by the legal system for their 
irregular deeds while trying to secure good contracts with the state for their other business 
endeavours. The Romanian journalist becomes almost irrelevant in such a context.  
The results of the study contribute to a better understanding of post-communist 
Romania, its problem with political corruption and the working of its media. The results also 
suggest that, in view of the lack of any significant research into the phenomenon of corruption 
in Romania, understanding the problem of political corruption and the role of the media in 
tackling it should be as well approached from a clear understanding of the culture of corruption 
in Romania. 
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Introduction 
 
 
This research employs a critical political economy of media approach to investigate the 
discursive construction of political corruption in mediated communication in Romania. Its 
purpose is to understand the relationship between the written press discourse about political 
corruption and the critical political economy of press against the background of the political 
and economic context in Romania between 2004 and 2014. 
 
The Importance of Romania 
 
 Romania has a population of 20 million inhaBiţănts and it is the 7th largest member of 
EU 28. With a surface area as big as the UK (38,931 square km), Romania is the largest EU 
member state in South-Eastern Europe and a key player from an economic and geo-strategic 
aspect in the area.  
From a geo-political point of view, Romania is the border of NATO and the border of 
the EU. Positioned at the crossroads of two different spheres of influence, NATO and Russia, 
Romania is particularly vulnerable to the flare up of any of the frozen conflicts concerning the 
pro-Russian territories belonging to the Republic of Moldova as well as to potential significant 
immigration from Ukraine in case of an extended conflict with Russia. As such Romania needs 
to be a strong and capable ally to the international organisations. To perform both roles, as an 
EU and NATO member, according to the respective standards of each institution, Romania 
needs internal political stability and the capacity to follow through with its external 
commitments.  
Romania is as well an important economic hub. It is the second largest consumer in 
Central Eastern Europe, behind Poland. Surrownded by Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Ukraine, 
Moldova and the Black Sea, Romania is part of a 100 million consumers market.  Its has a 
strategic location which facilitates trade and investment in countries of the former CIS, the 
Balkans, the Middle East and North Africa. Romania is the junction of the 4, 7 and 9 
prospective European transportations corridors. As a consequence, it attracts a significant 
percent of the foreign direct investment in South Eastern Europe and benefits from generous 
available EU funding for new projects: €30bn of structural funds from the EU were allocated 
for the period 2007-2013 and another €30.8 billion were allocated for the period 2014 – 2020. 
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Romania is closer to the rest of Europe than China and India, and being a new market, exhibits 
many opportunities, especially in terms of infrastructure.   
Due to the low costs of doing business in Romania, international manufacturers are 
increasingly seeing it as a production alternative to China. Cutting the travel and shipping costs 
comes with the benefit of protecting their trade marks.  
However, if all this potential is to develop, Romania needs to deal with its stuffy bureaucracy 
and sometimes overwhelming corruption.  
 
The Problem of Corruption 
 
Political corruption is seen as a major political problem of post-communist Romania 
both internally and externally.  Internally, the problem of political corruption is a permanent 
hot topic, as corruption is seen not only as one of the main causes for Romania`s slow progress 
but as a source for fuelling politics as well (Cristoiu, 2013).  
Since Romania joined the EU in January 2007, its efforts to combat high level 
corruption have been closely monitored by the European Commission.  Like any EU member 
state, Romania has to be a functioning democracy, and the independence of the Judicial System 
from the Executive is a strong indicator of a healthy democracy.  The Commission’s most 
recent report at the time this research started noted that cases of high level corruption continued 
to be delayed or dropped altogether, proving the weakness of Romania`s judicial system when 
facing political pressures (European Commission, 2010). This delay had also been highlighted 
by external international bodies, including the Berlin-based think-tank Transparency 
International, strengthening the idea that Romania was not ready and that much work needed 
to be done in order to attain the required standards.  (Transparency International, 2004 – 2009).  
Romania’s corruption problems have been closely monitored by the EU via the 
Mechanism of Cooperation and Verification (MCV).  For example, the MCV report released 
by the European Commission in January 2013 focused on respect for the rule of law and the 
independence of the judiciary in Romania, as well as on the reform of the judicial system and 
the fight against corruption. The report highlighted that politically motivated attacks on the 
judiciary had not ended, as well as that fact that there had been numerous examples of the 
media exercising pressure on the judiciary. As for the fight against corruption, the report 
underlined some progress, as the Romanian authorities continued to prosecute corruption cases 
successfully, the number of final convictions doubled compared to the previous year and 
politicians of all main parties were affected.  However, the Commission recommended 
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Romania to accelerate progress of the reform of the judiciary and the fight against corruption 
and announced it would continue to monitor progress closely (European Commission, 2013).   
 
Research Questions and Aims 
 
Although studies on the general state of the Romanian media have been done, none 
focuses specifically on the Romanian media reporting political corruption. Aspects such as the 
transition of the post-communist Romanian media, the post-communist journalistic elites, the 
media ownership and owners in Romania have been explored but no attention was paid to the 
manner in which the Romanian media has been reporting cases of political corruption nor to 
the elements at work behind this process. This is however a symptom of a larger context in 
Romanian society. The debate about the role of the media in curbing political corruption in 
Romania is missing altogether because the debate about what political corruption is and how it 
affects the everyday life of Romanian citizens, the internal and the external affairs of Romania 
as well as the impact of its strategic external partnerships is also missing. Romania has been 
struggling with political corruption for centuries; it is aware that political corruption is one of 
the main reasons it has not made more progress but still no comprehensive research has ever 
been done to understand, describe and explain political corruption in Romania.  
The role of this thesis is to fill the gap in the research of  the media reporting political 
corruption by answering three questions: how is news about political corruption reported by 
the Romanian press to its public, what characterises the relationship between the media 
ownership and political realm in Romania and how does this relationship influence the 
Romanian journalist reporting political corruption in terms of professional autonomy, daily 
practice, recruitment and professional ideology.  
 To answer these questions, I pursued three directions of analysis. Firstly, I analysed 
how news about political corruption is reported by the Romanian press to its public.   Secondly, 
I focused on the relationship between the owners of the media reporting political corruption 
and the political realm in Romania by exploring the particular political-institutional and 
economic realities specific of the Romania press-political elite nexus. Thirdly, I explored how 
the relationship media ownership – political realm influences the Romanian journalist reporting 
political corruption in terms of professional autonomy, daily practice, recruitment and 
professional ideology. The most representative cases of political corruption between 2004 and 
2015 were examined and journalists were asked, via interviews, about the challenges they face 
and how they think about them.  
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The Thesis Chapters in Brief 
 
The first two chapters introduce Romania as a case study to investigate the role of the 
press in reporting political corruption in a post-communist country. They built up a general 
context of the media and political corruption in Romania.  
The first chapter, “Media & Democracy”, is a background chapter which sets out the 
main theoretical and conceptual foundations of the research and justifies Romania as a case for 
study. It introduces Romania, a post-communist state in transition bearing significant internal 
and external pressures on its democratisation process, within the larger debate about media and 
democracy. 
The second chapter, “Political Corruption and Political Culture”, introduces the 
concepts of political corruption and political culture and exemplifies their application in the 
context of the Romanian case. Although political culture is seen as one of the main 
determinants of political corruption, I argue in this chapter that it can be a factor of resistance 
against corruption and a mechanism of holding political power to account. 
The third chapter, “Methodology”, presents the rationale for adopting the research 
methods used in this study (discourse analysis, interviews and secondary documents analysis) 
by positioning the relationship between the Romanian media and the political realm within the 
coordinates set by the critical political economy of media approach. The rationale section is 
followed by a summary of the research aims and continues by exploring the methodology used 
for the discourse analysis and interviews and by explaining how these methods will be 
operationalised. 
The following three chapters are dedicated to the case studies of media reportage of 
political corruption in Romania. I argue in each of the cases that, as part of a Romania society 
tolerant to corruption, the Romanian press manages to report corruption but it fails to be part 
of the solution by holding the political elite to account. I argue that this tendency can be 
recognised in three ways: 1) while the Romanian press should be a strong component of the 
resistance to corruption, it fails to perform its role as a whistle-blower or as an external 
mechanism to detect and bring corruption to light; 2) the Romanian press fails to frame political 
corruption as an emergency that should be a priority for the public and the political elite; 3)  
the Romanian press shows little concern and reflection about lack of ethics, understood as 
corruption and biased, unethical behaviour, affecting journalists reporting political corruption.  
The fourth chapter, “Case Study 1: Adrian Nastase”, explores the manner in which the 
Romanian press reported the corruption case of Adrian Nastase, a politician who had to face 
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the full force of the law only after he finished his mandate as Prime Minister, lost the 
presidential elections and consequently the leadership of his party. 
The fifth chapter, “Case Study 2: Dan Voiculescu”, explores the manner in which the 
Romanian press reported the corruption case of Dan Voiculescu, a politician who had to give 
explanations for his deeds while at the height of his career both as an MP and as a business 
man owning a media empire.  
The sixth chapter, “Case Study 3: Microsoft – EADS”, explored the manner in which 
the Romanian press reported a corruption case indicating that political corruption in Romania 
is a practice widely spread irrespective of what political party forms the government, and 
inherited from minister to minister as a normal mode of functioning and managing public 
office.  
The seventh chapter consists of “Interviews with Journalists”: while the case studies 
show how the Romanian press reports political corruption and demonstrate its shortcomings in 
holding power to account, the section dedicated to interviews with journalists and political 
analysts looks into the reasons behind the performance of the Romanian press. 
The last part of the thesis, “Conclusion”, summarizes the key findings of the three case 
studies and interviews and looks at the contribution of this research to the understanding of the 
problem of political corruption in Romania. It concludes by suggesting directions for a future 
research.  
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Chapter 1: Media and Democracy 
 
 
This research employs a critical political economy of media approach to investigate the 
discursive construction of political corruption in mediated communication in Romania. Its 
purpose is to understand the relationship between the written press discourse about political 
corruption and the critical political economy of the press against the background of the political 
and economic context in Romania between 2004 and 2014. This background chapter sets out 
the main theoretical and conceptual foundations of the research and justifies Romania as a case 
for study. It introduces Romania, a post-communist state in transition, bearing significant 
internal and external pressures on its democratisation process, within the larger debate about 
media and democracy.  
Liberal theories of the media and democracy and the critical political economy of the 
media approach that underpin this study are explained and justified. They are employed to 
explore the Romanian press in the light of the media standards and challenges in the Western 
world. I argue this way that Romania can provide an insight into the difficulties related to 
political corruption faced by a post-communist country trying to observe Western normative 
standards of behaviour in democratic political cultures. The concept of the media as the fourth 
power of state is a key concept in this study; therefore, its various dimensions are outlined. 
  
 
1) Liberal Democracy and the Media 
 
1.1 Liberal Democracy Vs Neoliberalism 
  
One might argue that a discussion about neo-liberalism and the media would have been more 
appropriate to investigate the role of the Romanian press in reporting political corruption than 
focussing on the classic liberal view of the media as the fourth power in state. There are a few 
considerations that stop me from proceeding down the path of neo-liberalism.  
 The first and the most important one is the fact that, as we shall see soon in this chapter, 
political corruption is associated with a deficit of democracy. One way one can assess the 
contribution of the media in tackling this problem is to look at the capacity and the challenges 
the media faces in performing its particular role in keeping power accountable. That is to 
remember that although “commercial news organisations are first and foremost businesses, 
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news is no ordinary commodity and is linked directly to the health and well-being of democratic 
practice” (Fenton, 2011: 63).  The discussion about neoliberalism and the media is defined 
within the larger context of globalisation, in which the media system is playing the essential 
part of “promoting global markets and encouraging consumer values” (McChesney, 2001:1).  
Although, as Sparks underlines, in South-Eastern post-communist Europe there has been a 
strong element of entry by as sophisticated international enterprises in both press and 
broadcasting, (Sparks, 2000) my research focuses particularly on the internal changes of the 
press system in post-communist Romania, a process which, we shall see in the following 
chapters, has been influenced more by Romania`s un-processed Communist legacy and slow 
economic development and less by broader tendencies towards monopolisation and increased 
power for transnational and international media trusts. 
 Neo-liberalism can be understood as a “set of national and international policies” 
destined to establish business dominance over all social affairs without too much opposing 
force while governments remain largely to serve corporate interests and minimise the 
“activities that might undermine the rule of business and the wealthy” (McChesney, 2001:1). 
This would be difficult to apply to Romania, first because Romania is a country still struggling 
to impose a culture of open market encouraging investment, based more on business and 
entrepreneurship than on a large public sector. Second, because as Sparks shows, large 
international corporations had a go at the post-communist world and, although having the 
experience of operating in capitalist democracies, they ended up joining corrupt local practices 
(Sparks, 2000:37) or leaving the South-Eastern European market altogether in the aftermath of 
economic crises in 2008 due to poor economic return of their investment as in the case of the 
German media trust, WAZ. 
 More than this, it would be difficult to assert that the Romanian government has ever had the 
interests of the media at heart. The Strategy for National Defence produced by the Supreme 
Council of National Defence1 in 2010 reads:” the phenomenon of press campaigns ordered to 
denigrate the state institutions by spreading false information about their activity” as well as 
“the pressures exercised by media trusts on political decisions with the purpose of obtaining 
economic or other kind of advantages in the relationship with the state institutions” (SCND, 
2010: 14). As we can see, the media was included by the Romanian decision makers among 
the threats to national security. 
                                                          
1 Supreme Council of National Defence = SCND 
 
 16 
 
As McChesney states (2001:1), neo-liberalism is deeply linked to the belief that markets 
have the ability “to use new technologies to solve social problems better than any alternative 
course” and for achieving this, “commercial media and communication markets have to be 
deregulated”. In a neoliberal free market economy news has to pay its way and its value is 
sacrificed to increase profits for the shareholders of some media organisations caught in a full 
process of consolidation and monopolisation. It works at least with the assumption that a real 
economy media market exists, working on the principles of market demand and profit making 
by delivering a needed product/service to the public, and this assumption can be challenged in 
the case of the Romanian media. 
In conclusion, the present thesis will explore the role of the Romanian press in reporting 
political corruption by: 1) employing the classical liberal view of the media as the fourth power 
in state and guard dog of democracy, a model characteristic of Western democracies towards 
which Romania aims and 2) by using a critical political economy of the media approach in 
order to explore the challenges that impede the speed and the success of this process. 
 
1.2 Liberal Democracy 
 
Liberal democracy was born from the association of representative democracy with the 
principles of liberal ideology as a necessary mix to provide a coherent and fair formula for 
governing a society. It is today a model that many countries strive to follow, and it currently 
underpins all Western democratic political systems. The UK, the USA, Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand, for example, are nations closely monitored and assessed by Freedom House, an 
independent watchdog organization founded on the idea that freedom is possible only in the 
places where democracy, the rule of law, tolerance and the freedom of expression, association 
and belief prevail (Freedom House a, 2015). As advanced liberal democracies, these countries 
are considered a model by former post-communist countries implementing reforms towards 
democracy and an open market. 
  Liberal democracy today extends in varying degrees to much, but by no means all, of 
the economically developed world.  It faces opposition from totalitarian and autocratic 
ideologies and religions, but these are not considered further here, as this thesis is based on the 
western liberal democratic consensus. 
Representative democracy refers to government by majority. The ability of the people to 
change their governments peacefully through the ballot box is its hallmark. The necessity for 
representative democracy to be supplemented by liberalism became obvious very early. The 
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concept of representative democracy as a form of government in which people can involve 
themselves in decisions about public life by periodically electing their representatives seemed 
incomplete and attracted strong criticism. Montesquieu and Madison saw the danger of 
despotism in a democracy lacking rights or any form of liberalism (Rhoden 2015:564), Alexis 
de Toqueville (1835) and John Stuart Mill drew attention to the danger of the “tyranny of the 
majority” as something “generally included among the evils against which society requires to 
be on its guard” (Mill, 1859: 8).  
 The core of liberal ideology arguably represents the standards that should be observed 
today by any properly functioning society: rule of law, judicial independence, property rights, 
freedom of expression, religious freedom and minority rights. It draws its bases from the work 
of John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and Montesquieu. 
The liberal democracy built on these concepts is centred on the idea of moral and 
rational individuals who strive naturally for progress and who accept to organise themselves as 
a society based on a social contract promoting cooperation in order to achieve well-being for 
as many citizens as possible. John Lock and Thomas Hobbes focussed on human nature and 
conceptualised the distinction between natural rights and legal rights.  
John Locke saw human nature as being rational and tolerant. He considered that 
individuals are equal and independent in a natural state (Locke, 1689a) hence they all are 
equally endowed with natural rights to life, liberty and property, which cannot be alienated by 
any social contract (Locke, 1689b). As a consequence, legitimate governments are only those 
who have the consent of the people. Thomas Hobbes by opposition saw human nature as being 
very conflictual (Hobbes, 1651): therefore, a social contract was needed to sanction the consent 
of the individuals to give up some of their freedoms and submit to the authority of the ruler in 
order to protect the remaining rights.  
The ideal of the well-being of all citizens led to liberal efforts to develop an open 
society, with reward based on merit and supported by the spirit of justice. To achieve the 
desiderata of justice and freedom, power needs to be legitimised by extensive popular support 
expressed through free elections, to have clearly defined limits and to be kept accountable.   
The accountability of power was conceptualised by Charles de Montesquieu as “a 
system of checks and balances”. In “The Spirit of the Laws” Montesquieu (1748) promoted the 
division of powers in government into legislative, executive and judicial, as a mechanism 
which would allow different segments of power to check each other, making sure that the state 
does not overstep its limits in relation to the individual and their rights.   
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Although the objectives and the values of liberal democracy make it a desirable model in many 
people’s eyes for human society, its application is always imperfect and provides scope for 
research and debate. Even though an imperfect model in imperfect countries, liberal democracy 
has led to by far much better consequences than the authoritarian – totalitarian model of 
Communism, which brought destruction to the economies, moral and social fabric of societies 
affected by it. 
 Corruption is a label that often describes the most challenging realities within non-
liberal democratic countries. As such, researching post-communist countries such as Romania 
and the manner in which they manage or fail to tackle corruption can offer valuable insight into 
their difficulties to adopt standards specific to democratic political culture.  
 
 1.3) Freedom of Expression and Democracy 
 
Freedom of expression is a fundamental component of liberal democracy. As rational 
individuals are organised in societies and seek to govern themselves, they need to make 
decisions. Politics is nothing more than the process by which groups of people make decisions.  
To fulfil this purpose, individuals need as much relevant information available as possible. 
During the 19th century, John Stuart Mill affirmed the importance of free speech in 
offering the fundament for debate. In his essay, “On Liberty”, he stated that: “there ought to 
exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussion, as a matter of ethical conviction, any 
doctrine, however immoral it may be considered” (1978:15).  Mill`s freedom of speech is broad 
and inclusive: it allows everyone to form opinions and express competing ideas in the public 
space no matter the subject. 
 Freedom of expression is today acknowledged and promoted by international 
agreements particularly due to its role in supporting and enforcing democracy. Article 19 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms freedom of information as a human right 
(UN 1948); formal legal obligations are imposed by Article 19 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. The treaty ratified by more than 150 countries indicates that: 
“Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.  Everyone shall have the 
right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, 
in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice” (UN, 1966).  
The essential role of freedom of expression in promoting democracy by allowing 
society to exercise control over the state authorities is indicated by Resolution 59(I) of the UN 
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General Assembly (1946) which affirms freedom of information as a fundamental right and 
the basis of all the freedoms promoted by the United Nations. The UN Human Rights 
Committee states that freedom of expression is so important for any democratic society that 
any restrictions imposed on it must be properly justified (1995). 
Despite its desirability and use in protecting and promoting democracy, freedom of 
expression is bound by certain limits. Mill thought that it should end at the point where it started 
to harm others (1859). He opened a broad debate about the limits of free speech and respect for 
the rights of others. International and national laws today recognize that freedom of expression 
can be restricted but only in conditions strictly defined by law and only in order to respect the 
rights or reputations of others and for public security, public order, health and moral reasons 
(UN, 1966). More than this, freedom of expression encounters limitations due to social, 
political and economic circumstances as well as due to specific features of different societies: 
a significant freedom in the USA vs. a limited one in the UK system which promotes restrictive 
libel laws and willingness to tolerate a certain degree of secrecy in government (Mervin, 
1998:12-13). These differences make it very difficult for this term to be used per se, and each 
country should be considered as a case in itself.  At the present time the degree of limitation 
that may be imposed on free speech for religious reasons is highly controversial even within 
and between liberal democracies. 
 
1.4) Media and Democracy 
 
 Freedom of expression as a fundamental value of liberal democracy is not enough on 
its own for citizens to make informed decisions. Habermas states that citizens need a space of 
social life, separate from the state, in which opinions can be formed and expressed. He defines 
public sphere as a space that allows free access to all citizens, who, beyond their professional 
status “behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion - that is, with the 
guarantee of the freedom of assembly and association and freedom to access and publish their 
opinions - about matters of general interest. In a large public body this kind of communication 
requires specific means of transmitting information and influencing those who receive it. Today 
newspapers and magazines, radio and television are the media of the public sphere” (Habermas, 
1964:198-200). In other words, a medium is necessary through which freedom of expression 
can be put into practice in society. Mass-media provides a large range of mediums which allow 
the process of mass communication in society: these include print media (books and 
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newspapers), film, broadcasting (radio, TV), recorded music, and new media (internet, mobile 
technology) (McQuail, 2010).  
 The importance of mass media in a democracy is broadly recognised by international 
organisations. The press in particular is considered by the European Court of Human Rights as 
a very effective tool for discovering and forming opinions about the ideas and attitudes of 
politicians while giving them the opportunity to comment on the problems raised by public 
opinion, enhancing in this way participation in free political debate, a fundamental mark of a 
democratic society (1992). The UN Human Rights Committee  states that free communication 
between the public and political representatives about public and political issues is essential 
and can take place only where the press and other media are free to comment, without any 
pressures or restraints (UN,1996).There is even the suggestion that where democracy is not 
totally enforced, media should be first liberalised and only after this objective is achieved 
introduction of democratic reforms should start (Kalenborn & Lessmann, 2013: 877) 
 A media without censorship or restraint is a noble desideratum but rarely met in reality. 
According to Freedom House’s Freedom of Press Index, just 14% of the world`s population 
live in countries that have a free press while in the rest of the world, governments and non-state 
actors control the information that reaches citizens and limit any press attempts to “promote 
accountability, good governance and economic development” (Freedom House a, 2015). 
Understanding the role of media in a democracy requires an understanding of the relationship 
between media and power and how this relationship works: what is the nature of the power 
exercised by media, who exercises control over media and in what way (Curran, 2002).  
 From the perspective of the role of media in a democracy, the control exercised over 
media is a large area requiring careful analysis. Given that power is a fundamental process in 
society which represents “the relational capacity that enables a social actor to influence 
asymmetrically the decisions of other social actor(s) in ways that favour the empowered actor`s 
will, interests and values” (Castells, 2013: 10), to understand the limits of media means to 
understand the game of social actors, be it individual or collective, organisations, institutions 
and networks which pursue their own interests.   
Understanding the role of the media in a democracy requires as well to properly understand 
that, as a group of mediums used by communicators to disseminate messages to the public, 
media develops strong relationships with government, sources of opinions and public (Ngoa, 
2010). Media can influence and is influenced back and this dynamic can often be tainted by 
rogue practices developed in the exchanges between the media and representatives of the 
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political realm, which can diminish if not reverse altogether the media`s role in the process of 
democratisation as we shall see it has happened in the case of Romania.   
 
1.5 Media Holding Power to Account 
 
The capacity of the mass media as the embodiment of freedom of expression to support 
and enhance democracy is best understood by considering its relations with power in society 
while considering the freedom of the media as a measure of democracy.  
Although defined as an institution belonging to society, based on a technological infrastructure 
that is part of the economic and power base of society (McQuail, 2010: 70), mass media has 
never been a formal branch of a democratic government. However, the temptation to curb its 
freedom has always been a reality even in the most democratic regimes. 
If we follow the premise that mass media as a system is characterised by a set of 
principles organised as goals to be pursued (Jakubowicz & Sukosd, 2008: 10), mass media in 
liberal democracies has been traditionally seen as another (the 4th) power of state. It has been 
considered the “watchdog” of society due to its capacity to influence public opinion by 
controlling information and communication, indirectly affecting the outcome of elections and 
so keeping power in check on issues concerning the public. 2 Ideally, the media supplements 
the other three powers of a democratic state of law, the Executive, the Legislature and the 
Judiciary, and provides a space in which citizens can express themselves freely. 
The liberal view of the role of the media has its own narrative which follows the 
tradition of normative theories (McQuail, 2010: 19): it draws from the ideological core specific 
to liberal democracies and focuses on prescribing how the media should operate in order to 
observe certain values. The central thesis of the history of liberal media is that the process of 
democratisation “was enormously strengthened by the development of modern mass-media” 
as an institution that struggled successfully to become independent from government (Curran, 
2002: 2-4). Once independent from government, mass media became a watchdog of 
democracy. It empowered people and strengthened democratic processes by making 
information more widely available, by promoting a culture of democracy, by subjecting 
authority to critical scrutiny and by representing public opinion to government. It encouraged 
                                                          
2 A concept initially attributed to the Irish Edmund Burke but strongly developed in the 
United States due to its massive impact on the American politics (Mervin, 1998:16) 
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constructive and “reciprocal communication between different groups in society” (Curran, 
2002: 2-4).  
This is a general picture of a desirable outcome of the media.  However, the media has to 
navigate through market and political pressures, raising this way questions about its capacity 
to play the watchdog role properly. 
 The liberal view states that media is a provider of legitimacy and visibility. This 
function is properly performed when media observes values such as protection of the right of 
citizens to be informed and heard (Gurevitch & Blumler, 1990: 270).  As the voice of the people 
and defender of society in relation to power, media as a source of legitimacy does not just 
subject authority to critical scrutiny; it monitors and reports the political environment. As a 
channel of communication between state and society, media provides political representatives 
with a voice. It has the power to allow or deny them the access to public as well as the power 
to choose which of them is brought to public notice and in what way.  
Apart from controlling visibility and providing legitimacy, media is an agenda-setter. 
McQuail (2010) explains that by framing the issues at stake in a society, media structures the 
aspects of reality. The problematic aspects in society are brought to the attention of the public, 
which finds out from the information provided by the media how much importance to ascribe 
to issues and what position to have about them. David Deacon emphasizes that the written text 
in the media gives a definitional shape to a particular issue by selecting, omitting, highlighting 
and elaborating, all acts which give the text a particular orientation, either sense-making or 
exposing the sense already made of an issue (Deacon et al., 2007: 161). 
The exposure of the corruption of the British political body is a positive example of 
how the media can keep politicians accountable when performing its role of correctly informing 
the public about matters in which the public is highly interested: political corruption in this 
case.  It is as well a demonstration of the power the media can harness to cause significant 
changes within the political class, when needed. The story of the MPs’ expenses shows that 
irrespective of what mechanisms politicians use in order to cover up wrong-doing, as long as 
media senses something wrong, it can find the way of discovering and disclosing the facts.  
The expenses scandal pictures parts of the British political class as an oligarchic group 
benefitting from a loose legislation and the resources put at its disposal without observing that 
public money was used for personal affairs. The explanation seems to reside in the fact that 
freedom of expression and a free media are “important human rights and powerful controls 
against government” wrong doing which give “independent journalists a strong incentive to 
investigate and uncover stories” of misdemeanour (Brunetti & Weder, 2003:1801). Overall, 
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the MPs’ expenses scandal is an example of media playing a significant role in shaping political 
reality (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) by deciding how people and situations are depicted and what 
issues are important and need to be brought to the attention of the public.  
In summary, according to the liberal narrative, media is essential to the development of 
democracy. It is a promoter of an open and transparent society which recognizes the 
individuality, the right to opinion and respect of each individual, who in turn needs to be 
properly informed, educated and included in the public debate. To achieve these objectives 
media provides and controls visibility, is a source of legitimacy by offering credibility and 
authority and a public and political agenda setter. However, media`s capacity to perform these 
roles can be diminished by government interference, market concentration and strong private 
interests. All these aspects are considered by the critical political economy of the media 
approach. As we shall see in the next section, things are even more complicated when it comes 
to former communist countries such as Romania.  
 
1.6 Criticising the Liberal Model of the Media: The Critical Political Economy of Media 
Approach 
 
1.6.1 Critical Political Economy of the Media 
 
The political economy of media approach is a critique born from the imperfections of 
the liberal model and focuses on the material reality of mass-media.  Some exponents of this 
theory go as far as claiming that media is an instrument of the elite in its quest to maintain 
influence and power (Chomsky & Herman, 1988; McChesney, 2008).  Others (Murdock and 
Golding, 2005) do not go as far but propose a hands on, holistic, historical and ethical approach 
of the relationship between media and power.   
Political economy of media is grounded on Marxist and neo-Marxist views which see 
media as part of the economic and political elites, promoting their interests. It questions the 
independence of the media in capitalist liberal democracies by replacing the idea that 
everything can eventually be related to economic forces with the belief that economic forces 
are the driving factor. The liberal view sees media as a facilitator of an open debate based on 
dissemination of information and support for contrary opinions. The Marxist view promotes 
the idea of class manipulation of media content. 
One of the strongest critiques brought to the political economy of the media approach 
is the simplicity of its model, based on the idea that those who have power and wealth will 
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seek, by all means and successfully manage to retain them, to the exclusion of any other 
outcome the human actions might have. Chomsky & Herman (1988) and McChesney (2008), 
for instance, focus on the realities of the corporate American media system. In their view, media 
does not play the same role to all and each member of society, a fairness desirable within the 
liberal democracy model. In their view, the democratic public sphere is damaged by 
transnational and multinational corporate media systems and the corrupt policy making process 
these systems bring into existence. Chomsky and Herman think that if the media performs “a 
societal purpose at all, it is to inculcate and defend the economic, social and political agenda 
of privileged groups that dominate the domestic society and state” (Chomsky & Herman, 
1988:298).  
McChesney follows the same view as Chomsky and Herman about a media system 
dominated by corporations which work to the good of the privileged ones. He defines political 
economy of media as a field preoccupied to explore how media are shaped by ownership, media 
structures, commercial support, technology, labour practices and government policies 
(McChesney, 2008:12) and finds a negative answer to the question of whether, on balance, the 
media system promotes democratic institutions and practices and a positive answer to the 
question of whether the media is a force for oligarchy to the detriment of social justice.  
The model of political economy of the media meets significant critique for being 
incomplete, almost simplistic. Garnham (1979), for instance, draws the attention to the fact that 
the model disregards the role of other essential social components such as culture.  He considers 
that while mass media can be a tool of ideological domination, culture is not always an industry, 
as everyone creates and spreads culture all the time. More than this, cultural consumption is 
not always as needed as natural resources are and it requires adaptation to the demands of the 
markets to generate revenue Garnham (1979).  
Garnham pleads for the necessity of cultural studies to take into account political 
economy and ask economic questions such as the ones concerning the role of the economic in 
the reproduction of material and symbolic life (Garnham & Fuchs, 2014: 116).  More than this, 
he emphasizes that to understand the dynamics of modern societies, researchers focusing on 
cultural studies should go deeper into understanding economics (Garnham & Fuchs, 2014: 
116). Garnham (1979) draws attention as well to the fact that Marxist writings do not 
acknowledge that audiences become a commodity sold to advertisers. However, this aspect 
might not be relevant to the present thesis which sees the media as a field used by the politicians 
and media owners to pursue their power and commercial interests. Audiences become 
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secondary in this game and the only way they can figure out the truth is to read everything out 
there in the space of the media (Tatulici, 2012:8).  
To summarise, the model provided by Chomsky & Herman and McChesney can be 
accused of simplicity. It adopts a strong view of a media as a tool meant to just serve the 
interests of oligarchy and it was built having in view the American society dominated by large 
corporations promoting the interests of a long lasting oligarchy. For this reason, it would be 
rather difficult to apply it to a former Communist country dealing with a rather young media 
market.  More than this, as Garnham (1979) shows, this model is incomplete. As such, for the 
purposes of this thesis, I will employ the more comprehensive model of critical political 
economy of media proposed by Murdock and Golding (2005).  
From the point of view of the elements taken into account when researching media, 
critical political economy of the media as defined by Murdock and Golding (2005) represented 
a step forward from the traditional political economy of media. It defined four new directions: 
a holistic approach which proposes the economy to be seen as intertwined with the political, 
social and cultural realms, not separated from them; a historical approach which required 
attention to be paid to long term changes; focus on “the balance between private enterprise and 
public intervention; and finally, looking beyond technical issues of efficiency to engage with 
the basic moral questions of justice, equity and the moral good” (Murdock & Golding, 2005: 
61). As such, the utility of the critical political economy of the media as proposed by Murdock 
and Golding resides in its endeavour to ask fundamental questions about justice, equity and 
public good while investigating the manner in which the communicative activity in society is 
shaped by the unequal distribution of resources resulting from the general economic dynamics.   
Murdock and Golding (2005) agree to a certain extent with the supporters of the 
instrumentalist view, Herman and Chomsky, who consider privately owned media as 
instruments of class domination but draw attention to the fact that media owners, advertisers 
and key political personnel cannot always do as they wish, as the media structures facilitate by 
offering opportunities, but equally constrain by imposing limits. As one of the central elements 
of critical political economy of media is the study of the manner in which meaning is built and 
re-built through the activities of producers and consumers, Murdock and Golding (2005) reject 
as well the structural approach which sees structures as solid, permanent and immovable and 
not as dynamic elements, constantly reproduced and changed.  
Murdock and Golding (2005) define political economy of media as being interested in 
the relations developed between the economic section of society and political life, understood 
as the ground on which different ways of financing determine visible consequences on the 
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products of the media as well as for the access of the public to them. The critical political 
economy of media model proposed by Murdock & Golding (2005) defines production as the 
starting point of analysis and follows three core tasks: to investigate the manufacture of cultural 
goods understood as the production of meaning and the exercise of power; to investigate the 
political economy of texts; and to explore the political economy of cultural consumption. The 
analysis of the meaning production as a result of the exercise of power addresses two 
fundamental issues: the pattern of ownership of the media and its consequences in terms of 
control over the media`s activities and the nature of the relationship between state regulation 
and media institutions.  
Private interests, marketization and democracy. The political economy of media 
approach brings forward the debate about media ownership and democracy in a world 
dominated by markets. The impact of media ownership on media activities has been addressed 
by theorists of democracy who could see a contradiction between private ownership and the 
media operating as a public entity.  In a world increasingly dominated by large corporations 
and press barons helped by a supporting legislation focused on the consumer and not on the 
citizen, media owners could use their rights to control the flow of information and open debate, 
so curbing democracy. The critical political economy of media approach pays attention to how 
public policy is captured by market thinking and looks for consequences of this process in 
terms of evidence that the increasing power of major communication companies and the private 
interests behind them take over public culture. Murdock and Golding (2005) state clearly that 
public bodies behaving like private enterprises are at the heart of the conversion to an open 
market economy, but this carries cultural costs: “less diversity, less creative risk-taking and 
more reliance on tested formats and established reputations” (2005: 72). 
Media and state as communicator. Political economy of the media focuses on the 
relationship between the state and the communication institutions seen not only through the 
lens of the state as a regulator but as well of the state as a powerful communicator, which needs 
to promote its own views. To understand the manner in which the state uses its communication 
power, political economy of the media analyses the state as the biggest advertiser and looks at 
the process by which it gives subsidies to media organisations ranging from a healthy 
distribution of essential information to very limited sharing of information.   
 Codes, Professional Ideologies and Human Resources. Critical political economy of 
media in Murdock and Golding`s view is not limited to seeing production of communication 
as being only a reflection of the interests of public agencies and private corporations. It takes 
into account the aspirations, codes and professional ideologies of those working for 
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communication bodies and tries to establish not only how far the workers in the field can 
exercise autonomy given the economic constraints but “to what extent the economic structure 
of media prevents some forms of expression” (2005: 74).  
Murdock and Golding (2005) consider that the structural dynamics should be assessed 
through their concrete impact on daily practice, recruitment and professional ideology in order 
to understand the consequences of the relations between media ownership interests, economic 
imperatives and cultural production. This requires the study of how human resources in media 
do their work, the way sources of power and authority build agendas and the connection 
between the market and work situations.  
The consequences of the broad patterns of power and ownership. Seeing media 
through the lens of media ownership interests, economic imperatives and cultural production 
is not enough. Critical Political economy of media expands its analysis to the “concrete 
consequences of broad patterns of power and ownership” on the production of media goods in 
an attempt “to explain how the economic dynamics of production structure public discourse by 
promoting certain cultural forms over others” (Murdock, Golding, 2005: 75). As a result, 
“detailed connections between the financing and organisation of cultural production and 
changes” in the fields of public discourse can be traced (ibid.). 
 
1.6.2 Critical Political Economy of the Media and the Post-Communist World 
 
Sparks (2000) not only brings a criticism to the liberal view of the media by pointing 
to the fact that the separate and distinct spheres of action for political and economic agents 
become blurred in the context of the Central and Eastern European post-communist world, but 
he as well offers a direction of how the model of critical political economy of the media should 
be applied to the societies in this region.  
His research goes back in time, during the communist era, and follows the evolutions 
of the Central and Eastern European media systems past the fall of Communism until today. 
Sparks (2000) states that, as a consequence of the transition process, the political realm today 
does not intervene in the economic area of the media market just to regulate and correct 
distortions such as monopolies, as the classical model of media theory assumes. In the post-
communist world, the two areas, economic and political, almost lose their identities and 
become intertwined as a permanent and mutually supportive relationship between politicians 
and businessmen: the politicians help their friends in the media to gather competitive positions 
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in the market economy and at the same time as they retain their influence over the media, 
political influence is turned into commercial advantage (Sparks, 2000:37).  
Sparks identifies the origin of this exchange in the nature of transition: the passage from 
the communist economy to the capitalist one could be done only by taking political decisions 
and by transforming state property into private property. As this transformation could be done 
only by the state as the sole owner of the property, the old communist elite turned into the new 
private capitalist class owning a political capital and eager to get control over the media, with 
the consequence that “the stabilisation of capitalism democracy meant a reassertion of authority 
over journalists and media workers” (Sparks, 2000:35). This marked the beginning of a range 
of mutually beneficial and supportive, close relationships between politicians, businessmen and 
the media in which the distinction between what is “economic” and what is “political” does not 
exists anymore.  
This mixture prompts Sparks to believe that the media follows the same logic as the 
political elites placing themselves on the same side of power. As a consequence, the newly 
instated democracy in Central and Eastern Europe is a “democracy negotiated by the elite 
groups, organised for the benefit of the elite groups, and demarcated for the interests of the 
elite groups” (Sparks, 2000: 39). In this process, the most important component, the public, is 
disregarded. As such, Sparks considers that, when it comes to Central and Eastern Europe, the 
debate about media and democracy should shift its attention from the relationship between state 
and market, bureaucrat and entrepreneur, to the relationship between media and their audiences 
and the mishaps within media organisations between those who give orders and those who have 
to follow them. As the public is the most disregarded element in this dynamic of relationships, 
Sparks (2000) thinks that the only way the media can be democratised is to break the control 
of these elites over the main means of public speech. Unfortunately, he does not provide any 
suggestion about how this might happen.  
In conclusion, for the purposes of this thesis and within the boundaries offered by the 
critical political economy of the media model provided by Murdock and Golding (2005), I will 
follow the two directions defined by Sparks (2000) and focus on three fundamental aspects: 
how is news about political corruption reported by the Romanian press to its public, what 
characterises the relationship between the media ownership and political realm in Romania and 
how does this relationship influence the Romanian journalist in terms of  professional 
autonomy, daily practice, recruitment and professional ideology.   
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1.7) Keeping Media Accountable 
 
Media accountability is a particularly sensitive issue for a post-communist country 
struggling to develop a democratic media such as Romania. It is enough to reflect on the 
damage caused by the media in more established democracies due to improper accountability 
systems, as in the case of the UK phone hacking scandal, in order to understand how important 
as well as how difficult it might be to develop such systems within cultures already plagued by 
corruption up to the highest levels.  
As an institution which is part of the economic and power base of society, media`s 
freedom is curbed by a mix of pressures. Stuart Allan states that one should never lose “sight 
of how the news media are embedded in specific relations of power and control while, at the 
same time recognising the ways in which they are working to reflect, transform and, if only 
infrequently, challenge the same relations over time” (Allan, 2004:3).  It is an invitation to a 
balanced view in which products of media are seen and understood in the context of the 
pressures producing it. 
As a system characterised by a certain degree of centralisation, political influences, 
profile differentiation, multiple sources of finance finance and public scrutiny the media is 
subjected to the pressures imposed by broader phenomena such as globalisation (Saeed, 2009) 
and the expansion of the internet (Hopia, 2013). These factors increase the complexity the 
media encounters at a local level in the form of economic and political pressures which are 
ultimately mirrored in content, the product of self-censorship (Brunetti, 2003).  Irrespective of 
the form pressures take, either as competing interests in the private sector that distort reportage 
or as economic favouritism and reprisals by government due to unwanted press coverage 
(Brunetti, 2003: 1806), understanding them is essential as they bring up questions about the 
freedom journalists have to perform their traditional role in relation to the state, private sector 
and social actors.    
The phone hacking scandal in the UK is the most challenging situation a significant 
part of the British media has recently faced and mirrors the range of challenges Western media 
face today. It puts into perspective, for example, the negative aspects brought by the expansion 
of the internet. The Leveson Report is representative as it questions the accountability of the 
media in an era in which new technologies and adapted funding have consequences on both 
the quality of media product as well as on the systems of management and compliance.  
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The report states that competition from the internet and the absorption of advertising 
funds from the press led to a lowering of media standards to the disregard of the rights and 
liberties of individuals. (Leveson, 2012).  Hopia points out that “internet takes over when the 
media does not do its job” (Hopia, 2013: 44) and that sources of financing, sales and resources 
have been shrinking directly proportional with the expansion of the internet, causing significant 
changes in media systems. Human resources are dismissed and the focus of the public shifts 
from what is important for it to what is selling. The speed of producing materials increased 
dramatically leading to the decrease in the quality of work done by journalists and to 
plagiarism. As a consequence, rogue practices developed. Trade in private and confidential 
information without consent and with little regard to the public interest had become rife, a sign 
of a major failure of the current policy and regulatory framework of data protection (Leveson, 
2012). 
 On the brighter side, the expansion of the internet allows more perspectives to be 
brought to the table.  However, there is no guarantee of quality and good intent (Hopia, 2013: 
43). The lack of such a guarantee could be actually the least harmful effect if we take into 
account the blogs, websites or social media accounts which are used as a manipulation medium, 
failing to disclose where the finance comes from and what is their real purpose.  
The Leveson report raised a fundamental question: if mass media is the watchdog of society 
and the guardian of democracy, then who guards the guardian when the systems of management 
and compliance fail? (The Leveson Inquiry, 2011).  
As Sparks (2000) who considers that the media and political elite work in the same 
logic, Dominic Wring`s analysis of the hacking scandal shows that abuse within the media does 
not just happen: it is a process which develops over time by having the support of the “right” 
people, often members of the political elite, and by rejecting any accountability mechanism. 
Dominic Wring follows the evolution of News Corporation`s involvement in British politics, 
showing that the Murdock family has been in fact all along part of the UK power elite which 
offered him its generous support for business purposes in exchange for positive media 
coverage, promoting regressive ideological agendas wrapped in a populist rhetoric and 
showing a loud repulsion towards any idea of accountability system, be it a National Union of 
Journalists or other independent worker representation within News Corporation (Wring, 2012: 
635-636). 
In this context, the question raised by the Leveson report could be taken further: how 
can the media be guarded provided that political elites and the media realm pursue mutually 
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enhancing objectives without paying too much attention to the public? One solution would be 
for the public to stop consuming the products coming from the affected sections of the media.  
The classic view, as defined by McQuail (2010: 175), states that media accountability 
comprises a series of voluntary and involuntary processes which allow media to answer directly 
or indirectly to society and those immediately affected by the media. It is provided by 
mechanisms of social control and regulation which observe fundamental values such as free 
and transparent media based on guaranteed freedom of speech without causing any harm to 
individuals and society.  
The imminent tension between freedom of speech and the need to keep media 
accountable transpires from imperfect mechanisms in place (McQuail, 2010), rules and 
regulations can be good when emerging from open debate but can do very much harm when 
protecting vested interests; market mechanisms are good when encouraging competition and 
quality and bad when leading to monopoly and low quality. The public responsibility frame 
assumes media organisations as social institutions would voluntarily go beyond their 
immediate goals of making profits and commit to getting public opinion feedback while 
keeping the public interest in sight. The professional responsibility frame relies on media 
setting its own standards of good performance and on the self-respect and ethical development 
of professionals in media. Codes of conduct are regulating the activities of the media, but their 
limits when dealing with powerful media are evident.  
The Leveson Report brought into question the culture, the practices and the ethics of 
the press as part of a media which comprises today segments motivated predominantly by profit 
and run by media moguls with a political agenda, all based on declining standards of public 
service, significant gaps in the consensus about standards, and fragmentation of media due to 
individualism promoted by a decline of traditional values. Murdock and Golding (1973: 207, 
219, 221) see these consequences as the result of globalisation, explained as “integration” 
(more media owned by the same owners), “diversification” (“expansion of the media 
corporations across other industries through mergers and acquisitions”) and “internalisation” 
(“expansion of the media corporations in other countries through export and investment”) 
(ibid.).  
The failure of the British market to regulate media and the lack of professional 
responsibility have significant consequences. Media has been increasingly becoming a 
commercial entity oriented towards profit and consolidation. Many of the media`s core values 
are sacrificed to this purpose as an increased tendency towards trivialisation and a strong 
weakening of the Public Service Broadcasting have been tolerated (Saeed, 2009: 468). For 
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example, the focus on sensationalism and celebrity reached grotesque levels in which the 
human is treated as an object of public property: the press has taken the view that (…) “anyone 
in whom the public might take an interest are fair game, public property with little, if any, 
entitlement to any sort of private life or respect for dignity, whether or not there is a true public 
interest in knowing how they spend their lives” (Leveson, 2012:10). Despite the deviations 
from ethical standards, significant parts of the media did not take any reparatory action and 
displayed a cultural tendency to strongly resist or dismiss complaints and led extremely 
personal attacks on those who challenged them. 
The phone hacking scandal put under spotlight the relationship of the press with 
politicians, police and public. The Leveson report states that the phone hacking scandal is an 
example in which media, the press in particular, ceased to be a mechanism for holding 
politicians to account. The very close relationship between press and politicians pushed 
politicians into vulnerable positions by impeding their capacity to make objective and correct 
decisions regarding public policies about media and press standards in particular (Leveson, 
2012: 26). Therefore, laws and regulations have their own limitations caused by the behind the 
scenes interventions by people with connections, and public responsibility can be an illusion 
when profit is the main focus.  
 
 
2) The Post-Communist World: Romania 
 
We have seen in the previous sections what the values and the standards liberal media 
in Western democracies strive for and the main problems they face. The aim of this section is 
to introduce Romania as a case study, an example of a post-communist country struggling on 
its way towards democracy with political corruption, a phenomenon facilitated by Romania`s 
communist legacy.  
  
 2.1) Romania and Theories of Post-Communism 
 
The analysis of the post-communist countries in the Central and Eastern Europe 
encounters difficulties due to theoretical limitations. The theories of transition applied to 
countries in Southern Europe and Latin America that made their shift from authoritarian 
regimes to democracy are not enough to contain the challenges met by the new-comers in the 
world of democracy (Smith &Pickles, 1998; Wiards, 2002; Kollmorgen, 2013).  
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Smith and Pickles (1998) explain that the complexity of the transition from 
Communism lies in the reworking of old social relations in order to build a form of capitalism 
on and with the ruins of the communist system. They describe the mainstream transition theory 
as largely written in terms of the discourses and practices of liberalisation defined as techniques 
of transformation which work with specific instruments meant to de-monopolise the power of 
the state and separate the state from the economy and civil society.  
Smith & Pickles draw the attention to the fact that this is a simplistic way of seeing the 
fundamental changes the post-communist world passes through: first, the “conventional neo-
liberal view of transition wielded by multilateral agencies and advisers to governments that 
transition is a relatively unproblematic implementation of a set of policies involving economic 
liberalisation and marketization alongside democratisation, enabling the creation of a market 
economy and a liberal policy, relies on an under-theorised understanding of change in post-
communism” (1998: 1-2). This approach looks simplistic indeed when viewing the total 
destruction of the social, political and economic fabric caused by Communism in Romania.  
Smith and Pickles (1998) take into account the complexity of the processes involved in 
creating the grounds for liberal democratic and open market societies on the ruins of 
Communism and call for alternative sets of conceptual frameworks on transition to comprise 
and explain the variety of strategies, techniques and effects representative for the post-
communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe.  
 
2.1.1 Internal Pressures 
 
 Wiards (2002) supports Smith and Pickles (1998) view and presents some of the 
limitations impeding the theories of transition as a viable theoretical model for the post-
communist world: the lack of attention paid to the impact of political culture during the 
transformation process, the failure to notice the important and dynamic changes that occurred 
under the previous regimes in the later years, the failure to notice that economically the post-
communist countries were nowhere near to the ones in Southern Europe when the process of 
transition began, the failure to notice the lack of cultural and socio-economic base in the post-
communist countries for the political and democratic transition, the lack of a clear conceptual 
distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian which resulted in very optimistic expectations 
for the changes in East/Central Europe.  
 If the transition theories cannot explain properly the changes in the post-communist 
world, what is the solution?  Kollmorgen (2013) advances the idea that a new generation of 
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transformation theories has been emerging since 1990s and proposes Post-communism and 
Europeanisation as coherent theoretical approaches.  
The post-communism approach in Kollmorgen`s view has three components, which 
emphasize the internal pressures on the post-communist countries. The first component derives 
from the theory of totalitarianism and emphasizes the socio-cultural and particularly the 
cultural legacies of communism. The second component evolved from the Eastern European 
area studies before 1989 and is based on two fundamental claims: 1) the communist world was 
dominated by significant regional and national differences which led to different paths of 
transformation and variants of post-communism and 2) the region`s socialist past has not been 
erased after 1989 but it played a fundamental role in the new processes which led to a particular 
type of transformation. The third component of post-communism is interested in the global 
dimension of post-communism.  
 If we apply this explicative model to Romania, we can easily see why this country is 
today one of the post-communist Eastern European countries still struggling to become a full 
democracy. The latest report about nations in transit released by Freedom House indicates that 
Romania is a semi-consolidated democracy, significantly behind other post-communist 
countries considered fully-consolidated democracies: the Baltic countries, Czech Republic, 
Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia (Freedom House b, 2015). While aiming to become a fully 
functioning democracy and comply with the external requirements as an EU member state, 
twenty-five years after the fall of Communism, Romania still has a long way to go. 
A few particularities make Romania a unique case. The violent way the Communist 
regime fell (or appeared to fall) in Romania is a distinctive mark that set Romania apart and 
defined its future evolution on different coordinates.  All the acts and the facts that led to the 
fall of Communism in other countries, the “Round Table Agreement” in Poland, the 
“democracy package” adopted by the Hungarian Parliament and the multiparty political system 
and radical revision of the Constitution approved by the Hungarian Centrum Committee 
plenum; the Fall of the Berlin Wall in Germany and the non-violent student and popular 
demonstrations called the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia, contrast to the demonstrations 
and street fights in December 1989 in Romania that ended with the trial and execution of the 
Ceauşescu and his replacement by another product of the communist system.  
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Communist Romania 
 
The bloody end of the Communist regime in Romania is seen as being the result of a 
few particularities that differentiate the Communist regime in Romania.  The violence 
accompanying the change of regime in Romania in 1989 is seen first of all as a consequence 
of the fact that given the toughness and the repression perpetuated for four decades by the 
Romanian Communist regime, the model of negotiated transition “could not be adopted by 
either the opposition forces or the Communist Party in December 1989” (Ciobanu, 2007:1433). 
As Andrei Plesu points in a plastic way, “the events on December 1989 found Romania 
unprepared. Romanians were more adapted than they thought to life under a dictatorship; they 
did not have illusions about an eventual change and they had never seriously reflected on a 
normal political alternative” (Andrei Plesu, 1996). 
Behind Andrei Plesu`s words lie the reality of a society emerging after 45 years in the 
hands of a despotic regime organised by a profiteer class (nomenclature) around a supreme 
leader, which stripped the country of any rule of law and pluralism, destroyed any democratic 
political parties, disintegrated any free trade unions or political movements that might have 
challenged them (Presidential Commission, 2006). A murderous regime by essence, 
Communism in Romania promoted a policy of social extremism using assassinations, 
deportation, incarceration and forced labour in order to destroy the traditional social classes. It 
left behind an estimated 2 million victims, most of them belonging to the bourgeoisie, 
landlords, intellectual and students as well as to the peasants that stood up against 
collectivisation (Presidential Commission, 2006: 637). Ethnic, religious, cultural and sexual 
minorities vanished, persecuted, sold, deported and exterminated as was the case of the Jewish 
and German minorities (Presidential Commission, 2006: 635,637). Communist Romania 
created camps for its orphans and children with handicaps and introduced aberrant rules 
concerning “rational feeding” leading to the starvation and misery of the entire population, as 
moral and material misery and fear became instruments to support Communist power. At its 
last moments in December 1989, the supreme leader, approved and supported by his party, 
ordered the massacre of the protesting crowds (Presidential Commission, 2006: 637).  
 
The Media in Communist Romania 
 
The mass-media occupied a small place in Communist Romania. They remained very 
underdeveloped, with reduced television transmission and unappealing newspapers dominated 
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by propaganda and the Ceauşescu cult of personality (Nelson, 1990). The very same Romanian 
Radio and Television which would play an essential role during the 1989 December Revolution 
were part of a mass-media owned solely by the Communist Party, at the end of a process which 
started with nationalising the means of mass-communication. The freeway towards 
manipulation was opened by centralised resource distribution under the control of a small group 
of people which fixed the distribution criteria according to its own interest as well as by the 
fact that the party had allowed the exercise of censorship, the control of media messages before 
their distribution, so speeding the decline of any freedom of information (Coman, 2010).   
Lack of alternative, lack of choice, limited size and poor quality were the main 
consequences, and they had a dramatic effect for any normal process of media development. 
They emerged from sinister measures enforced by the communist total ownership and control 
over the mass-media: paper quotas established by the annual plan, newspaper and magazine 
production limited to the number decided by the party, the denial of the possibility of any 
alternative publication, strictly limited number of radio and television frequencies, strictly 
limited number of broadcast programme hours, total control over transportation, 
telecommunication and means of production.  All these measures assured the enhancing of 
Communist propaganda as the means of production assured rapid broadcasting of the 
Communist mass media products and the elimination of any products considered 
“unacceptable” (Coman, 2010).  
 
Post-Communist Romania 
 
Post-communist Romania started under an extreme polarisation of politics inherited 
from Ceauşescu`s regime and perpetuated long after 1989 into late 1990 within a troubled 
political party. An interesting description of the Romanian political party system, which 
indicates where Romania was placing itself a few years after the Revolution, is offered by 
Kitschelt (2001). He states that significant cross-regional variations had become visible by the 
mid-90s as the successors of the communist parties in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland 
had become modern social-democratic parties and had started to develop social and economic 
reforms, while the Romanian and Bulgarian counterparts were still engaged in authoritarian 
and populist practices. Kitschelt explains the differences between these two categories as being 
the result of the interactions between historical legacies, institutions and party systems. He 
thinks that the patrimonial Communism, specific to Romania, based on repression and a corrupt 
bureaucratic apparatus, had consequences for the transition from Communism, as the post-
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communist transition was led by just a section of the elite facing a weak democratic opposition 
(Kitschelt, 2001).  
The extreme polarisation of politics supported by a troubled political party system 
probably would not have had a long life without a low intensity citizenship, where political 
authority is not exercised according to legal norms, but engages in practices typical for 
clientelism, patronage and corruption (Ciobanu, 2007). This created a very permissive 
environment which allowed the rapid conversion of the old communist elite into the business 
elite.  The analysts noticed the emergence of the new class of rich, and explanations were 
sought to identify the causes and origins. The Romanian analyst Alina Mungiu-Pippidi noticed 
that there was a considerable overlap between the new rich and the political class, or at least a 
very strong bond based upon inter-locking common interests, so that economic advantages 
were gained through political patronage (Mungiu-Pippidi, 1997). 
 
 
2.1.2 External Pressures – Fighting Political Corruption 
 
 Europeanisation as a new theoretical approach which emphasizes the external pressures 
on the former communist countries follows two conceptual directions: the European dimension 
of cultural and ideological orientations and the embedment of the transformation process 
(Kollmorgen, 2013: 96) and the research on European integration, which scrutinises how the 
promise of EU membership, the conditions the candidate countries had to fulfil and the newly-
achieved membership status have shaped the post-communist change 
Twenty-five years after the fall of Communism, Romania still has to deal with its 
communist legacy, and political corruption is often seen as a strong component of this. In fact, 
Romania`s progress towards democracy has always been largely measured by its progress in 
diminishing political corruption. That Romania`s progress is the result of a clash between the 
internal pressures imposed by an unprocessed communist heritage in the form of an unreformed 
political class and judicial system and the external pressures, imposed by the process of joining 
the NATO and the EU, is indicated by the reports issued by international bodies. They tirelessly 
indicate corruption as the main cause of slow progress and a source for perpetuating corrupt 
ways of doing politics.  
Transparency International, for example, (a Berlin-based international NGO that 
monitors political corruption) has been monitoring the evolution of corruption in Romania, and 
it shows very slow improvement: in 2004, before its accession to the EU, Romania ranked 87 
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out of 178. In 2010, three years after the EU accession Romania ranked better, 69, the same in 
2013 and 2014. Despite this slow progress, Romania remains one of the most corrupt EU 
countries, together with Italy, Greece and Bulgaria (Transparency International, 2002 - 2014).  
A more detailed view has been provided by the EU. It is not surprising that after 
Romania joined the EU in January 2007, its efforts to combat high level corruption continued 
to be closely monitored by the European Commission.  Like any EU member state, Romania 
has to be a functioning democracy, and the independence of the Judicial System from the 
Executive is a strong indicator of this. The reports released by the European Commission via 
the Mechanism of Cooperation and Verification continuously brought to light the weakness of 
the Romanian judicial system when facing political pressures (European Commission, 2007, 
2010), indirectly pointing towards the absence of awareness of corruption among the 
representatives of the legal system, hence towards the mentalities and cultural traits of those in 
charge of judging corruption cases. 
The story of Romania’s evolution has been the weakness of the judicial power, the lack 
of political support for its reform and the continued assault of the political realm on the judicial 
system to protect corrupt politicians. The European Commission report in 2008 clearly puts the 
political arena under the spotlight: decisions on corruption are highly politicised, each step in 
the right direction is blocked by the internal divisive political debate which brings to a halt any 
consensus in the Parliament (European Commission, 2008, 2013). Despite significant progress 
in prosecuting political corruption cases in the last two years and issuing final convictions 
(European Commission, 2013, 2014) and acknowledging that the “application of the justice 
system to powerful political figures has been an important demonstration of the reach of 
Romanian justice” (European Commission, 2014) the European Commission notes that 
corruption is still not treated as a serious crime. The high percentage of suspended sentences 
illustrates the reluctance of the judges to carry through the consequences of a guilty verdict, 
preventing at the same time the confiscation of assets and asset recovery (European 
Commission, 2014).  
This makes Romania a good case study to bring to light the manner in which a corrupt political 
oligarchy acts as a powerful deterrent in the fight against corruption. It recommends Romania 
as well as a good case to broaden the research of corruption by including the study of 
mentalities and attitudes favourable to corruption and corrupt elements amongst those most 
interested to see this problem solved: the ordinary citizens. 
 
 
 39 
 
3) The Importance of the Media in the Post-Communist World 
 
The previous sections provided a description of the main concepts specific to liberal 
democracy and an overview of the main difficulties a post-communist country, Romania, has 
encountered in its way towards democracy. In the view of the present thesis, the question arises: 
what is the role of the media in the context of post-communist evolution? The history of the 
post-communist Romanian media offers a powerful image of the tribulations encountered 
during the process of becoming an effective instrument capabpe to support democracy. 
 
3.1 Post-Communist Romanian Media: 1990 – 2004 
 
The Romanian press which emerged after the Revolution in December 1989 was the 
result of turbulent circumstances characteristic of the change of political regime. The 
interviews done for this thesis indicate the challenges faced by the Romanian press, offering at 
the same time a clear image of the main political, economic and social difficulties faced by 
Romanian society in its endeavour to become fully democratic and developed.  
One of the main characteristics of this period, as described by Avădani (2012), Păcuraru 
(2011) and Țăranu (2011), is the effervescence which marked the emergence of the post-
communist press: newspapers appeared and disappeared rapidly, without any experience of a 
democratic press, no clear definitions, without professional journalists. The post-communist 
evolution of the Romanian press was described by Păcuraru (2011), Țăranu (2011) and 
Savaliuc (2012) as passing through different phases, each of them with their own 
characteristics: 1990 to 1992, 1992 to 1995 and 1995 till 2004 and 2004 till the present.  
The period 1990 to 1992 waschaotic and prolific. The press and generally the published 
word were in high demand, so different publications appeared, many of them without any clear 
stake in what was published, ranging from very serious magazines to similar publications to 
what we call today “tabloids”.  
Most of the Communist newspapers disappeared due to bad management, but a few of 
them rebranded themselves as “free” and served purposes in political battles, “Romania Liberă” 
(“Free Romania”) and “Scânteia” (“The Flame”) for example. “Scânteia” (“The Flame”) was 
the former official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and 
was re-branded as “Adevărul” (“The Truth”) in Bucharest on December 25, 1989. “Romania 
Liberă” (“Free Romania”) is the former official newspaper of the Front of Democracy and 
Socialist Unity in Communist Romania and was launched as a post-communist newspaper in 
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December 23, 1989. The Communist daily “The Information of Bucharest” was considered a 
daily for the citizens of Bucharest only. It was re-branded as “Liberatea” (“Liberty”) on 
December 22, 1989 and used as the first free newspaper by National front of Salvation, the 
organisation that took power in Romania during the Revolution. 
Researcher Manuela Preoteasa shows that the end of Communism prompted the 
appearance of more than 1,200 new titles. Some of them disappeared in 1995 but others were 
set up (Preoteasa, 2004: 404). Overall, post-communist Romania has had an impressive 
plurality of sources. In 2004, the year when the present research started, the Romanian press 
counted 1,500 titles.  
The period 1992 to 2000 is the period when the Romanian press started rebuilding itself. 
Successful national publications appeared, making a clear distinction between the serious press 
and tabloid press:  “Evenimentul Zilei” (“The Event of the Day”) appeared in Bucharest on 
June 22, 1992, “Cronica Română” (the “Romanian Chronicle”) appeared in January 25, 1993, 
the weekly “Dilema” (“Dilemma”) appeared in January 1993, “Jurnalul Naţional” newspaper 
(“The National Journal”) was set up in July 1993, the daily “Ziua” (“The Day”) appeared in 
June 1994, the daily “Curentul” (“The Current”) appeared in October 1997,”Pro Sport” was set 
up in July 1997, “Ziarul Financiar” (“The Financial Newspaper”) was launched in November 
1998, “Gardianul” (“The Guardian”) was launched in 2002, “Averea” (“The Fortune”) was set 
up in 2005 and “Gandul” (“The Thought”) was launched in May 2005. 
It is as well the period of specialisation for newspapers, investigative journalism 
expanded and investigative journalists were formed. Many types of writing and analysis 
developed: political, aesthetic, cultural, ideological, and economic. Investigative journalism 
developed as the result of public demand, and the general political and economic context 
offered an abundance of strong topics. The transition period was full of trickery, theft and 
abuses closely monitored by the press, resulting in constantly changing legislation and a 
permanent refining of methods of stealing public money.  
The written press reached a spectacular circulation in the first post-communist decade, but a 
decreasing trend started developing after 1995. For example, the newspapers “Romania Liberă” 
and “Adevărul” had a circulation of 1.5 million issues in 1990, but it started decreasing in 1992 
to 180,000 issues (“Adevărul”) and 110,000 (“Romania Liberă”) (Buzaş, 2009). Between July 
and September 2015, “Romania Liberă” managed to sell just 10,562 issues and “Adevărul” 
sold only 8,906 (BRAT, 2016). 
Overall, 10 years after the fall of Communism the Romanian media were far from being 
a strongly organised sector, capable of pointing out irregularities in politics and society. The 
 41 
 
FreeEx reports (AMP, 2010 – 2011) describe them as being overwhelmed by political 
pressures, harassment and censorship and media feudalisation or “berlusconization”.   
The interviews for this research describe the period 2000 to 2004 as one of the most 
difficult periods for the Romanian press, as the party in power, the Social Democrat Party 
(PSD), tried to dispose of the media. Significant political involvement is indicated by strong 
and direct financial pressures and falsified “official” measurements. The “mogulisation” of the 
press started mainly due to the public authorities (the National Audio-Visual Authority) issuing 
licenses only to those representing interests close to the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the 
party in power, and allowing many deviations from deontological behaviour in favour of those 
in power. This background allowed the big media trusts to be formed by taking over most of 
the national and local licenses.  
The analysis of secondary documents, particularly the reports issued by Agenţia de 
Monitorizare a Presei, offers too an image of how the “mogulisation” of the Romanian media 
took place. The process is closely linked to Năstase`s Social-Democrat prime-ministerial 
mandate (2000 – 2004) and is considered to be the consequence of the fact that the media did 
not benefit from any fiscal advantage, letting it depend on direct sales only.  
The process started at local level, in counties like Bacău, Constanţa, Buzău, Vrancea, 
wherever power had become concentrated at the level of political leaders and businessmen, 
usually the same persons. The example of Dumitru Sechelariu, both Mayor of Bacău and PSD 
member, became famous. He bought together with businessmen close to him the main 
economic objects in the area. The way he acquired political and administrative power was his 
shareholding in the main TV channel, a local newspaper and the local network for press 
distribution (Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei, 2002).  
Given the situation, editorial censorship and political harassment of journalists 
occurred. Well known is the case of Rodica Culcer, Cosmin Prelipceanu and Nadina Forga3, 
three journalists who resigned from their jobs due to censorship and political pressure coming 
from their editors trying to politically manipulate the news bulletins (Agenţia de Monitorizare 
a Presei, 2003). 
                                                          
3Rodica Culcer, Cosmin Prelipceanu and Nadina Forga, all working with the News Department of Europa FM 
Radio station, resigned on 5th of April 2003 saying that the management demanded them not present thenews 
that might be inconvenient for the political power. Europa FM belongs to the French “Lagardere” corporation 
whose main activity is building airplanes. The representatives of this corporation in Romania affirmed: “Europa 
FM is a radio which supports the political power because we have to sell airplanes”.  Recently, the Romanian 
government signed a pre-contract to acquire Airbus planes.   
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Public advertising budget was one of the strongest instruments used by the political 
parties in power to control the media. As a consequence, the Romanian press was affected, as 
money for advertising made it vulnerable to pressure from the political arena. On the reverse 
side of the situation, the media started to use editorial control to practice blackmail in order to 
get advertising (Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei, 2002).  
Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei presents the electoral year 2004, when local and general 
elections were due, as a particular example of leveraging public money to control the media. 
The audio-visual media were the main target of the aggressive political campaign as they were 
the media with the highest impact on the population (Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei, 2004). 
The methods used in order to achieve this included cancelling debts as in the case of Pro TV 
(Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei, 2004) which was often accompanied by government 
advertising granted in a non-transparent and preferential manner by public institutions and 
state-owned companies (AMP, 2004).  
One of the worst consequences of this was the fact that the political control over the 
national Radio and TV station took the form of political distortion of the information broadcast 
(AMP, 2002). The results of a monitoring undertaken by the Monitoring Media Agency 
between September and October 2002 indicates that news coverage of the representatives of 
the ruling party coalition (Social Democrat Party - PSD) had a 78% share compared to the 22% 
share of the Opposition on all 5 monitored stations (Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei, 2003).  
The fact that the party in power was using finance in order to control the media is shown 
by a simple calculation made by the Romanian journalists who gave the Romanian public an 
idea about the scale of corruption taking place at the heart of the media. According to journalist 
Cristina Hurdubaia, governmental advertising was estimated to account for 8% of the total 
expenditure for advertising in the media in 2003: “In 2000, according to the data provided by 
the Government of Romania, the ministries and their subordinate institutions allotted Euro 
8.9m for governmental advertising.  As a ruling party PSD (the Social Democrat Party) raised 
the amounts for advertising by 35% in the first three years, amounting to an average of 
Euro13.5m.  In the electoral year 2004 the amount almost doubled compared to 2000: 
Euro17m” (Hurdubaia, 2005). 
It is not a surprise then that the fundamental characteristic of Romania`s post-
communist press as stated by Cristoiu (2012) is the fact that it was born from a privatisation 
process tainted by corruption allowed by politicians and involving journalists.  
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3.2 The Romanian Press: 2005 to Today 
 
The period between 2005 until today has been marked by a weak economic and 
professional basis and lack of ethics. In his research of the post-communist Romanian 
landscape, Mihai Coman states that the transition in the Romanian media should not be 
analysed from a normative approach but rather understood as a battle for power whose ultimate 
goals are the closure of the professional field and the legitimation of a new media bourgeoisie 
(Coman, 2004: 45). This battle for power takes place in the context of a journalism based on 
improvisation not procedures, within a press with an uncertain identity, flipping between strong 
political attachments and aggressive demands for autonomy, and dominated by a human 
resource hired via corrupt means and unfair recruitment methods (Coman, 2004: 46, 50). 
The Romanian press in the last decade (2005 – 2015) does not present itself very 
differently from the picture of the transition described by Coman, although the change of 
regime after the election at the end of 2004 brought a few modifications to the media 
legislation. For example, the new government took measures to improve things by suspending 
public advertising, by summoning the media institutions to pay their debts and by deciding 
together with the representatives of media institutions and media NGOs a set of new regulations 
in order to make the distribution or media advertising more transparent. Despite these reforms, 
the interviews describe the same daunting image of the media in the last decade as Coman`s 
image of the Romanian press before 2004.   
 The Romanian media stands on weak professional bases and is affected by the new 
technological developments. Cristoiu4 (2012), Tatulici (2012), Băcanu (2011), Păcuraru 
(2011), Rogozanu (2012) and Avădani (2012) describe the Romanian press as lacking any 
standards of ethics and behaviour. For example, part of the Romanian journalists does not 
check their stories even from 2 sources, launch false themes and invective easily, and 
newspapers do not give the right to reply or issue corrections.  
The Romanian press lost sight of the fact that the public interest should be the basis of 
journalistic activity. Cristoiu (2012), Țăranu (2011) and Băcanu (2011) indicate that the 
Romanian press is flooded with tabloids and overwhelmed by a strong local oligarchy. It is not 
tuned to the demands of the market and incapable of disclosing significant corruption cases. 
Investigative journalism is under-funded and is unable to employ inquiry and investigation, its 
                                                          
4 The presentation of the journalists interviewed for this research can be found in Chapter “Methods & 
Methodology”. 
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main instruments to disclose corruption, because of strong pressures from owners and 
managers regarding the subjects to be investigated and carrying a significant risk of being sued.  
As concerning the latest technological developments and their consequences, the new 
technologies stopped the monopoly journalists had on managing and transmitting information 
so that the entire profession had to re-position, re-define and re-invent itself. Tatulici (2012) 
considers that the future and the evolution of the press are doubtful as, at worse, the Romanian 
press might become a phenomenon of public gossip. Tatulici (2012) and Savaliuc (2012) 
consider that it might re-specialise on the internet, in the same format as newspapers, 
magazines, etc. 
The Romanian media is affected by a loose economic basis. Cristoiu (2012), Tatulici 
(2012), Țăranu (2011), Băcanu (2011), Păcuraru (2011), Savaliuc (2012 and Avădani (2012) 
consider that economic forces are one of the main causes of the problems the Romanian press 
has to face today. In this category are mentioned the journalists that choose to become owners 
as well as the fact that journalism had become for people in other economic sectors an 
extraordinary opportunity to launch into business by setting up newspapers and publications 
involved in politics. Cristoiu (2012) doubts the Romanian press is a real market economy to 
the extent that he doubts as well that Romania can be called a market economy given that the 
majority of fortunes there have been made based on business with the state and not on a healthy 
development of open competition. 
The Romanian press had two types of engines during this period: official and unofficial 
ones. The Romanian press has three official economic engines: money from advertising, money 
from special campaigns/events, that bring extra income to the budget due to increased 
readership and money from other media organisations for production cooperation.  
Advertising is the most consistent source, but it is too scarce to satisfy the needs of so many 
newspapers and TV stations.  
Both state and private advertising encounter difficulties due to corrupt dealings. State 
advertising is offered in a discriminatory manner only to those media-trusts or companies that 
are accepted by the parties in power  
In the case of private advertising, the TV stations for example, have to generate a lot of 
very low quality content to get high ratings and so attract as much advertising as possible. 
Another challenge related to private advertising is the fact that journalists cannot write 
negatively about the companies that have advertisements in the newspapers those journalists 
work for. And most of the companies that commission advertisements in the newspapers have 
political connections that could change at any time.  
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The Romanian press has as well an unofficial economic engine, represented by their 
private owners (“bosses”). As the Romanian media institutions are not generally profitable, 
media owners bring money from their own pockets to keep them going. As businessmen, the 
Romanian media owners cannot afford to lose money on their assets, so they use their media 
as instruments to get a different kind of advantage. By bringing his own money to pay his 
employees and keep his media asset going, the Romanian media owner expects to obtain a 
certain immunity, business and to win public tenders, all with the complicity of politicians. 
The consequences of these problems are both short and long term and comprise: 
censorship according to the media owner`s interest, distortions of the public agenda, paralysis 
and lack of credibility in the eyes of the readers. In the long term, the market mechanisms 
become distorted as fair competition disappears and the erosion of the public interest as a main 
reason for journalistic activity disappears.  
  As a consequence, the Romanian media is deeply affected by corruption. Cristoiu 
(2012), Păcuraru (2011) and Tatulici (2012) describe the post-communist press as the result of 
corruption. It is politicised and partisan and used as a tool for blackmail in a relationship 
involving the media owner and politicians.  Journalist Cosmin Păcuraru explains that: “the 
publicity market and the measurement market are both a complete mafia; bribes have to be paid 
for everything, meaning money influences the whole chain: advertising, media-buyer, survey 
company, sales managers; media is bought for group interests, political or economic, and many 
local distribution channels have disappeared because political interests acted against the 
distributors” (Păcuraru, 2011: 2).   
The Romanian media is still affected by the Communist legacy. William Horsley (2012) 
assesses the state of the Romanian press today by looking at other elements that have influenced 
its evolution. The Communist legacy has had a significant influence as Romania inherited a 
more bankrupt and corrupt political and professional culture than the other former communist 
countries in Eastern Europe. The post-communist transition lacked ethical principles, as many 
compromises were made compared to other post-communist European countries. Romania 
parted very slowly with Communism as it took much longer than the other countries in the 
region to develop a functioning multi-party system. 
 The powerful and unreformed establishment chased away foreign investment, mostly 
coming from Western Europe. Although foreign investment initially managed to create a 
diverse and more open media landscape, it was overpowered by powerful Romanian oligarchs 
who took back most of the media market. Chronic corruption in politics and business drove out 
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any foreign competition and diverted the attention of western companies towards friendlier and 
more transparent markets (Horsley, 2012).  
The habits of secrecy, suspicion and deception deeply ingrained in the behaviour of the 
Romanian people by the Communist regime were a serious barrier to the growth of an open 
and competitive media landscape. British journalist and President of the Association of 
European Journalists, William Horsley declared: “It is hard to have a straight talk about 
Romanian media in Romania. Discussions with Romanian journalists about their profession 
and their industry are in my experience still strongly marked by secrecy, suspicion and even 
deception about current realities” (Horsley, 2012:2). In this context, the Romanian press has 
developed in an organic way, without strategies, a plan or a big picture and know-how 
(Avădani, 2012). 
Outside authorities are indicated as part of the problems as well. The EU as a standard 
setter and to a certain extent an enforcer of proper laws and regulations related to media for 
candidate countries is considered to be partly to blame for the poor outcome when it comes to 
separating state and political power influence from media. The Council of Europe, which in 
the 1990s showed a strong commitment to keep media freedom and human/civil rights 
standards in its member states, including Romania, is considered to have softened its authority 
and political determination severely, diminishing its impact (Horsley, 2012). 
The Romanian media is a clear indicator of the level of progress post-Communist 
Romania has achieved. Țăranu (2011) and Tatulici (2012) consider that the level of 
development of the Romanian press indicates the level of reform achieved within Romanian 
society: a weak democracy dominated by forms without content, in which an incoherent legal 
system makes the law slowly and incoherently. A muddled relationship between the powers of 
state renders them incapable of offering a background which would allow the politician and 
journalist to develop an institutional and professional relationship.  
Romanian media is the only body capable of holding politicians to account in Romania. 
Tatulici (2012) and Avădani (2012) see the Romanian media as a guardian of democracy in 
Romania. The public seem to agree with this view as the press is indicated to be the most 
credible source of information about corruption5, according to a study on the “The citizens` 
perception of corruption in public institutions: causes, practices, prevention” (Badea & 
                                                          
5“Media, the first reliable source of information about corruption”, Mediafax.ro, August 25, 2010. Study 
conducted by the National Agency of Civil Servants, in partnership with the “Support Programs for Sustainable 
Development” Association.  
 47 
 
Copoeru, 2010).  A more recent study undertaken during 2012 confirms the trend, mass-media 
being one of the institutions Romanians trust most (19% of the respondents have trust in the 
mass-media), in contrast with the low degree of trust they have in institutions such as 
Government (90% do not trust in Government), Parliament (95% do not trust in the 
Parliament), Justice (85% do not have faith in Justice) and Police (80% of respondents do not 
trust the Police) (Andronache, 2012).   
Ioana Avădani (2012) explains that Romanian politicians are afraid of journalists, and many of 
their legislative initiatives come from personal, unpleasant experiences usually linked to the 
exposure of corruption or suspected corruption.  Tatulici shows that each part of the press taken 
separately does not tell the truth, but taken globally one can understand what the reality is 
(Tatulici, 2012).  
 
3.3 The Media as an Actor in The Post-Communist World 
 
The process of democratising the media might be paved with challenges but the 
literature about mass-media no doubtly underlines their substantial contribution to the 
democratisation and evolution of post-communist societies through their ability to construct 
news about what happens in society. Sparks emphasizes that certain features of “society are 
more clearly illuminated through this optic (of media change) than through others” (Sparks, 
1998: 16-7). Media change becomes an indicator of more general political change. Hopes are 
put in media as the shift between fundamentally different systems is expected to be registered 
particularly in the mass media (Sparks, 1998).  
In the middle of the turmoil of such massive change, media has a significant importance 
as people rely on discursive constructs when trying to assign meanings to changing political 
reality (Baysha & Hallan, 2003). Media`s responsibility is substantial in this respect as the 
progress towards democracy depends on its state. 
However, just stating the importance of the media in not enough. Jakubowicz and 
Sukosd (2008) urge the Central and Eastern European media scholars to take an objective look 
at other media systems and analyse what is happening in their own region compared to the 
processes developing elsewhere. They suggest the post-communist media to be seen as a key 
area of systemic change, based on the liberal theories of the democratic state as a fundamental 
philosophy of the press system which has to fulfil a number of expectations, to provide a 
number of services for democracy and to play some particular roles provided the historical 
context. An “enabling environment” (Jakubowicz & Sukosd, 2008, p. 10) for media freedom 
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and contribution to democracy is needed: therefore, a critical political economy of the media 
approach should be employed to look not only at the prerequisites necessary to consolidate 
media freedom but at the political and economic environment that influences the manner in 
which post-communist media reports problems such as political corruption.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 49 
 
Chapter 2: Political Corruption and Political Culture 
 
 
 
“If your vote mattered, we would not allow you to vote. All you are doing is to change some of 
us with others of us. We are the ones who do the combinations, we are above. We have relations 
everywhere, no matter who comes to power. We make money anyway. What are you doing? 
You are the “I cannot afford” generation (...). You have to leave the country in order to make 
it.” (Vântu6, 2014). 
 
1) Introduction 
 
Political corruption and political culture are related concepts that meet on the ground 
of practices and values. Political corruption, a rogue behaviour practised by the political elite, 
is rooted in certain mentalities or modes of thought arising from the practices and values that 
determine political behaviours. Although political culture is seen as one of the main 
determinants of political corruption, I argue in this chapter that it can be a factor of resistance 
against corruption and a mechanism of holding power to account. 
Although corruption is usually acknowledged as a deeply negative occurrence in any 
society, some researchers support the idea that corruption can be good in small doses. Max 
Weber`s functional approach, for instance, looks at the circumstances of societies in transition 
and describes corruption as a mechanism which helps remove the tension between emerging 
and outdated norms. The institutional approach considers corruption as a means of 
redistributing resources from an old elite to a new elite without causing a direct clash between 
them (Barsukova, 2009).  
However, this is not the position implied in this thesis. In my view, corruption, no 
matter how little, is harmful. As we shall see towards the end of this chapter, Romania 
experienced a “small” level of corruption during the Communist era. The behaviour had spread 
due to the Communist economic conditions and turned, post-Revolution, into systemic 
corruption which led to dire economic consequences, due to its ubiquity and depth. Since the 
fall of Communism in December 1989, this country has been rated as one of the most corrupt 
                                                          
6 Sorin Ovidiu Vântu is a Romanian businessman and media owner with strong connections in the political 
world, convicted to prison for blackmail and loot. 
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countries in Europe. According to the Index of Corruption made by Transparency International 
in 2014, Romania is one of the four most corrupt countries in the EU, ranking 43, the same as 
Greece, Italy and Bulgaria (Transparency International, 2014).  
The first part of this chapter is dedicated to explaining the concept of political 
corruption, followed by an overview of the political context which allowed Romania to be 
seriously challenged by political corruption. The second part is dedicated to political culture in 
Romania. Romania’s history of corruption dates back to the Ottoman domination in the 16th 
Century. Habits of corruption and corrupt ways of thinking learnt from foreign domination 
were perpetuated by local leaders with incalculable consequences for the Romanian people, the 
military incapacity to face the Russian ultimatum in 1940, to name but one, since military 
procurement had been ruined by corrupt practices.  
 As “a mentality is not usually examined by those who inhabit it” (Dean, 1999:16), 
reflexivity is generally missing from a political culture. Despite this, there has always been in 
Romania a small but strong segment of society which drew attention to the mentality of 
corruption and its consequences and made its voice heard through the media of their time.  
 
2) The Concept of Political Corruption 
 
2.1) Defining Political Corruption 
 
The political arena is the place where people expect guidance and good leadership, and 
where any malfunctioning can produce significant negative effects on large populations. 
Consequently, researchers and organisations interested in the phenomenon of political 
corruption pay attention to defining and understanding the mechanisms, causes and 
consequences of corruption as well as to the political and social context which allows 
corruption to thrive.  
Attempts to define and analyse the phenomenon of corruption highlight different 
aspects, but they all see the lack of ethics among the elected or appointed political 
representatives as the common denominator.  Transparency International defines corruption as 
“the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency International, 2011). The World 
Bank defines it as “the abuse of public office for private gain” (World Bank, 1997: 8). 
Stapenhurst sees corruption as “the abuse of public power for personal gain or for the benefit 
of a group to which one owes allegiance”, an exchange which appears “when public office is 
abused by an official accepting, soliciting or extorting a bribe” (Stapenhurst, 2000:1). Robert 
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Klitgaard (1998: 4) uses formulas to help with empirical studies: C (Corruption) = M 
(Monopoly) + D (Discretion) – A (Accountability). The United Nations describe bribery, 
embezzlement, theft, fraud, extortion, abuse of function, favouritism, nepotism, exploiting 
conflict of interests, and improper political contributions as the most common corrupt practices 
(United Nations, 2004:24-29).  
 
2.1.1) Mechanisms of Corruption 
 
 The extent of corruption is the parameter that measures the severity of the disease. 
Klitgaard thinks that as a general rule “systems can stand some corruption, and it is possible 
that some truly awful systems can be improved by it” (Klitgaard, 1998: 4). However, the story 
is different when a society faces both grand and petty corruption. Their effects become 
crippling as they tend to get a grip on the entire system. Once systemic corruption is installed, 
the rules of the political and administrative game become impossible to play by, and the 
consequences are difficult to reverse. 
“Grand corruption” or “state capture” is specific to the highest levels of decision in a 
state. It was first defined by Susan Rose-Ackerman (1978) who considered corruption the result 
of poorly channelled self-interest which appeared when the office holder acted in favour of 
interest groups based on the rational decision that it was more advantageous to accept the 
offered bribes. Surprisingly enough, this model of corruption is an indirect consequence of 
democracy. The outcome of elections is always determined by a majority. As a consequence, 
interest groups, an expression of a minority, pursue their own agenda by offering incentives to 
incumbent office holders who have to decide if a future term in office will be more rewarding 
that accepting the bribe and potentially losing the next elections for breaking their promises. 
The World Bank defines grand corruption as “the phenomenon in which outside 
interests (often the private sector, mafia networks, etc) are able to bend state laws, policies and 
regulations to their (mainly financial) benefit through corrupt transactions with public officers 
and politicians” (The World Bank, 2010:1). In this case the influence of the interest groups 
goes as far as possible, to the point in which none of the fundamental institutions of the state 
fulfils its attributions in a proper or legal way. 
 The model of Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2002) describes corruption which occurs 
when governments transform public goods into private goods. Private companies bribe officials 
to get public contracts and then sell their goods and services at over-price to recover the loss. 
This type of corruption is measured by comparing the expenditure on public goods and their 
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real production costs. It allows politicians from both Power and Opposition to take part in 
occult deals which cause great financial damage to public budgets. Voters never find out about 
the damage or find out only much later.  As a consequence, this type of corruption is a 
particularly obstructive factor in a democracy. 
 Extortive corruption is known as “petty corruption” or “day-to-day administrative 
corruption”. It appears when government officials use their power to refuse or delay a service 
that private entities are entitled to in order to extract bribes (Brunetti & Weder, 2003: 1805).  
Corrupt officials are not always the final beneficiaries of illegal payments. They are often just 
intermediaries manipulated by groups in higher positions, which offer protection and guarantee 
jobs for as long as corrupt officials are profitable. The pressure falls on public budgets and, 
although the bribers enjoy short-term benefits, the entire system gets unbalanced and incapable 
of progress in the medium and long term (Ficeac, 2013).  
 Collusive corruption is a model specific to tax evasion. In this model, both the official 
and the private entity are better off doing corruption, consequently neither of them is interested 
in the corrupt exchange being discovered. A strong internal control system is the only chance 
for corrupt acts to be detected. In countries with a significant amount of collusive corruption, 
the fairness of the entire system is questioned and the trust in the political system is severely 
eroded. 
This model has been broadly researched by Besley and McLaren (1993) and Klitgaard 
(1998) but Brunetti and Weder (2003) took the analyses further and looked at the role of the 
media. They draw attention to the fact that a free press is the best control body, as independent 
journalists are strongly motivated to investigate any wrongdoing, while other bodies, such as 
the judiciary or anti-corruption commissions, can be less effective unless they are strongly 
incentivised internally. More than this, there is the danger they too might be corrupt (Brunetti 
&Weder, 2003).  
 Ficeac (2013) follows the research of Murphy, Shleifer & Vishny (1993) and focuses 
on the receiving end of corrupt exchanges by underlining the difference between the public and 
private rent-seekers. He considers these types of corruption to be a specific characteristic of the 
former Communist countries, Romania in particular.   
Murphy, Shleifer & Vishny (1993) define private rent-seekers as interested in the 
productive or service sectors that circulate significant amounts of money, using corrupt 
practices in order to obtain control over such businesses. Once in charge, private rent-seekers 
exploit the companies intensively, until they become bankrupt. In the case of post-communist 
Romania, the practice of rewarding the private rent seeker with top managerial positions in 
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public companies which get drained until they are finally privatised and sold or simply shut 
down, has been a common method of acquiring money to finance political parties, especially 
during electoral years.  
The public rent-seekers are interested in the investment and innovative sectors. The 
corrupt exchange in their case is due to the fact that investors or innovators, foreign or domestic, 
coming from outside the system, need to obtain a series of documents and to fulfil certain 
procedures in order to develop their activity legally. The corrupt officials demand an entire 
range of bribes in order to allow the investor/innovator to keep their business running. As 
outsiders, investors become subjects of “particularly heavy bribes and expropriations” 
(Murphy, Shleifer & Vishny, 1993: 413). As they are often credit-constrained and have 
difficulties finding money for bribes, they are deterred from entering a market and innovating.  
 
2.1.2) Determinants of Political Corruption 
 
Understanding the causes of corruption means to investigate those mechanisms and 
aspects of a society which do not work properly and should be reformed. Brunetti and Weder 
(2003) point to the direct, internal and external, mechanisms of a bureaucracy that could go 
wrong, so diminishing its capacity to prevent corruption. In their view a bureaucracy can be 
sabotaged internally by low standards of performance due to improper supervision and by 
mechanisms of recruitment and promotion oiled by nepotism, to the disregard of any notion of 
merit. Bureaucracy lacks external pressure from unbiased individuals and organisations with 
roles in curbing corruption, such as an independent judicial system, the mass-media and watch 
bodies.    
Randi, Baiyun & Ruppel (2012) propose that the phenomenon of corruption should be 
viewed in a larger context, the level of human development, which they define as the ability of 
people in a particular country to live fulfilled productive lives based on education and ability. 
A high level of human development is associated with a transparent public administration and 
government accountability. The capacity of the economic power to improve the quality of life 
is acknowledged, and better educated people are encouraged to scrutinise public authorities to 
ensure that they promote equal access to opportunities, and to demand social justice if they do 
not, so creating and maintaining an infrastructure necessary to control and sanction unethical 
behaviours (Randi, Baiyun & Ruppel, 2012).  
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2.2) Political Corruption in Romania 
 
 Political corruption developed in Romania in a permissive tradition dating from the 16th 
century, a lack of accountability for the crimes of the Communist past and the lack of a national 
blueprint for the future. Nobody in Romania ever assumed any responsibility for the 
Communist past: its damaging effects were researched and acknowledged very late, 26 years 
after the fall of Communism. This allowed the post-Communist transition in Romania to be 
managed by communists, auto-declared the new democrats, who made every effort to 
consolidate their position politically and economically.  Marked by a very weak, real-
democratic Opposition, the post-communist transition in Romania was a process of sham 
democratisation and of growing a corrupt political class.  
 
2.2.1) Political Context 
 
Lack of responsibility for the Communist past. The Presidential Commission set up in 
2006 by President Băsescu to analyse and officially condemn Communism in Romania noted 
that “no political party in post-communist Romania has ever assumed responsibility for the 
four decades and a half of obsessive attempts to build an impossible utopia. The horrors of 
Communist Romania remained un-punished to the astonishment of the Western world as well 
as of so many supporters of democracy” (Presidential Commission, 2006: 10). The lack of an 
organised endeavour to reveal the entire truth about the crimes of the Communist regime, 
forcing those responsible to be made accountable for their acts and encouraging the healing 
process, is a key feature of post-Communist transition in Romania. 
A draft Law of Lustration was proposed in 1990, but only in 2006 was a much watered-
down version adopted. Consequently, the old Communist nomenclature had the time and the 
opportunities to reproduce itself and get established by occupying key positions in business, 
politics, and media. The “communist legacy” has always won in Romania (Ficeac, 2013) in 
front of those who thought that the democratic institutions, once built, would develop, become 
strong and deter the anti-liberal and anti-democratic structures. 
A post-Communist transition managed by communists. Condemning Communism in 
Romania was not possible for a long time as the post-communist transition was dominated by 
the second rank Communist elite wishing to preserve its advantages. Romania`s politics from 
1989 to 2014 were significantly marked by three strong characters at the top, all groomed in 
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Communist values: President Ion Iliescu (1990- 1996 and 1996 – 2000) and President Traian 
Băsescu (2004 – 2009 and 2009 – 2014) were elected by direct vote; Prime Minister, Adrian 
Năstase, was appointed by Ion Iliescu during his second mandate (2000 – 2004). 
Ion Iliescu7, a representative of the Communist elite, who had lost his privileges in the 
party long before the Revolution but continued to retain his post in the Communist Party 
hierarchy despite the fact that he had become increasingly critical, never gave up his Marxist 
convictions. His presidential mandates are remembered for deeply undemocratic deeds: 
stopping the actions of civil society and those of the democratic parties; repressing the anti-
communist protests in the Spring of 1990 by using the miners under the supervision of covert 
intelligence officers in order to neutralise and annihilate civil society, the press and the 
democratic political parties; actively showing hostility to pluralism and market society and 
continually supporting the re-organised forces of the communist nomenclature with whom he 
and his party cooperated (Presidential Commission, 2006: 655). 
 Iliescu`s party is perceived as a direct follower, under a democratic disguise, of the 
Romanian Communist Party, jeopardising the first steps to inaugurate economic reforms and 
to regenerate the human resources within the governmental apparatus (Nelson, 1990). During 
his first mandate, a governing elite not understanding the implications of European integration 
and accession and the brutal suppression of the opposition demonstration in June 1990 brought 
to nought Romania’s chances for admission as an EU member State until 1996 (Pridham, 2001 
as cited by Pridham, 2002:966). The international community had little impact over the changes 
in Iliescu`s Romania, and no case of political corruption had been concluded during his 
mandates. On the contrary, under his leadership and that of Adrian Năstase, political corruption 
flourished.  
Traian Băsescu is a former ship’s captain in the Romanian merchant navy with very 
good communication and leadership skills but with a controversial past, raising questions about 
his connections with the former Security (Pro TV, 2014). Băsescu proved to be a very skilled 
politician capable of original ideas and spectacular moves on the political scene (Gabriel 
Elefteriu as quoted by B1 TV, 2015). He preferred to define himself as the “President-Player”, 
wishing to reform the legal system and political class and doing it in a deeply conflictual way. 
Băsescu was Mayor of Bucharest when he won the presidential elections in 2004 
against the Social Democratic Party (PSD) led by Adrian Năstase and Ion Iliescu.  As the leader 
of political alliance, Truth and Justice (ADA), his victory was facilitated by the fact that after 
                                                          
7 As a joke among those who do not like him, he is called “the Communist granny” 
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4 years of deep corruption, PSD and its presidential candidate, former Prime Minister Adrian 
Năstase, could not “present themselves as political actors genuinely interested in the country’s 
well-being; the Alliance for Truth and Justice promoted an aggressive anti-corruption electoral 
message under the symbol “mini-orange revolution”, which sought a renewal of the political 
class in a manner similar to the Ukrainian scenario; sections of the civil society, represented by 
the Coalition for a Clean Parliament and Pro-Democracy Association  actively highlighted the 
importance of promoting fairness, accountability and transparency in the electoral process” 
(Ciobanu, 2007:1440).  
The legacy left behind by his two constitutional mandates (2004 – 2009 and 2009 – 2014) 
included Romania`s EU accession, a significant progress in the fight against corruption and 
two referendums to reinstate him after being suspended twice by a hostile Parliament supported 
by politically involved media moguls. 
A post-Communist transition marked by corruption. The second government under 
Iliescu`s patronage was the one led by his protégé, Adrian Năstase, between 2000 and 2004. 
Married twice, each time to daughters of high ranking communists8 and occupying sensitive 
public positions9 during the Communist regime, Adrian Năstase found it easy to climb to the 
highest political positions during the post-communist transition.  He remained in history a 
symbol of corruption and served two terms in prison. 
Despite positive developments such as Romania joining NATO and finishing the 
negotiations to join the EU10, the Romanian media at the time were showing more and more 
corruption stories linked to the new oligarchy (“local barons”), and the top political leaders in 
the counties revealed a pronounced clientelistic characteristic of Iliescu`s and Năstase`s party, 
PSD (Ciobanu, 2007:1439) and, subsequently, the incapacity of building a strong democratic 
institutional system. At the same time, reports coming from the European bodies were 
indicating Romania’s failure in implementing and dealing with the anti-corruption legislation 
(European Commission, 2002, 2003, 2004). Corruption had become officially one of 
                                                          
8 Năstase was married first to Ilina Preoteasa, the daughter of the Communist Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Grigore Preoteasa, between 1955 and 1957. After divorce he married his current wife, Dana Năstase, who is 
the daughter of Angelo Miculescu, the Minister of Agriculture and Deputy Prime Minister between 1975 and 
1981 and Ambassador of Romania in China between 1983 and 1990. 
9 Information from the unofficial biography of Năstase states that he was very trusted by the Communist 
regime which sent him as its representative to different international bodies such as the International Institute 
of Human Rights in Strasbourg, the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (Oslo), the International Youth 
Festival in Pyongyang, the Republic of Korea. 
10 Romania finished the accession negotiations on 17th of December 2004 during the EU Winter Summit in 
Brussels. 
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Romania`s biggest problems and the most serious blockage in its way towards democracy and 
a fully functioning market economy during the second mandate of Iliescu. 
A post-Communist transition marked by a weak Opposition. Iliescu`s reign in post-
Communist Romania was briefly interrupted by an attempt at a democratic coalition between 
(1996-2000) that proved to be failure. The coalition emerged as early as 1991 when the political 
forces opposing Iliescu`s party coagulated into a political and electoral alliance, the Romanian 
Democratic Convention (CDR). After six years of fake democracy, Romanians decided to vote 
for a programme of democratic principles. The Democrat Convention (CDR) won the election 
in 1996 based on a political platform focused on implementing economic reforms and 
following the objective of obtaining EU membership. Being a coalition formed of too many 
pieces in a country which did not have experience of coalitions and lacking effective 
negotiation between its members, successive governments were marked by continuous 
conflicts, the lack of effective government performance, the inability to combat corruption and 
the weakness of the new President, Professor Emil Constantinescu (Tismăneanu & Klingman, 
2001).  In an epic interview at the end of his mandate, President Constantinescu declared 
himself defeated by the system: “I am feeling today more terrorised and threatened by 
Ceauşescu`s Securitate than I had felt before 1990. I did not cooperate with Securitate, I was 
not monitored, I am a victim today. They have defeated me today” (Radio Romania, 2010).   
Transition in Romania produced a deeply corrupt political class. During Băsescu`s 
mandates the sheer scale of political corruption in Romania became apparent. Romanian media, 
particularly the HotNews` Anti-corruption Files section (HotNews a, 2015) provides a 
disturbing image of how deeply corrupt the political class has grown since 1989.   
It shows that 19 politicians were definitely convicted for corruption by the end of 
Băsescu`s second mandate in December 2014. Among them one former Prime Minister, one 
former deputy Prime Minister, three former ministers, five MPs, five mayors, one head of 
county council, one party leader and one member of the European Parliament. Most of them 
were accused and sentenced to prison for taking bribes to facilitate the attribution of public 
contracts to their friend companies by avoiding public tendering or for influencing police 
officers and judges in order to give favourable sentences in the cases of businessmen offering 
bribes. Others were sentenced for deeds such as: fraudulent transfer of an asset from the state 
property to private ownership (the former  Liberal Minister of Justice, Tudor Chiuariu, and the 
former  Magyar Minister of Communications, Zsolt Nagy), blackmail, bullying and threatening 
public officials in order to obtain public contracts ( Liberal Deputy, Dan Păsat), buying lands 
and building for a price 75 times smaller than the real one such as the media mogul, 
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businessman, MP and leader of Conservative Party, Dan Voiculescu, camouflaging the fund 
raising for the his own electoral campaign by organising a symposium such as the former Prime 
Minister, Adrian Năstase or not declaring the real revenue obtained by selling private property 
to the state, such as the deputy Prime Minister, George Copos. (HotNews a, 2015). 
 26 politicians were in the process of being tried in Court by the end of December 2014. 
Among them seven representatives of local oligarchy (Heads of County Councils), six MPs, 
five former ministers, three mayors, two leaders of political parties, one member of the 
European Parliament, one State Secretary, one Prefect and one politically appointed head of a 
public institution (the head of the Tax Authority). 25 politicians had their cases blocked in 
different stages of criminal investigation by the end of December 2014.  
 
2.2.2. The Portrait of the Romanian Corrupt Politician  
 
A study undertaken by Dutch experts for the Romanian Ministry of Justice11 shows a 
very clear image of the typical Romanian corrupt public servant and his motivations. According 
to this study, between January 2006 and December 2013, 2,574 defendants were definitely 
convicted for corruption. Almost half of them held political positions (TRMJ & MFAN12, 
2015:8)  
 
 
                                                          
11 The study benefitted from the support of specialists from the Romanian National Anticorruption Authority 
(DNA) and the Prosecutor’s Office affiliated to the Highest Court of Cassation and Justice as well as from the 
support of the Schools of Law in Bucharest and Amsterdam. 
12 TRMJ & MFAN = The Romanian Ministry of Justice & the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 
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 (Source: TRMJ & MFAN, 2015: 7) 
 The profile unveiled by the study shows that the typical corrupt in Romania is a man 
(87%), aged between 41-50 (37.5%), orthodox (91.4%), married (67.3%), with an academic 
degree (61.6%), relying on a wage (48.9%) and having an average social status (58.7%). He 
mostly has a passive role in corruption (54.6%): he does not ask for bribes but accepts them 
when offered. He is most probably convicted and sentenced to prison between 2 and 5 years, 
does not recognise his guilt, and the final conviction comes many years (4-11 years) after the 
corrupt acts took place. He is usually investigated for 3-7 years before a final conviction is 
decided (TRMJ & MFAN, 2015: 18-37) 
 
 
 
3) Political Culture 
 
The display of a deeply corrupt political class raises an obvious question: what about 
the people governed by such a corrupt set? How do people led by corrupt politicians think? 
What are the beliefs and convictions that mould their behaviours? 
In the second half of last century, Foucault started from the premises that power can 
play a positive role: it produces knowledge and discourses that turn into guides for the 
behaviour of large populations once the individuals internalise them.  At the same time, he 
introduced the concept of “governmentality” or mentality of governing (Foucault, 2007), a term 
referring to the practices of governing but as well at the ways of thinking about governing. 
Foucault used the term governmentality to describe the modern mode of governing based on 
bureaucracies in which the government has objectives, means to achieve them and appropriate 
practices. He defined governmentality as “the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, 
analysis and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific 
albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of 
knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security” 
(Foucault, 2007:108). He used the term as well as a starting point for developing his theory 
about the technologies of power, understood as a manner of exercising power while 
intentionally interfering with the actions of the others.  
 If Foucault looks only at the governing and the thinking about governing, his concept 
is interpreted and enriched by adding the governed ones in the equation. Dean (1999) breaks 
the term governmentality into “govern” and “mentality”, mentalities of governing, and states 
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based on the Foucauldian premises that the power can play a positive role as it produces 
knowledge and discourse that turn into behavioural guides once internalised: the concept of 
governmentality is not a tool for thinking only about government and governing but it has to 
consider how and what the governed ones think. Dean defines thinking as a collective activity 
which comprises the sum of the knowledge, beliefs and opinions of people who are governed 
and which shows how and what they think from their own perspective, pointing out that it is 
not possible to understand power without understanding the background mentalities (Dean, 
1999:16), a significant component of political culture. This point is relevant as it shows that a 
certain type of government and governing could not persist without the silent acceptance and 
support of their led populations.  
 
3.1) Defining Political Culture 
 
As a comprehensive concept comprising a set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments which 
represent the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behaviours in a political system, 
providing order and meaning to political processes (Pye, 1968), political culture is a suitable 
instrument to explore and explain behaviours associated to political corruption. Being rooted 
in public events and private experiences, political culture is associated to the concepts of 
political ideology, national ethos, national political psychology, and the fundamental values of 
people (Pye, 1968), fixing the attention this way on both, the civil society and the private 
individual.  
In the late 1950s, Almond and Verba brought the concept of political culture into 
political science and described three types of political culture. In a parochial political culture 
people are remote and disengaged from the centre of power. In a subject political culture, 
specific to authoritarian states, the individual is aware of the power centre and politics and is 
the subject of political decisions. The participant political culture is the most reactive one, 
specific to democratic regimes. Individuals are aware the centre of power affects them so they 
monitor the entire system, with all its political and administrative aspects and have the 
capability to influence it (Almond & Verba, 1965).   
The concept of political culture as defined by Almond and Verba was used later by 
Hofstede who defines political culture as “the collective programming of the mind which 
distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another” (Hofstede, 
1991:5). Hofstede defined a broader cultural model which is often used to reach answers by 
evaluating national cultures based on precipitants of development and maintenance of a culture 
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prone to corruption: the power distance, uncertainty-avoidance, individualism-collectivism, 
masculinity-femininity and long term vs short term orientation (Hofstede, 1991:9-15). 
Hofstede places Romania in the category of countries with high scores of power distance, 
meaning members of society have a high degree of tolerance for the unequal distribution of 
power (Hofstede, 2011: 9),  high degree of uncertainty avoidance (meaning a low preparation 
of the members of society to deal with novel and unusual situations, lack of flexibility, lack of 
openness to novelty and high intolerance (Hofstede, 2011: 10),  high degree of collectivism 
(meaning people are born in extended families which protect them in exchange for loyalty, 
stress on belonging, relationships prevail over tasks) ( Hofstede, 1991:12), and long term 
oriented (meaning that adapting and evolving according to the circumstances as well as 
learning and persevering in achieving are considered the most important directions (Hofstede, 
2011:15). 
 
 
3.2) Political Culture as A Cause of Political Corruption 
 
 Brunetti & Weder (2203) consider culture to be a cause of corruption as important as 
the malfunctioning of internal and external mechanisms of control. Ficeac (2013), Randi 
(2012), Galbraith (1973), Scott (1992), Sandholtz & Rein (2005) consider political culture to 
be a significant dimension of political corruption. Galbright (1973) focuses on the contingency 
effect national culture has on political corruption and considers the solution to curb corruption 
is as effective as the conditions under which it is implemented allow.  Scott (1992) believes 
that curbing corruption depends on the nature of the related environment.  Starting from the 
premise that corruption is “culturally transmitted from generation to generation by the 
mechanisms of socialisation which in very corrupt societies fail to promote abstinence from 
corruption as a social norm” (Barr, 2010:862), I consider Romania an example of a post-
communist country which can provide an insight into the values and models of a nation which 
allows itself be significantly affected by political corruption.  
 
3.2.1) Culture as a Cause of Political Corruption in Romania 
 
Communism is labelled as a culture of corruption. Sandholtz & Rein note that the 
Communist regimes “created structural incentives for engaging in corrupt behaviours” 
(Sandholtz & Rein, 2005:109); as such corruption had become an unavoidable reality.  
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It is not only the principle of property belonging to all and to no one in particular or the idea 
that work should be evaluated and “rewarded from each according to his ability, to each 
according to his need” but the scale at which these rules were implemented. Public 
consciousness that made pernicious attitudes such as “they pretend to pay us, we pretend to 
work” (Ficeac, 2013: 224) become “rooted in the culture of these societies” (Sandholtz & Rein, 
2005:109) to the extent that corruption became something normal (Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer, 
1998:219). 
 Ficeac (2013) draws attention to the impact of historical legacy on the former 
communist countries. He describes the Communist bureaucracy inherited by the former 
Communist countries as a perverted concept in which leadership was much personalised and 
solving problems depended on buying the goodwill of the leaders in the context of a destroyed 
market economy. In these conditions, three types of corruption specific to the Communist 
regimes emerged: blat, bribe and grand corruption /state capture (Ficeac, 2013:224).  
The notion of “blat” was defined by Alena Ledeneva. It refers to the “use of personal 
networks and informal contacts to obtain goods and services in short supply and to find a way 
around formal procedures” (Ledeneva, 1998:1). Yang underlines that “blat” meant a “personal 
basis for expecting a proposal to be listened to” (Yang, 1989:47-48), a manner of developing 
personal relations that would solve everyday problems that would not have appeared anyway 
if the system had not been so rigid. In Communist regimes, “blat” is raised to mass level, 
spreading throughout the entire administration (Ficeac, 2013:225). 
The notion of “bribe” in the Communist regimes is different from the model of an 
official demanding a certain amount of money to provide a service; it entails a warm and 
understanding attitude from the public: bribe is a “form of rewarding kind public officers who 
are poorly paid, as a practice that is useful for “greasing” seized-up institutional mechanisms, 
and even as a sign of elegance, of courtesy, similar to leaving a tip to the restaurant waiter” 
(Ficeac, 2013:225). Corruption becomes very human, as a description of the culture of 
corruption in Romania provided by the study undertaken by Dutch experts for the Romanian 
Ministry of Justice shows.  
The conclusions of the study indicate that contrary to the expectance that financial gain 
or power position would be the main motivation, in fact the majority of respondents could not 
provide a reason for their acts. More than this, the study underlines that, although towards the 
end of the interview most respondents would acknowledge the behaviour for which they were 
convicted, they would refuse to label their actions as corruption because “giving presents” and 
“establishing connections between people are common practices everywhere in the world”. 
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Even more, they think that “everybody does it”, that “nobody pays you attention if you don`t 
do it” and that “in Romania one needs to have very strong moral principles because it is very 
difficult to not be corrupt” (TRMJ & MFAN, 2015: 38- 40). The few that admitted that their 
acts were corrupt provided a series of motivations such as the beliefs that “the whole system 
encourages corruption”, “there is corruption at the highest level”, “corruption is a practice”, 
“everybody does it so I could not be different”, “when the boss tells you to do something, you 
do it”, “if I hadn`t done it, I would have lost my job” (TRMJ & MFAN, 2015: 38). 
As concerning integrity standards, the study shows that those concerned think these are 
non-existent or, if they exist, it is easy to both respect and infringe them at the same time: one 
respondent said that, although these standards exist, they were created by the EU and 
Romanians lack education in this respect (“it is as if you would introduce the Swedish social 
model in the Balkans”). The integrity standards or the rules concerning corruption were 
considered difficult to keep in certain sectors (i.e. EU funds, NGOs, environment) (TRMJ & 
MFAN, 2015: 42). 
 
3.3) Political Culture in Romania as A Culture of Resistance 
 
Corruption is today a usual occurrence and despite being a serious problem, it has 
received little attention from Romanian researchers. Journalist Matei Udrea warns: 
“It is difficult to find a specialist in corruption in Romania. Scientists start dialog with an honest 
warning: “We haven`t studied the phenomenon!”  It is a paradox: we have to deal daily with 
this plague, foreigners talk about it, we talk about it, it affects our everyday life, but few are 
those who put it under the magnifying glass of science” (Udrea, 2013).  
Research might be missing, but there have always been voices, be it civil society, artists 
or ordinary citizens, which pointed out the faults of political leaders as well the corruption 
ingrained in the prevailing culture. Their testimonies survive over time as writings and 
memories indicating awareness and reflection about the state of the Romanian political class 
and the morals of its ruled citizens. Communism destroyed this special fabric of Romanian 
society, but it has been slowly emerging again. 
 Reflection and awareness of political corruption are present not only in the written 
press but as well in literature, music and glimpses of ordinary people`s everyday life. The 
expansion of the media brings its contribution to the spread of a culture of resistance to political 
corruption. Independent blogs and free and independent social media, especially Facebook, 
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turn into channels for signalling corrupt malfunctioning, expressing rage, starting debates and 
defining solutions. 
Despite lack of scientific research about corruption in Romania, historians, sociologists 
and psychologists appeal to history in an attempt to explain the behaviour and identify causes.  
Scientists explain the exogenous origins of political corruption and underline how rapidly 
corruption became part of the Romanian mentality. The history of political corruption in 
Romania is presented as an interchange of increasingly corrupt periods followed by tough 
austerity to prevent the country reaching a no-return point as a failed nation.   
 Romanian historian Dan Fălcan explains in an interview with journalist Petru Bădică 
(2014) that in fact corruption is not part of the Romanian DNA but part of a tradition forced 
upon the Romanian territories by centuries of foreign domination. The roots of corruption in 
Romania date back to the 16th Century, when the increase of Ottoman domination over the 
Romanian territories turned public offices into a trade-off:  
“To obtain the throne, the local leaders of the Romanian Countries had to pay increasing 
amounts of money to Constantinople. After being appointed as leaders of the Romanian 
Countries they focused on making as much money as possible to recover the amounts paid to 
Turks for the throne and to save some for themselves. As such, they were selling public 
positions. The Fanariot domination throughout the 18th Century is a reference moment as 
corruption had become generalised in the Romanian Countries” (Fălcan cited by Bădică, 2014).  
Reminiscences of this procedure exist today as part of a non-transparent system of financing 
political parties. 
The generalised corruption during the Phanariot epoch was inherited by the local leader, 
Alexandru Ioan Cuza, in the 19th Century. Although an enlightened leader who unified two of 
the Romanian territories setting the political background of today`s Romania, and despite the 
progressive reforms which contributed to the modernisation of Romanian state and society, he 
allowed his lover, Maria Catargiu-Obrenovic, to patronise an entire corrupt network firmly 
established in his entourage. Fălcan explains that in certain respects Cuza was like Ion Iliescu, 
Romania`s first post-communist President: he would not take money but would not take any 
measures to stop the rife corruption around him either (Fălcan cited by Bădică, 2014). 
Mediation for facilitating public contracts to build public roads in exchange for commissions 
and direct intervention in the legal system were the most corrupt occurrences at that time.  
 The reign of King Carol I of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen (1866-1914) which followed 
the exile of Alexandru Ioan Cuza was the least corrupt in Romania`s history. Romania was led 
by a political class formed of small and middle bourgeoisie, which was financially independent 
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and very responsible. Very patriotic and believing in Romania`s future, this political class 
obtain Romania`s independence in 1877. 
The decay of the political class returned after the First World War, during the reign of 
King Carol II. Fălcan considers Kind Carol II the most corrupt Head of State Romania had, 
with drastic consequences for Romania`s capacity to defend itself and face the challenges of 
the Second World War: 
 “Damages of billions happened and national security was jeopardised. Corruption 
made the army badly equipped and unprepared in 1940. Billions were wasted on fitting the 
army out, but when the Russians gave Romania an ultimatum we couldn`t react. (…)” (Fălcan 
cited by Bădică, 2014).  
King Carol II`s successor, Field Mareshal Ion Antonescu, a very controversial political 
figure due to his friendship with Hitler and involvement in the Holocaust, understood Romania 
was in a serious condition due to systemic corruption. He started trials against the profiteers of 
the previous regime, including King Carol II, who fled Romania, and introduced tough 
austerity. When the Russians invaded Romania on August 23 1944, Marshal Antonescu was 
arrested, tried and executed.  
The Communist era brought a different type of corruption. Political corruption became 
the exception: “Corruption means an illicit relationship with the state. As a party activist it was 
difficult to steal because this would have meant to steal from the regime which supported you 
and which you supported” (Fălcan cited by Bădică, 2014).  
 Political corruption descended to the level of each individual, who had to learn the new 
rules fast in order to survive: “During Communism corruption descended, from high level to 
micro level, where it became generalised. Especially the first years after Communism got 
instated until 1965, and the last years, the ones after 1980, represented a time of great sacrifices. 
You had to offer little gifts to have a good relationship with the butcher, with the greengrocer, 
with the manager of garments. You couldn`t find anything on the market, but the problem 
would be solved if you knew whom to give the present. There was the famous pack of Kent 
cigarettes which I used to give to the doctor, the doctor would give it to the butcher, the butcher 
would give it to the policeman and so on. There were few cases of high corruption and those 
that happened were covered up or were party vendettas and frame ups” (Fălcan cited by Bădică, 
2014). 
Generations of political leaders in Romania inherited corruption from their 
predecessors. Instead of changing the trend, a series of factors facilitated its continuation. 
Sociologist Constantin Schifirneț agrees with Fălcan that corruption is not a Romanian 
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phenomenon but puts things into a larger context: corruption was facilitated by the geo-political 
context and enhanced by local factors.  Romania has never been allowed the time to draw up a 
national blueprint and it has never had a real bureaucracy such as the French one, its model of 
inspiration (Schifirneț cited by Udrea, 2013).   
 Marius Diaconescu, Specialist in Medieval History and Professor of History at the 
University of Bucharest, notes the lack of any documentary testimony indicating honesty and 
respect for law except the reign of Vlad the Impaler, in the 15th Century. Diaconescu highlights 
the Orthodox Church as factor perpetuating corruption in Romanian territories due to its lack 
of will and ability to reform like the Catholic Church. Diaconescu thinks the solution to 
corruption is very simple and it has been applied by the Occidental countries: the state has to 
become intransigent towards attempts to evade the law. As such, conscience will be formed 
with the help of punishment and education (Diaconescu cited by Udrea, 2013). 
Marius Vasileanu, Professor of the History of Religions, notices too that corruption 
goes hand in hand with the Orthodox faith: the priests are not better than the believers, they 
have not assumed their role in a prophetic manner and the discourse of the Orthodox Church 
has not been updated to the reality of the present world (Vasileanu cited by Badea, 2014).  
In an interview given to journalist Anca Țenea, Aurora Liiceanu, Doctor in Psychology 
and an expert in Anthropology and Social Psychology, defines corruption as a strong 
anthropological and cultural component of Romanian people embodied as a tradition of 
bribery. Bribery is used to bring close two parties so neither of them would be in a superior 
position: bribery dissolves the hostility from the perceived difference (Liiceanu cited by Țenea, 
2011).  Liiceanu thinks corruption has become so deeply rooted that Romanians do not 
understand it anymore, the reflection is missing. Traffic of influence and nepotism in the public 
space are part of the Romanian mentality, they come from a non-thought automatism and 
cannot be eradicated by higher wages.  Liiceanu thinks too that corruption in Romania is linked 
to religion and that the anti-corruption education should start with the children: 
“I think corruption is somehow linked to religion. We do not have the education of 
contract, which is a rational matter. Bribery and corruption have a strong irrational ingredient: 
emotions such as gratitude, pity, etc. Contractuality is a rational act. It is linked to the cultures 
where it is written. We have an oral culture. We still have streets without written signs with 
huge and countless institutions. Contractuality is linked to order and organisation, but we do 
not have an organised society” (Liiceanu cited by Țenea, 2011). 
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Representatives of the Romanian literature and philosophers approached the 
phenomenon of political corruption by reflecting upon the precarious state of the population`s 
morals, its political class and the consequences for Romania`s development and security.  
Despite passing corruption from generation to generation, there has always been in Romania 
an opposition which made its voice heard. Representatives of the cultural field, members of the 
civil society of ordinary citizens voiced their reluctance towards corruption by raising 
awareness, defining and condemning reprobate acts of politicians. The strongest voices against 
political corruption marked Romania`s cultural life at the end of the 19th and the beginning of 
the 20th Century.  
 I.L. Caragiale (1852-1912) is one of Romania`s greatest classic writers and most 
praised playwright.  He is a landmark of humorously stating how grotesquely corrupt human 
nature can be; his theatre plays abound in ridiculous characters marked by stupidity, vices and 
duplicity. Disturbed by the unfolding political corruption in Romania, Caragiale reflected upon 
its consequences: 
 “The cause of the disaster of this country is due to only, yes only, the wretched politics 
our political parties and politicians have been doing in the last forty years” (Caragiale as cited 
by Legal Adviser, 2015).  
Personally affected by high level corruption, Caragiale left Romania and spent the rest of his 
life in Berlin declaring that: 
 “For no reason in the world would I leave this corner of foreign life (Berlin) to return to my 
country. I do not want to see what I have seen, I do not want to bear what I have borne, the 
same faces, the same fossils that lead the public life, poisoning you with their stupid and 
suspicions looks, the same magistrates that intentionally lose trials and undeservedly acquit. 
No, my dear, no. I exiled myself and that is all (…).  There is nothing for me in a country where 
cajolement and theft are virtues and hard work and talent are pitiful vices!” (Caragiale cited by 
Andrei, 2015). 
Mihai Eminescu (1850-1889) is Romania`s iconic poet, he remained in history as the 
“Lucifer of Romanian poetry” due to his most loved and known poem, “Lucifer”13, an 89 verse 
philosophical poem about the condition of genius attempting to live among mortals. Educated 
in Law and Philosophy in Vienna, Eminescu was a very sharp and critical journalist who never 
abdicated from his firm moral principles. A declared enemy of political corruption, Eminescu 
investigated the most significant political corruption cases of his time and broadly exposed 
                                                          
13 Lucifer by Mihai Eminescu: http://www.estcomp.ro/eminescu/cuclin1.html  
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them in the newspaper “The Time”. His investigations brought to light corruption by the highest 
rank politicians of that time. For example, King Carol I is mentioned as being involved in 
corrupt acts to lease the building of a significant railway to the German Consortium 
Straussberg, under pressure from the political and financial groups around Chancellor Bismark.  
In his writings, Eminescu notices that moral misery is part of the urban landscape as 
much as bribery and corruption: “Your example daily shows that corruption is the easiest way 
to live in Romania. This is the evil spirit that melts the Romanian society and kills it; this is the 
venom that makes room for discontent and public unrest (…)” (Eminescu, 1985: p.111).  
Eminescu reflects as well on the consequences of accepting corruption as a style of life:  
“There is nothing more dangerous for the conscience of a people than gratified corruption and 
lack of value (…). This prospect removes the trust of the people in the value of work and the 
certainty of promotion through merit. By showing daily that without knowing anything and 
without working someone can become rich and respected (…) the intellectual infection grows 
from endemic to epidemic, it spreads from the small group to bigger and bigger groups of 
citizens” (Eminescu, 1985: p. 124). The death of Eminescu at the age of 39, in mysterious 
circumstances and without any apparent physical cause has remained a mystery.  
 Mircea Eliade (1907-1986) was a Romanian philosopher and fiction writer, professor 
at the University of Chicago. He wrote the first complete history of religions. Sensing the 
Communist Party would take over, Eliade left Romania in 1945 and got established in France. 
The Communist regime harassed him until his death. In an article published in the magazine 
“Vremea”14 in 1937, Eliade sees the political class as immoral, totally lacking the instinct of 
state and politically incapable. While reflecting at the destruction brought by Communism on 
the best social categories, Eliade describes the manner of thinking prevailing among Romanian 
politicians: 
 “The class of our political leaders (…) does everything it can to prolong its power. They only 
think about the millions they still can scrape, about the ambitions they still can satisfy, about 
the elations they still can repeat. But their biggest crime does not lie in a few wasted billions 
and a few murdered consciences. It lies in the fact that not even now, when there still is time, 
they do not understand to reconcile” (Eliade cited by Oprea, 2010). 
The Communist regime destroyed the social fabric which allowed voices such as Eliade 
to exist and be heard. 25 years after the fall of Communism Romania still does not have any 
                                                          
14 Vremea = The Weather (Eng.) 
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significant cultural personality to explain and condemn political corruption. However, the 
subject of corruption appears in successful theatre plays and music. The play `Idiots under 
Moon Light` by Theodor Mazilu shows how corrupts are able to steal without remorse, 
mimicking shame, love and empathy. The theatre play is concurrently a critique of the 
contemporary media. The corrupt world is full of dramatic events, masked raids, tax controls, 
attempts of suicide, all broadcast live on TV channels. The producer, Ion-Ardeal Ieremia, 
declared: “Life forced me to do this show. I did it because of nerves, life caught up with me 
and this is my way of saying: enough is enough, let us end once and for all with imbecilities 
and infamies and be normal people” (Ieremia cited by Osan, 2015).  
 “Solidarity” is a theatre play directed by Gianina Cărbunariu and presented at the 
International Festival of Theater in Avignon. Cărbunariu chose the title as a game of words: 
solidarity and solitude, she inspired from reality and her play presents five pictures based on 
real facts. Among them is the story of the Mayor in Baia Mare, in North-West Romania, who 
won elections by more than 80% of votes because he built a wall between the gypsy community 
and the rest of the town. Cărbunariu thinks that the Orthodox Church is untouchable in 
Romania, and one of her pictures shows images of the future Cathedral to be built in central 
Bucharest, in front of the former Palace of Ceauşescu (Cărbunariu cited by Călin, 2014).  
In today`s Romania, digital media has become a strong component of the Romanian 
resistance to corruption and it is competing with the traditional media, written press and 
magazines, TV and books.  “România Curată” and “Vox Publica” are two anti-corruption 
blogs that have become more and more active in the last two years. They are a platform for 
debate as well as a place where journalists, analysts and artists express their opinions about 
political corruption. “România Curată 15” website, for instance, has a section called “The Map 
of Regional Corruption” (România Curată, 2015). It is an inter-active on-line map which 
allows a serial of information regarding the cases investigated by the National Anti-Corruption 
Authority to be viewed in a user friendly manner. “România Curată” has as well a section 
called “The Black Lists16” (România Curată a, 2015) which investigates the past and the moral 
probity of the candidates for public offices, both at local and national level, and a section called 
“We Monitor the State17” which keeps an eye on all the wrong doings of the elected ones, 
starting with the creation of difficulties to access information of public interest and ending with 
electoral fraud and political corruption (România Curată b, 2015).  
                                                          
15 “România Curată”: (Eng) “Clean Romania”.  
16 “Black Lists” = (Rom) “Liste Negre”. 
17 “We Monitor the State” = (Rom) “Monitorizăm Statul”. 
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“Vox Publica” website hosts investigative journalists such as Stelian Negrea (Vox 
Publica, 2015), who have a go at the most actual corruption cases such as the case of Sorin 
Oprescu, the General Mayor of Capital Bucharest, who was recorded on camera by the Police 
while receiving an instalment of €25,000 out of a bribe of €60,000 (Digi 24 HD, 2015) or such 
as the case of Prime Minister, Victor Ponta, who was as well sent to Court for corruption by 
the National Anti-Corruption Authority (HotNews b, 2015).  
However, significant problems are blighting this area. For example, there are countless 
articles without an acknowledged author or declared sources of funding or a mission 
declaration stating the values and principles promoted by such websites. This situation is 
clearly explained by Mihail Tatulici, one of the journalists I interviewed for this thesis: “It is a 
world of anonymous people and it is very difficult to figure out which of these anonymous 
people are journalists. You should also add the fact that the free internet allows the political 
parties and the interest groups to manipulate on many forums using specialised institutions” 
(Tatulici, 2012:5). To choose carefully where you get your information and to try to figure out 
the entire picture is the solution, Tatulici thinks, but it becomes tiring (Tatulici 2012:6). 
Social media is becoming as well an increasingly strong component of the Romanian 
resistance to corruption. YouTube is freely streaming songs and sketches parodying the leaders 
of the Romania political class. “1-Q Sapro” and their song, “Pinocchio, I am sorry” is mocking 
Victor Ponta, Prime Minister of Romania, famous for his deceitful character. “Divertis Group” 
is mocking the deceitful character and capacity to steal of the entire Romanian political class 
with a special emphasis on its leaders.   
Many journalists, politicians, representatives of civil society and ordinary citizens use 
Facebook accounts to air their thoughts about corruption. The Presidential elections in 
November and December 2014 were an example of the power digital media has to circulate 
information which does not make its way within the mainstream media and to create a strong 
current of opinion which completely changes the outcome of elections.  
 
 
4) Conclusions 
 
We have explored in this chapter the main coordinates of the concept of political 
corruption. No matter how numerous the definitions of political corruption, they all have a 
common denominator: political corruption results from the lack of ethics within the political 
class. It involves different mechanisms and has different consequences depending on its extent. 
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In large quantities corruption can bring an entire system down, put national security in danger 
and cripple the entire economic system in a country, cutting any chance to correct resource 
distribution.  
The Communist regimes enhanced the phenomenon of corruption by creating an 
environment in which people had to employ corruption as a means of survival. In the case of 
Romania, post-communist political corruption built on an already corrupt background, marked 
by the total destruction of the social fabric able to provide an opposition as well as by a tradition 
of political corruption inherited from previous centuries. Romania has become a symbol of 
corruption, most recently being labelled as the most corrupt country in the EU, together with 
Bulgaria, Greece and Italy.  
Behind the corrupt behaviour of a political class there is a facilitating mentality 
understood as a mode of thought and action. The majority of individuals in corrupt populations 
lack reflection about the phenomenon of corruption as they grow up and are educated in values 
encouraging corruption. This characteristic is noticeable in a clear lack of scientific research 
on the topic.  
Despite the lack of research dedicated to corruption in Romania, particularly to political 
corruption, a certain part of society has always taken an active interest in the subject and 
coagulated as a voice of resistance.  The written press is not the only actor involved.  Opposition 
to corruption can be identified in the works of writers, artists at the end of the 19th Century – 
the beginning of 20th Century. Historians, psychologists and social scientists are paying 
attention today to this phenomenon in an attempt to decipher its causes and mechanisms in the 
Romania society. The resistance to political corruption is increasingly strong as digital media 
facilitates the expression of dissent towards corrupt practices. All these developments 
corroborated by the massive emigration of Romanians to countries with a long established 
democracy for work or education purposes might help to change the culture in a not very distant 
future. The Presidential elections in November-December, when the plans of the Social 
Democrat Party in Power to limit the access of the Romanians in diaspora to exercise their 
constitutional right to vote blew up in the face of its candidate, Prime Minister Victor Ponta18, 
                                                          
18 Prime Minister, Victor Ponta, had a large support inside Romania, mainly due to very populist measures 
proceeding the electoral campaign but little from the over 3 million Romanians working and living abroad. As a 
high number of votes could have changed the outcome of the elections, the electoral process was poorly 
organised by the Romanian embassies. As tens of thousands of Romanians did not manage to vote a huge 
scandal started. The media inside Romania did not report much so Romanians inside Romania did not know 
what happened. The information started circulating via social media, especially Facebook causing public 
outrage and demands for the second tour between the favourites, Victor Ponta and Klaus Johannis, to be 
properly organised so that all the Romanian emigrants could cast their vote. The attempt to limit the access to 
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thanks to information circulating mainly via social media, show that there is a critical mass 
developing and the turning point for Romania might not be very far away.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
vote for the Romanians abroad together with the fact that Victor Ponta was the leader of the most corrupt 
political party in Romania brought to vote the more lethargic part of Romanian electorate and changed the 
political options of many other voters. Although favourite throughout the entire political campaign, Victor 
Ponta lost the elections. At the time when I write this thesis he was under criminal investigation and sent to 
Court for corruption.  
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Chapter 3: Methods and Methodology 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous two chapters introduced post-communist Romania and the case for 
investigating the role of the press in reporting political corruption there. They built up a general 
context of the media and political corruption in Romania, examined the theories of media and 
democracy, defined the concepts of political corruption and political culture and exemplified 
their application in the context of the Romanian case.  
The present chapter starts with the rationale for adopting the research methods used in 
this study (discourse analysis, interviews and secondary documents analysis) by positioning 
the relationship between the Romanian media and the political realm within the coordinates set 
by the critical political economy of media approach. The rationale section is followed by a 
summary of the research aims and continues by exploring the methodology used for the 
discourse analysis and interviews and by explaining how these methods will be operationalised.  
The chapter closes with an outline of the case studies, interviewed subjects and researched 
newspapers followed by a brief summary of the research design as a whole. 
 
3.2 Romanian Media and Politics, Rationale for Research 
 
The Romanian media has been passing through its own process of transition, similarly 
to the rest of society. The beginnings of post-communist Romanian media were marked by the 
conversion of old communist publications into new ones and the appearance of new private 
publications. The media were affected by acute difficulties in accessing resources, a factor that 
has shaped negatively its process of liberalisation, as well as by a lack of training in democratic 
values and procedures and often a lack of ethics.  
Studies of the Romanian Press have been conducted by international bodies such as 
Reporters without Borders, the European Commission, and Freedom House. These 
organisations have scrutinised different aspects of the Romanian media. However, they have 
not focused specifically on the mass-media’s reporting of political corruption and the aspects 
that can impact on the quality of reporting. This research is intending to fill in that gap by 
focusing particularly on the Romanian written press.  
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Although it has been increasingly occupying a secondary, even tertiary place as a 
medium to provide relevant information compared to the pre-eminence of TV, radio and 
Internet, the written press should receive a special attention.  Numerous shortcomings indicate 
that, despite being preferred by the public, TV, radio and internet fail to engage the public in a 
proper analysis, causing distortion in the public understanding of how political systems actually 
work. with direct effects on the voter`s capacity to choose in a fully informed manner. For 
example, American society considers the TV the most reliable source of political news, and 
this has been an increasing trend since 1960s (Mervin, 1998, p.9). However, this comes 
packaged with serious problems: watching news on television doesn`t engage the mind the 
same way as reading newsprint: the quality of news broadcast on TV is affected by the limited 
time available and the permanent need of good visuals even though this means that the reality 
gets distorted by over simplification, exaggeration or even trivialisation (Mervin, 2008:10-11).  
By contrast, to engage the written word means to follow a line of thought, which requires 
considerable powers of classifying, inference-making and reasoning. It means to uncover lies, 
confusions and overgeneralizations, to detect abuses of logic and of common sense. It also 
means to weigh ideas, to compare and contrast assertions, to connect one generalization to 
another ... In a culture dominated by print, public discourse tends to be characterized by a 
coherent orderly arrangement of facts and ideas (Mervinh, 2008:.9) 
 If we consider the increasing popularity of TV and radio, the written press remains, despite 
being pushed to the back, the medium which would allow the reader to get a proper overview 
of a certain situation and detect manipulation by allowing him the time and space to detect the 
logical fractures in the content of the text (Curran, 2009:13-15).  If we consider the increasing 
popularity of the internet, the written press remains probably the most straightforward area 
when it comes about the expertise and the financial, political and ethical coordinates of those 
delivering and commenting the information.  
 
3.2.1 Media and Politics between 1990 and 2004: Parting with Communism 
 
 The first reason for doing research on the reporting of political corruption by the 
Romanian press is the fact that since the end of Communism the Romanian media and the 
political arena have had a corrupt relationship, caused to a large degree by the economic 
hardships the media encountered. As a consequence, blackmail, censorship and distorted 
reporting became common occurrences. 
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The period 1990 – 2004, particularly the mandate of Adrian Năstase as Prime Minister 
(2000 – 2004), was characterized by a weak media in the strong hands of the party in power. 
Unsupported by legislation or by the overruled judiciary, creaking under the lack of financial 
facilities and of any economic protection, the Romanian press, instead of becoming a guardian 
of democracy and public interest, turned into both a victim and an aggressor. It became a 
victim, as money for advertising made it vulnerable to pressure from the political arena; it also 
became an aggressor as the use of advertising as an instrument for editorial control allowed 
some press institutions to practice blackmail (Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei19, 2001/2002).  
The electoral year 200420 is a reference one, as the main party in power (the Social-
Democratic Party – PDS) launched a strong campaign against the audio-visual media (Agenţia 
de Monitorizare a Presei, 2004).  Debts were cancelled and government advertising was granted 
in a non-transparent and preferential manner by public institutions and state-owned companies 
(AMP, 2004). As a consequence, the political control over the national Radio and TV station 
politically distorted the information broadcast (AMP, 2001/2002). Strong evidence exists that 
this campaign was a fully intended process. The declarations of the PSD leaders of the time, 
the official documents of PSD, the records of the PSD staff meetings published by the national 
press and confirmed by Mircea Geoană, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and one of 
PSD`s vice-presidents, indicate that the campaign against the media was intentional and 
carefully organised (Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei, 2004). 
Media feudalisation/” berlusconisation” emerged as a strong feature of the media during 
Năstase`s government, a consequence of the fact that the media did not benefit from any fiscal 
advantage, depending on direct sales only. The process took place at local level, wherever 
power had become concentrated in the hands of political leaders and businessmen, usually the 
same persons.  In consequence, editorial censorship and political harassment of journalists 
became rife. Rodica Culcer, Cosmin Prelipceanu and Nadina Forga21 are three journalists who 
became famous for leaving their jobs due to censorship and political pressure coming from 
their editors trying to politically manipulate the news bulletins (Agenţia de Monitorizare a 
Presei, 2003). 
 
                                                          
19 Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei = (Eng) Agency for Press Monitoring. 
20 Local, General and Presidential elections took place in 2004. 
21Rodica Culcer, Cosmin Prelipceanu and Nadina Forga, all working with the News Department of Europa FM 
Radio station, resigned on 5th of April 2003 saying that the management demanded them to avoid presenting 
news that might have been inconvenient for the political power. Europa FM belonged to the French 
“Lagardere” corporation whose main activity is building airplanes.  
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3.2.2 Media and Politics between 2005 and 2007 
 
The second reason for doing research on the Romania press reporting political 
corruption is the fact that once the new class of media owners appeared, the relationship 
between the Romanian press and the political realm became a channel through which the media 
owners would get political and business advantages and would be protected from a weak legal 
system looking to uncover and punish those doing corruption, sometimes with the price of 
severe political crises. The shadow of Communism is still present in the Romanian press, which 
sometimes employs methods specific to the old Communist Security such as infiltrating the 
press with covert intelligence officers.  
The change of regime after the election at the end of 2004 brought changes in the media 
outlook. The new government took measures to improve the media landscape by suspending 
public advertising, summoning the media institutions to pay their debts and by deciding 
together with the representatives of media institutions and media NGOs a set of new regulations 
in order to make the distribution or media advertising more transparent. Unfortunately, the 
freedom of the media at the time was wrongly understood as the freedom of owners to use the 
media for their own interests. Thus businessmen and politicians who already had or managed 
to take control over media institutions used it as an instrument to get political or business 
advantages, to the prejudice of the public’s right to be properly informed (Agenţia de 
Monitorizare a Presei, 2005/2006). The clearest example is the media trust of conservative MP, 
Dan Voiculescu: by using his media he was at the heart of two major political crises in Romania 
when the Head of State, President Traian Băsescu, was suspended twice by the Parliament, in 
2007 during his first mandate and then in 2012 during his second mandate, and reinstated each 
time by the vote of the electorate.  
Starting in 2006 it emerged that the Romanian media had been infiltrated by the 
intelligence services. This information was brought to the public’s attention by the journalists` 
association Civic Media22  that launched the “Voci Curate”23 campaign trying to expose 
opinion makers, columnists and journalists in management positions that had collaborated with 
the former political police (the Communist “Securitate”). Civic Media made a list with more 
than 1000 people and requested the National Council for the Study of Securitate Archives 
(CNSAS) to verify whether these people were responsible for political police misdeeds during 
                                                          
22 www.civicmedia.ro  
23 “Voci Curate” = (Eng) “Clean Voices”. 
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the communist regime. Shortly after, several reputed journalists and public personalities 
confessed or were exposed by CNSAS as former collaborators of Securitate.  In July, 
Curentul24 daily published correspondence from 2001 between the Director of the Romanian 
Intelligence Service (SRI) at that moment, Radu Timofte and the Great Romania Party (PRM) 
Senator, Damian Brudaşcu. According to these documents, Timofte admitted that SRI had 
infiltrated agents into various editorial offices. Subsequently, the press published information 
stating that the other secret services were trying to recruit and infiltrate agents amongst 
journalists (Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei, 2006/2007). 
 
3.2.3 Media and Politics between 2007 and 2014: The Economic Crisis 
 
The third reason for researching the Romanian press reporting political press is the 
impact of the relationship media-political realm on the quality of journalistic products and 
journalists` ethics, especially in the aftermath of an economic crisis. 
 The period immediately before the major economic crisis that started in 2008 recorded 
increased political pressures on the Romanian media, especially from the highest levels of the 
political class, President Traian Băsescu committing the most serious misdeeds25 in 2007. 
Public media became subject to negotiations between the political parties and, for the first time, 
a politician with a leadership position in a major party was appointed as the Director of the 
Public Television (Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei, 2007).  
The tough economic crisis took its toll on the Romanian media, which became even 
more vulnerable to economic and political pressures. A depressed advertising market affected 
the budgets, followed by waves of dismissals, resignations, re-groupings and wage reductions. 
MediaSind, the Romanian Federation of Journalists, estimates that 4,000 journalists lost their 
jobs in 2009 - 2010. As a consequence, the control of politicians over mass-media institutions 
became powerful yet again by means of advertising contracts, while the press groups’ 
employers proved to be engaged in supporting one or another of the presidential candidates 
(Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei, 2009/2010). New types of economic relations between 
                                                          
24 “Curentul” = (Eng) “The Current”. 
25 The most widely covered incident was when Băsescu grabbed the phone of a journalist who was filming him 
with her phone, in a public space. The President left the scene and took the phone with him. He did not know the 
phone was still recoding so he recorded himself insulting the journalist in a private conversation with his wife 
(he called the journalist “dirty gypsy”) (Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei, 2007, 5). 
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politicians and media were generated as concrete cases were identified of favourable news 
being bought with public funds. (Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei, 2009/2010). 
Following these developments, the press underwent an unprecedented crisis of image. 
The Global Barometer of Corruption 2009, maintained by Transparency International 
(Transparency International, 2009), mentions the Romanian mass-media for the first time at 
the top of the most corrupted institutions, due to the partisan editorial policies. As a symptom, 
a new journalistic genre, involving politicians, was invented: the non-stop, live, political soap-
opera.  Everyday, TV studios invited representatives of political parties and “analysts” of the 
most unusual kind. Several times a day, in marathon-like shows, they discussed “topics of the 
day” and begun arguing on any subjects, accusing one another of political bias and 
manipulation. The protagonists lived in a continuing unattested conspiracy and journalists 
made no efforts to clarify things (Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei, 2010/2011).  
Despite this, Romanians consider the media to be the most credible source of 
information about corruption. According to the study “The citizens` perception of corruption 
in public institutions: causes, practices, prevention” (National Agency for Civil Servants, 
Support Programs for Sustainable Development Association, 2010: p. 15) conducted by the 
National Agency of Civil Servants in partnership with the Support Programs for Sustainable 
Development Association – Agenda 21, 73.54% of Romanians consider the mass-media as the 
most reliable source of information about corruption. Despite the high percent of Romanians 
trusting the media to inform them about corruption, the same study indicates that only 36.9% 
of respondents declared they knew about corruption cases from the written press. When asked 
to give examples their answers were rather diffuse. The trust in the Romanian press has been 
however on a decreasing trend. Between January 2014 and May 2015, only between 32.5% 
and 37.4% of Romanians trusted the press much and very much (INSCOP - Adevărul26, 2015). 
 
3.3 Aims of the Research 
 
Mass-media have always been perceived as a potential, if imperfect, instrument for 
uncovering, raising awareness, explaining, debating and proposing and promoting solutions to 
different problems arising in a society. As we could see in the previous chapter, media is part 
of the external mechanisms at work to identify corruption where the internal mechanisms of 
                                                          
26 Adevărul = (Eng) The Truth. 
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different institutions fail to play their role. It could be reasonably expected that the Romanian 
media should be one of the main instruments used by society to tackle corruption: starting with 
investigations and disclosure of corrupt acts and going through the classical roles of informing 
the public, the media has as well a role in changing mentalities, practices and customs.  
Political economy of the media sees the manufacture of cultural goods as production of 
meaning resulted from the exercise of power (Murdock, Golding, 2005). As such, the first aim 
of this thesis is to explore how news about political corruption is reported by the Romanian 
press to its public. That is to explore the news depiction of political corruption in order to assess 
the prevalent content and sources of news corroborated with an overview of the social universe 
presented by the news (who the main actors are, how are they linked in the political network, 
how are they presented by the press).  
Political economy of the media addresses two fundamental issues: the pattern of 
ownership of the media and its consequences in terms of control over the media`s activities and 
the nature of the relationship between state regulation and media institutions (Murdock & 
Golding, 2005). Following this path, the second aim focuses on the characteristics of the 
relationship between the media ownership and political realm in Romania. It will explore the 
particular political-institutional and economic realities characteristic of the Romanian press-
political elite nexus.  
Ownership is a core subject of political economy of the media. Focused on the relations 
developed between the economic section of society and the political arena, political economy 
of the media looks at the social relations and the play of power through the consequences of 
the broad patterns of power and ownership (Murdock, Golding, 2005). In the case of Romania, 
reports released by international organisations emphasize the tight connection between media 
ownership, political distortions and inefficiency of the judicial system.  
A report released by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2013) 
states that the Romanian outlets were instruments at the disposal of the political parties and had 
become vulnerable to political interests due to the troubled financial situation of the media 
market in recent years. For example, Dan Voiculescu27`s Intact organisation was identified as 
an instrument of political manipulation which played an overwhelming role during the 
parliamentary elections in 2012 (OSCE, 2013).  
                                                          
27  Dan Voiculescu, politician and entrepreneur, is a controversial figure in Romania due to the trouble caused by 
his political ambitions, which he propelled with the support of his media empire, as well as due to his 
connection to the former Communist Securitate. He is currently serving a 10-year term in prison for corruption. 
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The European Commission`s Report, Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification 
(2013), portrays the Romanian media as an element blocking the independence of the judicial 
system in dealing with cases of political corruption. For this reason, the European Commission 
recommended the revision of the existing norms linked to the media, so that the freedom of the 
press would be accompanied by a corresponding protection of institutions and fundamental 
human rights (European Commission, 2013). This recommendation has been questioned by 
experts in the Romanian media. Ioana Avădani, Manager of the Independent Centre for 
Journalism, considers that the report correctly identified the phenomenon of media pressure on 
the judicial system but had mistaken its root causes; the problem is not that the institutions have 
to be protected against the media but the fact that the media have to be protected against those 
who are able to seize control of them and use them to exert pressures on the institutions and 
fundamental human rights. According to Ioana Avădani, the Romanian media had published 
news reports that could be seen as attempts to intimidate and exert pressure on the judiciary, 
“but omitting the fact that those media outlets were carrying out a direct order, be it of a 
political or personal nature (…)” (Avădani cited by Haraga, 2013). 
The game between state regulation and media institutions has always been an issue 
which affected deeply the capacity of the Romanian media to perform independently. For 
instance, Reporters without Borders and its Romanian partner, the Media Monitoring Agency 
(MMA), took position in 2007 when the Romanian Constitutional Court decided to 
recriminalize press offences based on the argument that defamation and insult seriously 
violated personal dignity and would be a source of permanent conflict if not discouraged by a 
penal law. The measure was a result of complaints according to which the reform of the 
criminal code deprived the victims of a legal way to obtain redress (Reporters Without Borders, 
2007).  Two years later, the same organisations drew attention to the fact that the Romanian 
Government was trying to rush through a Civil and Criminal Code reform restricting the right 
to information, pointing at the same time to the fact that amendments to the criminal and civil 
codes were needed to conform to European media standards but they should be adopted after 
consulting all the actors involved: as it stands, the draft civil code “would reduce the work of 
the press to just putting out information and statements that have been explicitly approved by 
those that produce them. The right of reply is part of journalistic practice, but it cannot acquire 
the automatic character envisaged by this bill. The proposed reform’s requirements in the 
articles referring to data protection would also seriously undermine the right to the protection 
of sources that is the basis of all investigative journalism” (Reporters without Borders, 2009).  
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In 2010 Reporters without Borders and its Romanian partner, Active Watch – MMA 
and another 18 Romanian NGOs declared themselves outraged when the National Defence 
Strategy pointed to the Romanian press as a threat to national security. The document was 
approved by the Supreme Council for National Defence (SCND) and submitted to the 
Parliament. The document stated that “orchestrated media campaigns, aimed at slandering the 
state institutions by disseminating false information about their activity are one of Romania`s 
vulnerabilities” (Reporters Without Borders, 2010). Reporters without Borders and their 
partners declared that: “It is astounding that the government of a country that is a European 
Union member can regard the media as a threat to national security. We thought this kind of 
language was nowadays used only by dictatorial regimes that exploit national security concerns 
to legalise censorship and justify jailing lots of journalists. (…) The claims made about the 
media’s impact on defence strategy are completely unwarranted. If the press gets their facts 
wrong, European governments have many options at their disposal for ensuring that the facts 
are corrected and they rarely fail to take advantage of them (…)” (Reporters Without Borders, 
2010). 
Reporters Without Borders continue describing the media environment in Romania in 
2011 as a “disturbing panorama of continuing media decline” dominated by many conflicts of 
interest and power struggles, populated by journalists without proper work contracts and 
threatened by lawsuits leading to disproportionate damages and threatened by bankruptcy, as a 
total of 6,000 journalists and media workers had been laid off and at least 60 newspapers had 
closed since the start of the economic crisis. At the heart of the entire disaster, “Romania`s 
politicians are steadily undermining Europe`s status as a model of media freedom” (Reporters 
Without Borders, 2011).   
The third aim explores how this relationship, media ownership – political realm, 
influences the Romanian journalist in terms of professional autonomy, daily practice, 
recruitment and professional ideology. Critical Political Economy of media does not see the 
production of communication only as a reflection of different competing interests but as well 
as a result of the aspirations, codes and professional ideologies of those working for 
communication bodies. It tries at the same time to establish not only how far the workers in the 
field can exercise autonomy given the economic constraints but “to what extent the economic 
structure of media prevents some forms of expression” (Murdock & Golding, 2005: 74).  
Murdock and Golding (2005) recommend the dynamics to be assessed through their concrete 
impact on daily practice, recruitment and professional ideology in order to understand the 
consequences of the relations between media ownership interests, economic imperatives and 
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cultural production. This requires the study of how human resources in media do their work, 
the way sources of power and authority build agendas and the connection between the market 
and work situations.  
 
3.4 Methods & Methodology 
 
3.4.1 Discourse Analysis Defined 
 
Since discourse generally is understood as a writing which embodies beliefs, values and 
categories that represent primarily a way of looking at the world, and an organization or 
representation of experience (Fowler cited by Deacon, Pickering, Golding, & Murdock, 2007) 
and media discourse particularly is an essential context for understanding the formation of 
public opinion (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989), the discourse-based approach to news analysis 
is used for the first aim. Quantitative (frequency and thematic analysis) and qualitative (frame 
analysis) content analysis of the texts are deployed in order to provide a clear image of the 
representational (social universe) of press news. 
If the quantitative content analysis reveals the thematic universe, the frame analysis 
performs four main functions: it defines problems, diagnoses causes, evaluates actions and 
prescribes solutions, helping in this way to identify the particular ways of seeing or thinking 
about high level political corruption, and how the problem is defined, explained and morally 
evaluated (Deacon, Pickering, Golding, & Murdock, 2007). Of course, the media might not 
always perform all these functions; however, the identified patterns will show those discursive 
components that structure the political corruption frame, allowing in this way a reflective look 
at the manner in which the media are performing these functions. Since the content of the 
discourse is always the outcome of a value-added process (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989), the 
frame analysis shows how the discourse about high level political corruption has evolved and 
changed over time. Based on the fact that news and information have no intrinsic value unless 
put in a context that provides coherence, frames are the main devices that make sense of 
relevant events and suggest what is at issue (London, 1993). 
The first aim discloses the salient framing schemas/frameworks behind the major ways 
corruption is reported, discussed, interpreted and understood by the Romanian press (Gamson 
& Modigliani, 1989). Since media discourse is a meaning system in its own right (Gamson, 
1992) and because content analysis does not work reliably when codes are required “to read 
between the lines” (Van Zoonen, 1994), frame analysis helps reveal the latent aspects of 
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content like ways of defining the problem, the suggested ways to think about the problem and 
suggestions about how to remedy it (Kinder, 1998). The first aim also shows what is the social 
universe presented by these news (who the main actors are, how are they linked in the political 
network, how are they presented by the press).  
 
3.4.2 Algorithm of Research 
 
The first step was to measure the frequency in reporting political corruption in the 
Romanian press for each of the three cases mentioned before, in order to see how visible the 
topic was and how much attention the press paid to it. The second step was to identify the 
critical discourse moments since they make the discourse on any particular issue especially 
visible (Gamson, 1992) by generating commentary and debate on a topic (Chilton a, 1987). 
The critical discourse moments identified revealed what were the most important topics, in 
which order these appeared, what was the time dedicated to each, what was the relationship 
between topics, how they emerged and what were the main actors involved, bringing the most 
mediatised cases to light. These cases were analysed through the media events as such moments 
are characterised by a noticeable intensification of the communicative process (Balkin, 1998). 
The frequency analysis answered the following questions: what were the most 
frequently presented topics about a particular politician? What was the content type used for 
presenting the corruption of the particular politician? What tone was used in presenting the acts 
of corruption done by the politician? What are the information sources of corruption coverage 
in political corruption cases?  
The frame analysis answered the following questions: what are the main aspects of 
corruption presented by journalists? What are the suggested ways to think about the problem 
of corruption? Any suggestions about how to remedy the problem of corruption? Any journalist 
ethic?  
The categories of content presented by this research are the categories of content as stipulated 
by each Romania newspaper. As such, the content counted as news or, for example, 
investigation, was taken from articles categorised by the Romanian newspaper researched as 
“news” or “investigation”.   
The detailed algorithm I used comprises four steps:  
1) On-line research was undertaken to identify all the articles linked to the name of the 
politician researched. 
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2) An initial monitoring of the identified articles was conducted in order to select all the articles 
comprising the name of the politician which had corruption as the main topic. Based on this 
initial monitoring I identified the most presented topics about the corruption done by the 
researched politician. 
3) As Critical Discourse Moments are essentially moments of discourse crises (Chilton a, 
1987), times when “discourse on an issue is especially visible” and “they stimulate commentary 
in various public forms by sponsors of different frames, journalists and other observers” 
(Chilton a, 1987), I identified the period of time comprising the moments when the frequency 
of published material about the researched politician`s corrupt acts was highest.  
4) As media events are those events which are created by the media or attract particular 
attention by the media and are characterised by a noticeable intensification of the 
communicative process, I identified those events linked to the politician`s corrupt acts within 
the critical discourse moments. These events were preceded or followed by an increase in the 
frequency of the news items. When this happened, I took into account the preceding of 
following months as well. As a result, I analysed the news items published during several 
months.  
 
3.4.3 Case Studies 
 
Since political corruption is mostly about elected politicians (Hodess, 2004), this 
research considered three case studies: the former Prime Minister Adrian Năstase, top politician 
Dan Voiculescu, both strongly linked to their Communist pasts, both investigated for 
corruption and sentenced to prison, and the Microsoft – EADS case.  
Adrian Năstase has become notorious due to the corrupt acts that marked his mandate 
as Prime Minister between 2000 and 2004 as well as due to the significant censorship and 
pressure he put on the media during his prime ministerial mandate, especially by using the arm 
of public funding of advertising in the media. He is a symbol of how the system used to protect 
its corrupt politicians, as no criminal investigation against him started until he lost the 
Presidential elections to Traian Băsescu in 2004, and consequently the leadership of his party, 
the Social Democrat Party (PSD). 
Dan Voiculescu on the other hand was criminally investigated and sentenced to 10 years 
in prison for corruption at the top of his political power. Surrounded by close politicians 
positioned in key offices (some of them owing him significant amounts of money, impossible 
to repay from the ministerial wage alone, such as Daniel Alexandru, the Minister of 
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Agriculture) as well by his huge media empire and numerous NGOs he had set up in order to 
create the image of a charitable and responsible politician, and despite all the judicial artifices 
used, he couldn`t avoid being judged and convicted for his acts.  
The Microsoft – EADS case offers an overview of the level of political corruption in 
Romania due to the high number of politicians involved as well as due to the mechanism that 
helped the corrupt practices be perpetuated from politician to politician. The case focuses on 
corruption that has taken place at the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of 
Communications since Adrian Năstase`s Prime Ministerial mandate. This case research is 
significant as it raises questions about what is actually happening in other, more sensitive and 
less effective ministries, such as the Ministry of Transportation and Ministry of Roads and 
Motorways (for example, many know Romania is infamous for its having only 435 km of 
motorway built by the end of 2013, despite significant funding from the EU) (Neferu, 2013) 
and the Ministry of Regional Development, an authority in charge of investment projects 
developed mostly with money from the EU.  
 
3.4.4 Newspapers, Blogs & Websites 
 
Following Deacon, Pickering, Golding, & Murdock (2007), content analysis was used 
to obtain an “objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication” (Deacon & al, 2007) about high level political corruption in selected 
newspapers. To obtain a representative sample, I have chosen highly respected, good quality 
newspapers with medium to high circulation, privately owned, read by different socio-
economic strata and different age groups. Together they represent a major source of 
information, especially for news such as politics and corruption. I have selected as well the 
most representative websites for presenting and commenting political corruption, Vox Publica, 
România Curată 28, HotNews, Contributors, Critic Atac, Cătălin Tolontan. Unfortunately, for 
the purposes of this research only HotNews proved to be consistent in its reporting for the 
period of time researched, 2004 - 2014. A reputable news website, HotNews has an entire 
section dedicated to reporting corruption cases, up-dated in real time.  
Evenimentul Zilei29 was the most read quality daily broadsheet of general information 
in 2014. It had an average general distribution of 14,403 copies and 103,000 readers per edition 
                                                          
28 România Curată = (Eng) Clean Romania. 
29 Evenimentul Zilei = (Eng) The Event of the Day. 
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(BRAT30, 2015). Between January – March 2015 it was the most read high quality newspaper 
in Romania (13,000 copies), followed by Romania Libera31 (10,300 copies); Jurnalul 
National32 was read by 4,807 Romanians within the same period (Pagina de Media, 2015).  
Evenimentul Zilei was set up in 1992 by journalists, Cornel Nistorescu and Ion Cristoiu (whom 
I interviewed for this thesis) and businessman, Mihai Cârciog. It was bought by the German 
media trust Gruner&Jahr in 1998 and sold to the Swiss media trust, Ringier, in 2003. In 
February 2010 the newspaper was bought by the Romanian businessman, Bobby Păunescu.  
 Evenimentul Zilei positioned itself from the beginning as an anti-communist and pro-
democracy newspaper, so it was an adversary of the power represented by Ion Iliescu and his 
party. Its inclination towards the right galvanised the support of this newspaper for President 
Băsescu and his supporters in the Liberal Democrat Party. This support went beyond the legal 
limits during the electoral campaign for the general elections in 2014. Newspaper Libertatea33 
mentions that according to the prosecutors within the National Anti-Corruption Authority 
(DNA), people around Elena Udrea, President Băsescu`s closest political collaborator, made 
monthly payments of €10,000.00 from money received as bribes to “postaci”, people specially 
hired to post comments under fictive identities on the internet pages of newspapers and news 
portals (Libertatea, 2015). The Free Ex Report about the Freedom of Press in Romania 2014 – 
2015 shows that the coordinator of these “postaci” was Cristi Călugăru, one of Evenimentul 
Zilei`s editors (Active Watch, 2015: 15). 
 Romania Libera is a daily broadsheet of general information with national distribution. 
It was the second most read quality daily broadsheet of general information, with an average 
distribution of 13,712 copies and 37,000 readers per edition in 2014 (BRATa, 2015). The 
newspaper is currently owned by Medien Holding Society, a press trust owned by businessman 
Dan Adamescu. Adamescu acquired România Liberă from the German group WAZ that left 
the Eastern European markets in 2010 in the aftermath of the economic crisis started in 2008. 
România Liberă is one of the oldest newspapers in Romania. It was set up in 1877 and 
became the second most important newspaper in Communist Romania behind Scânteia34. It 
was re-launched during the Revolution on December 1989 by journalist Petre Mihai Băcanu 
after his release from the Communist prison where he had been thrown by the Communist 
regime under the accusation of preparing to launch a clandestine newspaper. Under Băcanu`s 
                                                          
30  BRAT = (Eng.) The Romanian Office for Audit and Circulation. 
31 România Liberă = (enG) Free Romania. 
32 Jurnalul Naţional = (Eng) The National Journal. 
33 Libertatea = (Eng) Freedom. 
34 Scânteia = (Eng.) The Flame 
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management and leadership România Liberă became one of the first anti-communist and pro-
democracy private newspapers in Romania with an orientation towards the right wing of the 
political spectrum, focusing on under-cover investigations, editorials and interviews.  Petre 
Mihai Băcanu is one of the journalists I interviewed for this research.   
 The present owner of România Liberă, Dan Adamescu, is serving a four years and 
four months term in prison for corruption. The Romanian authorities discovered in 2014 that 
Adamescu had transferred between 2011 and 2014 €23.00 million from Astra Insurance 
Company, a company in financial difficulties which was put under administration, owned by 
Adamescu, to Medien Holding Society, as loans that have never been returned. In exchange, 
România Liberă published misleading information about the financial robustness of Astra 
Insurance Company by stating under the headline “The Most Secure Insurance Company in 
Romania Consolidated in 2013” that “Astra Insurances remain a solid company clients and 
partners can trust. Its solvency and liquidity will exceed double the legal limits, and the social 
capital will approach €100.00 million, according to the consolidated financial results for 
2013, estimated by the company in an official press release” (Marin, 2014). 
Criminal investigation was started by the National Anticorruption Authority against 
Dan Adamescu in May 2014 as he allegedly bribed two senior judges at the Bucharest Tribunal 
with €15,000.00 and €5,000.00 to get favourable resolution in his insolvency case. Adamescu`s 
barrister was a witness in this case and killed himself in an underground station after being 
questioned at the National Anticorruption Authority (DNA). According to newspaper 
Gândul35, Adamescu`s barrister killed himself after showing the DNA prosecutors documents 
indicating that Adamescu and his son gave bribes (Gândul, 2014). 
 In June 2014 the distribution numbers of România Liberă were halved due to a report 
of PriceWaterhouseCoopers for BRAT (The Romanian Office for Audit and Circulation). 
The report showed that the representatives of România Liberă had inflated the circulation 
numbers by 60% for many years, cheating their advertising clients, media partners and the 
public. Doru Buşcu, an investigation journalist who first signalled the problem during an 
interview in 2012 (Nicoleanu, 2012) was sued by Adamescu for damages of RON 510,00036 
in 2013. Adamescu lost the trial (Jurnalul Nationala, 2013). 
Jurnalul Naţional was the third most read quality daily broadsheet in 2014 with 4,807 
readers (Pagina de Media, 2015). It was set up in 1993 and is owned by Intact Media Group, 
                                                          
35 Gândul = (Eng) The Thought. 
36 RON 510,000 = £ 85,407.20 (October 2015). 
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founded and owned by controversial politician Dan Voiculescu and his family. Intact Media 
Group is one of the most powerful media trusts in Romania and has 100% Romanian capital. 
It comprises six TV stations (Antena 1, Antena 3, Antena Stars, Arena Internaţional, Euforia 
Lifestyle TV, ZU TV), two radio stations (Radio ZU, Romantic FM), two newspapers (Jurnalul 
Naţional, Gazeta Sporturilor) and three magazines (BBC Top Gear, BBC Science World, BBC 
Good Food) (Intact Media Group, 2015).  Antena 3 TV station has been affiliated to CNN since 
October 2011 (Antena 3, 2011).  
Jurnalul Naţional and Antena 3 TV station are highly controversial from a political 
point of view. It is acknowledged that Dan Voiculescu used them as a tool for his political 
purposes as well as a way of protecting himself against the criminal investigations started 
against him for corruption with undervalued state property.  Dan Voiculescu is currently 
serving a ten-year term in prison for corruption and his media empire is led by one of his 
daughter, Camelia Voiculescu.    
Gândul used to be a daily broadsheet of general information, national distribution. It 
was set up in May 2005 by journalist Cristian Tudor Popescu and Mircea Dinescu. Cristian 
Tudor Popescu had resigned together with his team of journalists from Adevărul newspaper.  
Gândul gave up the printed form on April 8, 2011. Its digital format received 501,102 visits 
on September 14, 2015. The editorial team has been led by Cristian Tudor Popescu until his 
resignation this year. Cristian Tudor Popescu was the president of the Romanian Press Club 
until 2006 when he resigned displeased by the representation of journalists in the Club but 
was re-elected in 2007. The opinion polls designated him as Romania`s best journalist 
between 2005 – 2008. He was famous for his distaste for President Băsescu and politicians 
close to him. 
 Gândul newspaper belongs to Mediafax Group which owns as well Mediafax News 
Agency. Mediafax Group is owned by Adrian Sârbu, a consummate Romanian businessman in 
the media. Sârbu was accused by Social Democrat Prime Minister, Victor Ponta, of blackmail 
done via his media in order to avoid paying the fiscal debts his companies acquired. Ponta 
declared: “Sârbu told me he made all the Heads of State and if I want he can make me Head of 
State too. I told him, no, thank you. I would prefer you to pay your taxes. Our relationship has 
been very cold since then” (Romania TV, 2014). Ponta mentioned as well that Sârbu asked him 
to stop the fiscal checks done by the tax authority on his companies and underlined that his 
refusal prompted the publication of press materials hostile to the Prime Minister: “The only 
one who had been in my office was Mr. Sârbu who asked me if I could stop the checks done 
by the National Authority for Fiscal Administration (ANAF). I told him I could not” (HotNews 
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a, 2014). Gândul newspaper reported comprehensively about a corruption file involving a local 
Social Democrat oligarch. The file mentions as well the name of Prime Minister Ponta. Adrian 
Sârbu was accused in February 2015 of tax evasion, money laundry and instigation to 
embezzlement and taken into preventive custody.  
Revista 2237 is the first independent post-communist weekly magazine, highly 
respected today as a publication about the political culture in Romania. Its name is dedicated 
to the date of the 22nd of December 1989, when Nicolae Ceauşescu left the building of the 
Central Committee, fleeing by helicopter. The magazine was set up by “Grupul pentru Dialog 
Social”38, the first NGO which appeared in post-communist Romania at the end of December 
1989 by bringing together dissidents and intellectuals. The group expanded to comprise 
different professional avenues such as philosophers, sociologists, writers and historians and 
promoted the plurality of opinions. Grupul Pentru Dialog Social claims to promote via its 
magazine principles such as: support for the pro-Western orientation, support for the 
democratic values and institutions, support for minorities and a critical attitude towards power 
abuses. 
Blogs & Websites 
The selection of websites and blogs approaching the subject of political corruption has 
proven not to be straightforward. As indicated in Chapter 2, “Political culture, Political 
Corruption” (page 22), this is an area dominated by anonymity, where it is difficult to establish 
what author is or is not a real journalist, and an instrument in the hands of political parties and 
interest groups to promote their own interests. To avoid this difficulty, I did not consider the 
website or the blog as a source per se and I counted the journalist of the expert publishing there 
as a source. I encountered as well difficulties due to the fact that some articles published in 
newspapers were copied on these websites, sometimes even two or three times, so I had to be 
careful to avoid counting the same material more than once in my analysis. Another difficulty 
I encountered during the monitoring of blogs and websites is the fact that some of them seemed 
to have been built with the purpose of promoting a certain topic or subject and went dormant 
(nothing else was published) once the topic had become obsolete. I removed such websites 
from my research. As a result, I selected in the end just three websites and one blog. 
HotNews is a Romanian news website, set up in 1999 by two Romanian journalists: 
Ionel Mărgărit Timbolschi and Manuela Preoteasa. Its initial purpose was to gather the most 
                                                          
37 Revista 22 = (Eng) 22 Magazine. 
38 Grupul pentru Dialog Social = (Eng) The Group for Social Dialogue. 
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important topics from the Romanian press and present them as a press review. In 2000s 
HotNews started producing its own materials, the result of its own investigations and coverages. 
In 2004 Hotnews started organising online meetings via its website between public 
personalities and its readers. It has had links with BBC, RFI and Deutsche Welle. It has an 
entire section dedicated to political corruption called “HotNews Corruption Files” (HotNews 
a, 2015). According to BRAT, HotNews registered 341,202 visits on September 30, 2015 and 
835,659 readings (BRATb, 2015). 
Contributors.ro is a political debate website. It is a pilot project of the Association 
“Online Society” and it defines itself as “a civic platform of opinions and analysis” 
(Contributors.ro, 2015) where free authors can share their experiences and knowledge through 
a relaxed debate meant to offer new perspectives on the most important subjects of the day.   
Critic Atac defines itself as a leftist group of social, intellectual and political critique. 
It considers that civil society is too much like politics so it promises to stay away from the 
political parties and have a political impact from outside the establishment (Critic Atac, 2015). 
Its purpose is to promote a sharp critical discourse about the most important problems of 
society. Critic Atac is coordinated by journalist Costi Rogozanu, one of the journalists I 
interviewed for this thesis.  
Cătălin Tolontan (www.tolo.ro) is the blog of investigative journalist Cătălin Tolontan. 
Initially specialised on reporting sport events, Cătălin Tolontan has become known as 
investigative journalist by uncovering corruption by the former Minister of Youth and Sports, 
Monica Iacob Ridzi and former Minister of Tourism and Development, Elena Udrea. His 
investigations focus on politicians, representatives of central public administration and high 
representatives of the legal system.  
 
3.4.5 Press Partisanship 
 
Having a clear view of the political partisanship of these newspapers can be revelatory 
to understand the relationship between press and the political arena. In their article about 
patterns of press partisanship in the UK 2010 general election, Dominic Wring and David 
Deacon (2010) analyse how the British media had shifted its support in time, by carefully 
analysing the various newspapers` editorial endorsements during previous electoral campaigns. 
Their conclusion according to which in Britain the newspaper industry has been a very 
important political actor (Wring & Deacon, 2010) could equally be applied to Romania. 
However, as we shall see below, there is a big difference between the British media partisanship 
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and the Romanian one. The Romanian newspaper partisanship is solely dictated by the 
immediate needs/interests of the media owner. In many cases, the need is to have un-paid taxes 
written off, as in case of Adrian Sârbu and his Mediafax Group (the owner of Gândul 
newspaper), or Court cases finished favourably as in case of Dan Adamescu and his Medien 
Holding Group (the owner of România Liberă newspaper). If the favour is not granted, the 
support is withdrawn and negative campaigns are started. In such situation is difficult to follow 
a pattern of partisanship from one electoral year to another. 
 A taste of how these relationships take place is offered by the famous case of Social 
Democrat candidate for Presidency, Mircea Geoană. The entire scene takes place in the night 
of Thursday, 3rd December 2009, during the final TV debate between the two candidates 
contesting for the highest position in state in a run off scheduled for the following Sunday took 
place. The Head of State, Traian Băsescu, was competing for a second Constitutional mandate 
and Mircea Geoană, the leader of the Social Democrat Party, desires to replace him.  This story 
shows how the mutual interest between the media owner and politician goes on quietly behind 
the scenes and the seriousness of the traded “services”: on one hand media mogul Vântu, 
considered to be the main culprit in a fraud that left thousands of Romanians without their life 
savings, is worried about the arrest of Nicolae Popa, the CEO of the investment fund via which 
he committed the fraud, while the presidential candidate seen as a winner at that time, Mircea 
Geoană, wants to make sure he has the back up of his media trust during those three days 
remaining until the elections. During the debate it emerged that the Social Democrat leader had 
visited the night before the media mogul, Sorin Ovidiu Vântu; his arrival had been recorded by 
paparazzi.  
The debate was mediated by journalist Robert Turcescu: 
“Traian Băsescu: Nicolae Popa, the man who looted the National Fund of Investment (FNI) 
on behalf of Vântu39 was arrested yesterday. 
Turcescu intervenes: Please focus! 
Traian Băsescu: Is there any connection between Vântu`s invitation to visit him with the arrest 
of Popa? 
Mircea Geoană: This is a huge lie. I do not know who Popa is. 
Traian Băsescu: Did you visit Vântu last night? 
Mircea Geoană: I said I did” (HotNews, 2009). 
                                                          
39 Sorin Ovidiu Vântu = controversial businessman and media owner. 
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This incident gives us a clue not only about how shifty, unsecure and short termed the media`s 
political support is but as well an indication of the manner in which stories about political 
corruption get in the press and how objectively they are reported.  
 
3.4.6 Interviews 
 
Jensen stated that the “news depiction of social reality has been decisively shaped by 
economic, political and organisational forces” (Jensen, 1986: 22).  Murdock and Golding 
(1973: 226) showed that the frameworks “necessarily articulated with the nexus of interests 
producing them”. In order to understand how the manufacture of the news about high level 
political corruption takes place in the context of socio-political and cultural dynamics, 
interviews with political scientists and journalists promoting the idea that the history of the 
Romanian post-communist press is a faithful mirror of what is happening in the political realm, 
and secondary document analysis is employed for the second and the third aims.  
The interviews are semi-structured to ensure that the main issues are addressed in a 
purposeful and organised manner but allow the participants the freedom to elaborate (Deacon, 
Pickering, Golding, & Murdock, 2007).  Where it was possible, the interviews were done face 
to face such as the case of Ion Cristoiu, Mihail Tatulici, Ion Diamandi and Andrei Țăranu. The 
rest of the interviews were conducted by phone (Petre Mihai Băcanu) or e-mail (Ioana Avădani, 
Răzvan Savaliuc, Cosmin Păcuraru, Costi Rogozanu, Colin McIntyre and William Horsley).  
Significant challenges were encountered when attempting to contact Romanian journalists 
for interviews. Most of them were very reluctant to speak and the reason becomes apparent in 
the interviews obtained from the more open journalists. The refusal came mostly from younger 
generations of journalists, while very experienced ones, such as Mihail Tatulici, Ion Cristoiu 
and Ion Diamandi were very open to talk about the developments within Romanian media and 
its connections with the political arena.  
Apart from Andrei Țăranu, Ion Diamandi, Colin McIntyre and William Horsley, who are 
personal connections of the researcher, the rest of the subjects accepted to be interviewed 
only after I was recommended by very trustworthy sources. The journalists interviewed were 
informed about the scope of the interviews, the topic of my research and the fact that their 
interviews might become public. None of them required confidentiality, although this option 
was given to them. Those who had privacy issues simply refused to give me any interview.  
The questionnaire I used was structured in three directions following the main coordinates 
of critical political economy of media as defined by Murdock and Golding (2005): media 
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ownership, media regulations and the relationship with the political arena and the 
characteristics of the Romanian journalists and his/her work conditions. Relevant information 
was gathered by using questions regarding behaviours, beliefs, attitudes and attributes.  The 
questionnaire begins with a section dedicated to the evolution of the post-communist Romanian 
press in order to provide an overview of the main trends the media followed during the quarter 
of a century after the fall of Communism.   
 
EVOLUTION OF THE ROMANIAN PRESS 
 
1. How would you describe the Romanian Press after the 1989 Revolution? 
2. How would you describe the Romanian Press today? 
3. Why do you think the Romanian mass-media evolved as they did compare to other post-
communist countries? 
 
REGULATION OF MASS-MEDIA IN ROMANIA 
 
4. Do you think the Romanian mass-media are properly regulated? 
5. What are, in your opinion, the faults in their regulation? 
6. Why do you think the Romanian mass-media have been regulated the way they are? 
 
MASS-MEDIA OWNERSHIP 
 
7. Some analysts consider that the present state of the Romanian mass-media is due to a group of 
media owners who have been trying to get control of this sector since 198940. What do you 
think about this idea? 
8. What do you think about the way the journalists are organised and represented in branches? 
9. How would you describe the media ownership in Romania? 
10. Some analysts consider that the reason the Romanian mass-media don’t have a proper leading 
organization is that this group of media owners wants to keep their monopoly and control the 
money in the area41. What do you think about this theory? 
 
                                                          
40 Coman, Mihai (2010), “Journalistic Elites in Post-Communist Romania”, Journalism Studies 11:4, 587-595, 
First publishes on: 8th of July 2010. 
41 Idem. 
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JOURNALISTS AND MEDIA MOGULS 
 
11. What do you think about the concept of “media moguls”? Is it a concept that could be applied 
to the Romanian mass-media?  
12. If yes, what elements do you think facilitated the appearance of the media moguls?  
13. How would you describe the typical Romanian journalist today? 
14. How would you define the concept of “media mogul”? 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICS AND THE MASS-MEDIA 
 
15. How would you describe the way the state is using its power as communicator in Romania? 
16. How would you characterise the relationship between politics and mass-media in Romania? 
17. How large do you think is the autonomy of those working within the media given the 
consequences of the broad political situation? 
18. Why do you think this relationship has evolved this way?  
19. What do you think are the effects of Government money for advertising?  
20. What do you think are the economic aspects that influence most the way the Romanian mass-
media are organized and are functioning? 
 
 
The journalists I interviewed are:  
 
 
 
Ion Cristoiu: born in 1948, Ion Cristoiu is a Romanian journalist, writer and political 
analyst. He started his career in Journalism in 1968 while he was still a student.  
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In 1990 three publications appeared under his coordination among which the first private 
newspaper in Romania, “Observator”. “Zig Zag” newspaper managed to reach 600,000 issues, 
a record at that time. After he resigned from the board of “Zig Zag” newspaper, he set up 
“Evenimentul Zilei”, a daily considered to be the publication which marked the beginning of 
the Romanian post-communist press. After he left “Evenimentul Zilei”, he cooperated with 
more publications. On 9th of December 2002 he became the Manager of Realitatea TV news 
station. On 10th of June 2003 Cristoiu resigned as he did not want to fulfil the request of the 
ownership to fire 100 people.  
 
 
 
Source: http://www.ziare.com/media/presa/ioana-Avădani-director-cji-rolul-televiziunilor-
de-stiri-nu-este-sa-aduca-bani-ci-influenta-interviu-1248151  
Ioana Avădani is the Manager of the Center for Independent Journalism. She has been 
working in the press for more than 15 years, working as a news and television agency journalist. 
Ioana has been managing programs for the professional preparation of journalists, providing 
assistance to media enterprises, conducting advocacy concerning the media legislation and 
strengthening the journalistic associations.  
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Source: http://www.reportervirtual.ro/2013/07/ce-face-pensionarul-mihai-
tatulici.html  
Mihai Tatulici: born in 1949, Tatulici is a Romanian Journalist and writer. His debut 
in the press took place in 1966.  In 1980 he started doing TV shows for the national state 
television, TVR. He worked here until 1989. His first success after 1989 was the TV show 
“Veniţi cu noi pe programul doi” (“Join us on the second channel”) where he got a rating of 
about 46%.  He set up the TV station, TELE 7 ABC but resigned in 1995. In 1996 he set up the 
Romanian Club of Press.  At the present he is a Programme Manager at Realitatea TV.  
Together with Sorin Ovidiu Vântu he owns a television station still in project and Mihai 
Tatulici Production. He invested money in a sugar products trading company and has an 
association with the PRO Trust in Mediafest Company.  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.webbrain.ro/politice2/pagini/andrei-538259ranu.php  
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Andrei Țăranu: Andrei is a Professor in Politics at the National School of Political 
Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest. He has been the Scientific Secretary of this 
institution since 2004. He is also the founder member and President of the Romanian 
Association of Political Studies, as well as Editor of “Cadran Politic” (“Political Dial”) 
magazine and Manager of “Perspective in Politică” (“Perspectives in Politics”) magazine. He 
is also a political adviser for the Liberal-Democrat Group in the Romanian Parliament.  
 
 
Source: http://roncea.ro/tag/Răzvan-savaliuc/  
Răzvan Savaliuc: benefitting from judicial training, Răzvan Savaliuc has been working 
as an investigative journalist since 1994. He worked for publications such as: “Ziua”, 
“Baricada”, “Cronica Română”, “Ora”. He works for “Ziua Veche”, an online publication.  He 
specializes in investigation concerning the political and judicial fields.  
 
Source: http://www.romanialibera.ro/stil-de-viata/casa-mea/iazul--un-accesoriu-la-
moda-pentru-gradina-305689 
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Ion Diamandi: trained as economist and researcher, Ion Diamandi has been working 
as a journalist for 20 years. He published over 1,000 articles on various fields and 10 books. 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.mediafax.ro/cultura-media/costi-rogozanu-paraseste-cotidianul-
4776709  
Costi Rogozanu: born in 1977, Costi Rogozanu is an author, blogger and a 
representative of the young generation of journalists focusing mostly on politics. He has been 
working as a journalist since 2002. Together with Şiulea, Ernu and Ţichindeleanu he 
coordinated the anthology “The Ilusion of anti-communism (“Iluzia anticomunismului”, 
published by Editura Cartier. 
 
Source: http://www.Păcuraru.eu/  
Cosmin Păcuraru: Cosmin has been working as a journalist since 1990 and has had 
first-hand experience in the Romanian mass-media while holding some senior positions.  He 
has also been involved with the political world, as he was the head of the Romanian Democratic 
Convention electoral campaign in 1996. 
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Source: http://williamhorsley.com/profile/  
William Horsley: William is a former BBC foreign correspondent for TV and Radio 
News active in Europe and Asia. He is now International Director of the Centre for Freedom 
of the Media at Sheffield University. He is also the Media Freedom Representative of the 
Association of European Journalists (AEJ) and Chairman of the AEJ UK Section. 
William recently attended the AEJ annual international Congress which took place in 
Bucharest in November 2011. The event was attended by journalists from about 20 European 
countries and the agenda included presentations and debates on the state of media, especially 
media freedom or the lack of it, in the countries of South-Eastern Europe and others on the 
western border of Russia. The Congress was addressed by the Romanian Foreign Minister, 
Teodor Baconschi. 
 
 
Source: http://www.tsinghua-gji.com/thomson_reuters_trainers.html  
 100 
 
Colin McIntyre (right, pictured here with the Czech Ambassador to London): Colin 
has been working as a Consultant for Reuters Foundation on Journalism training since 2000. 
Previously he worked as foreign correspondent and sub-editor for Reuters. He was sent to 
Romania during the Revolution in 1989 and he had first-hand experience with the communist 
mass-media during and after the Revolution. 
Following Deacon & al who think that analysis of secondary documents is invaluable 
for those seeking to map the general patterns but also to identify changes and continuities over 
time (Deacon D & al, 2007), my in-depth interviews are complemented by the analysis of 
secondary documents, including reports released by relevant national and international 
organisations monitoring the media, research materials generated in universities and official 
documents about the political realm in Romania.  
All the research undertaken used public sources, the information researched and 
provided in the case studies is public, no confidential sources were used.  
 
3.5 Summary 
 
The Romanian press has been passing through a very challenging process of 
liberalisation and modernisation. The corrupted relationship between the political realm and 
media owners is apparently one of the main culprits, manifested as financial pressures with 
significant consequences on the quality of the journalistic work, raising questions as well about 
the quality of human resource in the Romanian press in terms of both professional education 
and ethics. Although studies on the general state of the Romanian media has been done, none 
focuses specifically on the Romanian press reporting political corruption. This thesis intends 
to fill it this gap.  
Provided the circumstances, this research employs a critical discourse analysis to 
explore how news about political corruption is presented by the main Romanian newspapers 
and news websites. Qualitative and quantitative content analysis are used for the three case 
studies selected. Interviews with journalists and specialists in politics are employed in order to 
understand the characteristics of the relationship between media owners and politicians in 
Romania as well as in order to understand how this relationship affects the manner in which 
journalists are trained and perform their work. It is noticeable as well that the owners of three 
out of four most respected high quality newspapers are in prison for acts of corruption involving 
state property or dues.  
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Case Studies 
 
Romania has been carrying for a very long time the label of being one of the most 
corrupt countries in the EU. As we could see in the second chapter, it has a history of 
corruption, and corruption is ingrained in everyday life. The most recent political drama that 
has unfolded in Bucharest shows how serious the problem of corruption has become, as well 
as the fact that Romanians are nowhere near the point of saying clearly “Stop corruption! “.  
In the night of October 30, 2015, a former communist factory42 turned into a nightclub43 
in Bucharest with an approved capacity of 80 seated people hosted a free rock concert attended 
by 400 standing guests (Poenariu, 2015). The club went up in flames in a matter of seconds, 
killing 27 and critically injuring 155 spectators. By the time this chapter was written another 
31 had died, many of them in specialised units throughout Western Europe dealing with severe 
burns. The tragedy happened due to unsuitable sound isolation of the club, a polystyrene 
mixture which caught fire instantly when touched by sparks from fireworks. The fire spread 
instantly along the entire ceiling and released deadly fumes, an unseen mixture of many poisons 
which made many people inside lose consciousness before they could get out, or killed them 
later, although apparently they had made a lucky and safe escape from the club.  
New information about the club emerged during the following days. The club was 
considered among the best in Romania, but it did not have any proper licence to organise events 
of the scale of a rock concert (Poenariu, 2015). The Mayor in charge of that part of Bucharest 
declared that the representatives of the Town Hall could not check the club properly because 
the work programme at the Town Hall finishes at 17.00 and the Club opened at 18.30. The 
Inspectorate of Emergencies had refused to provide any licence as the club was not complying 
with the safety standards (Poenariu, 2015). The firemen who went inside the club declared the 
club did not have any windows, any airways, and the emergency door was blocked with a steel 
chain.  
All the authorities in charge knew the club was not safe but had turned a blind eye, 
presumably after receiving bribes, a too well known practice in Romania, but this time, people 
died. Many of them were students, very popular bloggers and photo-journalists, architects and 
journalists. All of the sudden death had become very real, and the trauma of seeing people 
killed in a building which should have been pulled down long ago added to the grievances of 
                                                          
42 The factory was called “The Pioneer” and manufactured sport shoes.  
43 The nightclub was called “Colectiv”. 
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Romanians fed up with corruption who had had to put up with a Prime Minister accused of 
many counts of corruption, including the plagiarism of his PhD thesis, and of limiting the right 
to vote of Romanians living abroad, as well with a Minister of Interior, indirectly responsible44 
for the tragedy in the nightclub, who had previously attempted to escape any responsibility for 
the death of one of his security guards who had died in a motorbike accident while being part 
of an illegal motorcade ordered by the minister himself.  
All these events brought Romanians onto the street in massive protests against 
corruption, and very soon the Prime Minister, Victor Ponta, resigned together with his entire 
government. This left the Head of State, Klaus Johannis, in the unhappy position of having to 
appoint a new Prime Minister to form a new government in a situation where the protesters in 
the street did not want politicians as Prime Minister Ponta as members of the new government. 
It had very soon become clear that Romanians could not accept a government formed of 
representatives from the political parties present the Parliament, as they were completely 
compromised due to the 7345 MPs avoiding criminal investigation for corruption thanks to 
parliamentary immunity. Different variants of action were proposed. One of them was that the 
MPs suspected or accused of corruption should resign and by-elections should take place. 
Another one was that the entire Parliament should resign and early elections should take place. 
The third option was that a government of technocrats should be formed to govern until the 
general elections next year.  
Instead of insisting on the resignation of the corrupt MPs leading to by-elections in 
which they could not contend anymore, as happened in the UK during the MPs` expenses 
scandal, the President preferred the third option in which a technocrat government will try to 
introduce reforms to cut down corruption while needing the vote of a deeply corrupt Parliament 
to pass the legislation. As a bitter irony, only three weeks after the tragedy in Colectiv 
Nightclub and the public unrest which led to the resignation of Prime Minister Ponta and his 
corrupt government, the reprieved Romanian MPs voted against a bill allowing the seizure of 
the assets from corruption conducted by Romanian MPs under criminal investigation 
(ZiareLive, 2015) 
Romanians` tolerance of corruption is much bigger than that of the British, and it is 
backed by a system of immunities which keeps corrupt MPs sheltered from legal proceedings. 
Romania has again wasted a significant opportunity to turn itself around and has chosen instead 
                                                          
44 The Inspectorate of Emergencies is an authority subordinating to the Ministry of Interior. 
45 List of criminal politicians: http://www.scribd.com/doc/289567033/Ini%C8%9Biativa-Romania-list%C4%83-
politicieni-penali  
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a patchy solution which will give time to corrupt MPs to organise themselves and come back 
next year when general elections are due, although perhaps not in the front line.  
I argue in each of the following case studies that, as part of a Romanian society tolerant 
to corruption, the Romanian press manages to report corruption but it fails to be part of the 
solution by holding the political elite to account. I argue that this tendency can be recognised 
in three ways: 
 The first is the fact that while the Romanian press should be a strong component of the 
resistance to corruption, it fails to perform its role as a whistle-blower or as an external 
mechanism to detect and bring corruption to the knowledge of the public and authorities: the 
investigative reporting is minimal and most of the content comes from official channels.  To 
demonstrate this statement, news depiction of political corruption in Romania will be explored 
in order to assess the prevalent cases presented and sources of news corroborated with the 
content type of news and content coverage by tone. 
The second way is the fact that the Romanian press fails to frame political corruption 
as an emergency that should be a priority for the public and political elite. That is the cases of 
corruption are not presented by the press in a manner that would indicate a serious debate with 
potential consequences on the government`s practices, while progress in this area comes due 
to external pressure from the EU. To demonstrate my statement, the frame analysis employed 
will scrutinise the main aspects of corruption presented by journalists when reporting political 
corruption, including an overview of the social universe presented by the news (who the main 
actors are, how are they linked in the political network, how are they presented by the press). 
The third way refers to the fact that the Romanian press shows little concern and 
reflection about any potential lack of ethics, understood as corruption and biased, unethical 
behaviour affecting journalists reporting political corruption, so drawing attention to the 
shortcomings within their profession. 
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Chapter 4: Adrian Năstase (Case Study I) 
 
”(Adrian Năstase) is a case of corruption at the highest level, as the individual involved 
was not just the leader of a party, he was among the most important representatives of the 
Romanian political class, the leader of the biggest political party in 2004, acting Prime 
Minister at that time and the candidate with the highest chance of being elected to the highest 
office of the Romanian State” (The conclusion of the Judges who sent Năstase to prison for 
corruption in the Quality Trophy case.)(Popescu, 2012) 
 
 
Photo: Adrian Năstase & his wife, Dana Năstase46.  
Adrian Năstase is one of post-communist Romania`s highest ranking politicians. 
Married twice, each time to daughters of high ranking communists47 and occupying sensitive 
public positions48 during the Communist regime, Adrian Năstase found it easy to climb to the 
highest political positions during the post-communist transition.  During his mandate as Prime 
Minister Romania became a member of NATO and the accession negotiations with the EU 
took a positive turn.  
                                                          
46Source: 
http://www.timesnewroman.ro/files/attach/images/stories/adrian_nastase_dana_lucuri_invatate_inchisoare.jpg 
47 He was married first to Ilina Preoteasa, the daughter of the Communist Minister of Foreign Affairs, Grigore 
Preoteasa, between 1955 and 1957. After divorce he married his current wife, Dana Năstase, who is the 
daughter of Angelo Miculescu, the Minister of Agriculture and Deputy Prime Minister between 1975 and 1981 
and Ambassador of Romania in China between 1983 and 1990. 
48 Information from the unofficial biography of Năstase states that he was very trusted by the Communist 
regime, which sent him as its representative to different international bodies such as the International 
Institute of Human Rights in Strasbourg, the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (Oslo), the 
International Youth Festival in Pyongyang, the Republic of Korea. 
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Some economic reforms, which led the Romanian economy in a positive direction, are 
equally attributed to him.  Acknowledged for his intelligence as a Professor and Lawyer and 
recognised as a high-calibre politician, Adrian Năstase has become as well a symbol of 
arrogance and corruption and a permanent subject of debate for the Romanian authorities each 
time international bodies took a stand and pointed a finger at Romania`s efforts to tackle 
corruption (European Commission, 2014).  
 
4.1) Methodology 
 
 In order to answer the main question of my research, what is the role of the Romanian 
press in reporting high level political corruption, I am going to use content analysis, which will 
focus on two aspects.  
The first aspect is a frequency analysis, which will answer the following questions:  
- Which are the most frequently presented topics about Năstase`s corruption?  
- What is the content type used for presenting Năstase`s corruption? 
- What tone was used in presenting Năstase`s corruption?  
- What are the information sources of corruption coverage in his case? 
The second aspect is a frame analysis used in order to reveal latent aspects of content which 
will give us a clear indication about the mentalities and behaviours of the Romanian journalists.  
By following the four roles played by frames in a text, defining problems, 
identifying/diagnosing causes, providing judgement/evaluating actions and 
justifying/prescribing solutions (London, 1993) the frame analysis conducted will answer the 
following questions: 
- What are the main aspects of corruption presented by journalists? 
- What are the suggested ways to think about the problem of corruption? 
- Any suggestions about how to remedy the problem of corruption? 
- Any journalist ethics? 
The paragraph is my unit of research to make sure that all the positions and quotes of actors 
mentioned in articles are recorded.  
Content analysis was conducted on the following:  
A) Newspapers and magazines: România Liberă, Evenimentul Zilei, Jurnalul Naţional, 
Gândul, Revista 22. 
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B) Blogs & Websites: Contributors (political debate website), Tolontan (the blog of the 
investigative journalist, Cătălin Tolontan), Anchete Online (a blog dedicated to journalistic 
investigations), Critic Atac (blog dedicated to the fight against corruption). 
C) Press Agencies: Hotnews. 
 
In order to answer these questions, and taking into account the quantity of material that has 
been produced between 2005 and 2014 about Adrian Năstase`s corrupt acts, relevant material 
was identified by using the following algorithm:  
1. On-line research was undertaken to identify all the articles comprising the name “Adrian 
Năstase”. 896 articles were identified. 
2. An initial monitoring of these 896 articles was conducted in order to identify all the articles 
comprising the name “Adrian Năstase” which have corruption as the main topic. Based on this 
initial monitoring, I identified that the most frequently presented topics about Năstse`s 
corruption are the three corruption cases he was sent to Court for: 116 articles were about the 
“Trofeul Calitătii49” case, 115 articles were about the “Zambaccian” case and 37 articles were 
about “Mătuşa Tamara50” case. 
3. As Critical Discourse Moments are essentially moments of discourse crises (Chilton b, 1987), 
times when “discourse on an issue is especially visible” and “they stimulate commentary in 
various public forms by sponsors of different frames, journalists and other observers” (Chilton 
b, 1987), I identified the period between 2012 and 2014 as comprising the moments when the 
frequency of published material about Adrian Năstase`s corrupt acts was highest.  
4. As media events are those events which attract particular attention by the media and are 
characterised by a noticeable intensification of the communicative process, I identified those 
events linked to Năstase`s corrupt acts within the critical discourse moments. These events 
were preceded or followed by an increase in the frequency of the news items. When this 
happened, I took into account the preceding of following months as well. As a result, I analysed 
the news items published during the following months in: 2012 (June), 2013 (February, March, 
April, June, November, December), 2014 (January, February, March, April, May, June, July, 
August). A total of 370 articles were analysed.  
 
 
                                                          
49 Trofeul Calităţii = Quality Trophy (Eng.) 
50 Mătuşa Tamara = Aunt Tamara (Eng.) 
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Table 4.0: Number of Articles by Newspaper /Blog 
RL EVZ JN G 22 Contributor Tolontan Anchete 
Online 
Critic Atac HotNews 
171 103 110 125 125 2 0 3 0 257 
 
 
Table 4.1: Examples of News Coverage 
1. “Motivarea Instanţei in Dosarul Zambaccian: Inculpatul Năstase nu a avut nici o 
reţinere de a acţiona în cel mai pur stil mafiot”51 (Attila B., 2014 in Gândul). 
2. “Sorina Matei: De fiecare data când Adrian Năstase a trecut prin momentedelicate, 
Victor Ponta a cedat psihic”52 (Botezatu C., 2014 in Evenimentul Zilei). 
3. “O sinucidere cât un plagiat. Laşitatea lui Adrian Năstase”53 (Câmpeanu C., 2012, 
România Liberă). 
4) “Prăbuşirea: de la Năstase la Voiculescu”54 (Cincea M., 2014 in România Liberă). 
5) “Adrian Năstase a încercat să se sinucidă, 5 pensionari au reuşit”55 (Domnişoru C., 
2014 in Vox Publica). 
6) “Adrian Năstase merge la închisoare. Politicienii îi plâng de milă”56 (Ciupercă C., 
2012) 
7) “Dosarul Mătuşa Tamara – Adrian Năstase: dosar finalizat în 2931 zile de la începerea 
urmăririi penale”57 (Hotnews, 2014 in Hotnews). 
8) Urmaşii lui Ceauşescu: Iliescu, Năstase, Ponta”58 (Tismăneanu, V., 2014 in 
Evenimentul Zilei). 
9) “La mulţi ani, Adrian Năstase! “Pentru mine fericirea are un gust de libertate 
combinatăcu sentimental de a aparţine””59 (Vintilă R., 2014in Jurnalul Naţional). 
10) “Impăratul ouălor: Contribuţii la portretul lui Adrian Năstase” (Tismăneanu V., 2014 
in HotNews). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
51 “The motivation of the Court in Zambaccian File: Adrian Năstase had no hesitation to act in the purest 
mobster way”. 
52 “Each time Adrian Năstase passed through difficult moments, Victor Ponta lost his temper”. 
53 “A suicide as a plagiarism. Năstase`s cowardice”. 
54 “The collapse. From Năstase to Voiculescu”. 
55 “Adrian Năstase tried to kill himself. Five pensioners managed to do it”. 
56 “Adrian Năstase goes to prison. Politicians pity him”. 
57 “Aunt Tamara File – File completed 2931 days after the start of criminal investigation”. 
58 “Ceauşescu`s decedents: Iliescu, Năstase, Ponta “. 
59 “Happy Birthday Adrian Năstase! “For me happiness has a taste of freedom combined with the feeling of 
belonging””. 
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4.2) Romanian Press as Part of the Resistance to Corruption 
 
4.2.1) The most frequently presented topics about Năstase`s corruption?  
 
The frequency analysis revealed that the most presented topics are all linked to the three 
big corruption cases for which Năstase was sent to Court.  Apart from these three big cases, 
Năstase is mentioned as well in connection with other corrupt acts he was part of or knew about 
such as: Rompetrol Refinery, Bancorex, corruption in the Danube Delta, Dacian bracelets, 
illegal logging concessions in Bucegi mountains, the sale of Elena Lupescu Palace, support 
provided to the terrorist Omar Hayssam, illegal VAT returns to his aide Ristea Priboi, the 
corrupt relationship between Prime Minister Năstase and the Prime Minister`s Control 
Authority, the contract with Bechtel, corrupt acts involving Năstase linked to Corbeanca 
Timber, the farm in Cornu,  the house on Christian Tell Street, the support provided to Dan 
Voiculescu to illegally privatise the Institute for Food Research (Voiculescu was sentenced to 
10 years in prison in this case), real estate from the state patrimony (RAPPS)60 illegally sold to 
political clients, importing carcinogenic rockets from the Netherlands, corruption linked to the 
duty-free shops in the International Airport Henry Coanda (Otopeni), the privatisation of 
Rodipet61, the suicide of the Prosecutor Panait, corrupt acts of his Chief of Cabinet, Remus 
Truiă, the plagiarism committed by the present Prime Minister, Victor Ponta, the transfer of 
Ploieşti Hippodrome to public property, favouritism for companies working on the re-
construction of Iraq, possible corruption with EU funds for the farm in Cornu and attempts to 
control the media. One article, an investigation article by România Liberă, describes how the 
Russian Intelligence Services tried to get control over Romania but failed because their 
facilitator, Adrina Năstase, lost the elections (Gherguţ, 2011).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
60 RA-PPS = Regia Autonomă – Administraţia Patrimoniului Protocolului de Stat (Eng Autonomous Authority – 
The Administration of the Patrimony of the State Protocol). It is an institution founded to manage, to preserve 
the integrity, and to protect the public heritage of goods that ensure the public services of national interest – 
representation and protocol for the Senate, the Chamber of Representatives, the Presidential Administration, 
the Government, and the Constitutional Court, the goods that ensure the proper functioning of the Diplomatic 
Missions, consular offices, representative offices of the international and inter-governmental organizations 
licensed in Romania, as well as goods in the property of the state. 
61 RODIPET – the national network of press distribution and express courier. 
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Table 4.2: Content analysis – Events 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Total 
2005 5 9 7 6 2 5 2 8 6 5 10 2 67 
2006 13 11 15 3 4 3 1 6 0 0 9 4 69 
2007 8 5 4 3 4 7 5 2 3 5 4 2 52 
2008 4 4 2 1 6 6 5 2 0 1 9 5 45 
2009 5 5 11 2 3 2 4 1 3 5 11 7 59 
2010 3 7 3 2 1 2 11 5 1 7 12 2 56 
2011 4 5 7 3 3 2 4 3 4 16 8 16 75 
2012 8 7 7 3 7 24 9 6 4 5 3 5 88 
2013 8 10 31 12 7 11 5 6 6 8 9 21 134 
2014 67 7 11 10 18 20 49 69 0 0 0 0 251 
            Total 896 
 
Line of events 
 
February 2006: Adrian Năstase is charged with corruption for the first time. 
March 2009: Adrian Năstase lost his MP’s immunity. 
December 2011: Năstase is acquitted by the Court in the Aunt Tamara Case. 
January 2012: A former Prime Minister is sentenced to prison for corruption for the first time 
in Romania. Adrian Năstase is sentenced to prison in the Quality Trophy Case. He appeals 
against the Court decision. 
June 2012: Adrian Năstase is definitively sentenced to prison for corruption and attempts 
suicide. 
March 2013: Adrian Năstase is released from prison.  
November-December 2013: The Court reaches a conclusion in the Zambaccian Case. 
January 2014: Adrian Năstase is sentenced to prison. 
July 2014: Adrian Năstase is released from prison.  
Yellow: extra months analysed. 
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4.2.2) Adrian Năstase – the Court Cases Most Presented by the Written Press 
 
The “Quality in Construction Trophy” Case 
 
 
The corruption scheme as identified by România Curată  
(http://romaniacurata.ro/Năstase-spaga-electorala-si-din-bani-publici/) 
 
This case began in July 2008 when the National Anticorruption Department (DNA) 
started a criminal investigation against the former Prime Minister, Adrian Năstase, for 
financing his electoral campaign in 2004 with the fees paid by companies which registered to 
participate to the “Quality in Construction Trophy” competition, organised that year by the 
State Inspectorate for Construction62 (ISC).  
In May 2010 the National Anticorruption Department (DNA) DNA charged Adrian Năstase 
with blackmail and taking bribes, and his wife, Dana Năstase, with complicity in bribery and 
                                                          
62 The State Inspectorate in Construction = Inspectoratul de Stat in Construcţii or ISC (ro.) is a governmental 
body which monitors the quality of construction, urban planning, monitors the market of construction 
materials and approves investments with public money for construction activities. Its activities spread 
throughout the entire Construction Industry. It is coordinated by a State Adviser in the team of the Prime 
Minister. 
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blackmail. Irina Jianu, the former General Inspector with ISC, was charged with giving bribes 
and money laundering. 
On the 20th of June 2012 Adrian Năstase was sentenced by the judges of the High Court 
of Cassation and Justice63 (ICCJ) to two years in prison.  The decision was final.  On the same 
day, in a failed suicide attempt, Adrian Năstase shot himself while waiting for the police to 
take him to jail. Dishonesty seems to have plagued his suicide attempt too, as Romanian 
journalists investigated the circumstances surrounding the failed suicide and discovered that 
the ambulance which arrived very quickly at Năstase`s residence was sent as a result of a direct 
phone call from someone at the Ministry of Interior, a high ranking old member of PSD, Ioan 
Rus. The paramedics were forbidden to speak about the events, but journalists managed to find 
out from their colleagues that “the wound was not profound, the bullet barely grazed him” and 
Năstase only needed a thin plaster and some hydration to prevent a sudden drop of blood 
pressure (Befu &Naftanaila, 2012).  
Adrian Năstase was transported to the hospital and operated. He stayed in the hospital 
for six days and then he was transferred to Rahova Penitentiary. Şerban Brădişteanu, Năstase`s 
doctor as well as three policemen were arrested by the DNA for assisting the law breaker 
Năstase.  
In January 2013 the State Inspectorate of Construction (ISC) asked the Sector 1 Tribunal in 
Bucharest to enforce an order against Adrian Năstase as he owed it Ron 3,300,000.0064. Its 
request was approved. 
Adrian Năstase was discharged on 18 March 2013 after spending eight months in jail.  
 
The “Zambaccian” Case 
The prosecutors from the National Anticorruption Department (DNA) started a criminal 
investigation against Adrian Năstase and another six individuals for corruption in February 
2006. Năstase was accused that between 2001 and 2004 he used his influence and authority as 
President of PSD as well as the prerogatives specific to his position as Prime Minister of 
Romania to obtain undeserved benefits from Irina Jianu. Năstase was accused of receiving 
$100,000.00 (representing the value of goods imported from China) and RON 1,200,000.00 
(representing the value of materials, Aluminium, wood carpentry and double glazing) used for 
his house in Bucharest on Zambaccian Street, as well as for his house in Cornu, Prahova 
                                                          
63 High Court of Cassation and Justice = Inalta Curte de Casaţie si Justiţie (ro). It is the supreme judicial Court in 
Romania. Its main purpose is to judge appeals against rulings by the other criminal Courts. 
64 Ron 3,300,000.00 = £ 592,161 (August 2014) 
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County. In exchange for these benefits, Năstase facilitated Irina Jianu to be appointed and 
maintained as State General Inspector and President of the Board of State Inspectorate in 
Construction (ISC). In the same case an investigation took place into the former Romanian 
Consul in Hong Kong who, due to Năstase`s threat to revoke his mandate as Consul, illegally 
dispatched Chinese merchandise to Romania, as well as the former owner of the land in 
Zambaccian Street and Miron Mitrea, former Minister of Transportation.  
The Judges of the High Court of Cassation and Justice (ICCJ) condemned Adrian 
Năstase in January 2014 to 4 years in prison and a fine of Ron 1,824,000.0065 for blackmail 
and receiving bribes. His wife, Dana Năstase, was accused of complicity in bribery, use of fake 
documents at the border control and money laundering linked to corrupt acts.  She received a 
suspended jail term of 3 years.  
Sector 4 Court in Bucharest decided in July 2014 that Adrian Năstase, condemned to 
jail for 4 years and 6 months in the “Zambaccian” and “Quality Trophy” cases could be paroled 
after serving a third of the sentence.  Irina Jianu was accused of giving bribes, of inappropriate 
use of the goods of companies against their own interests, direct link in giving bribes, false 
signature linked to corrupt acts, use of false documents and money laundering. She was 
sentenced to 4 years in jail for using fake documents at the border control (Avram, 2013).  
 
 “Aunt Tamara” Case 
This criminal case was preceded by a scandal which started at the end of 2005, when 
Năstase`s wealth declaration submitted to the Chamber of Deputies indicated that he had 
inherited from Tamara Cernasov, his wife’s aunt, money, jewellery and real estate valued at 
$1million. 
In January 2006 journalists from Evenimentul Zilei started a campaign focused on aunt Tamara 
and the inheritance left to Năstase`s family. Information appeared that Dana Năstase was 
investigated by the National Office for Preventing and Combatting Money Laundering 
(ONPCSB) for a bank transaction of $400,000 made in 1999 (Evenimentul Zilei, 2006). 
Evenimentul Zilei reported that the documents stating the source of this money had simply 
disappeared from the investigation file (Evenimentul Zilei, 2006).  
DNA started criminal investigation against Adrian Năstase in May 2006. Năstase was 
sent to Court in May 2007 for giving bribes. Other defendants in this case were Ioan Melinescu 
- former President of the National Office for Preventing and Combating Money Laundering 
                                                          
65 Ron 1,824,000.00 = £ 327,304 (August 2014) 
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(ONPCSB)66 who was accused of stealing or destroying documents, taking bribes and 
divulging information – and Ristea Priboi – former MP in the Chamber of Deputies between 
2000 and 2004, accused of complicity in taking and giving a bribe. The case was closed in 
September 2012, 2142 days (Hotnews b, 2014) after the criminal investigation started. All the 
defendants were acquitted.  
 The facts of the file state that one of the first decisions made once Adrian Năstase had 
become Prime Minister was to replace Adrian Cucu, the Head of ONPCSB with Ioan 
Melinescu. According to the DNA Prosecutors, one month before Năstase became Prime 
Minister, Melinescu (who was a member on the board of ONPCSB) and Năstase had a meeting 
during which Melinescu informed the future Prime Minister that ONPCSB was working on a 
case against Dana Năstase as she had deposited $400,000.00 in a bank account at HVB Bank. 
Melinescu promised Năstase to block the case until after the elections and after being appointed 
as President of ONPCSB he would steal the file and give it to Ristea Priboi, one of Năstase`s 
close advisers. Genică Boerică, a controversial business man, witnessed the meeting and he 
appears in the files as a witness for the prosecution.  
The information from the file stolen by Melinescu would have demonstrated that the 
amount deposited by Năstase`s wife was not justified by their incomes: according to the sale 
contract attached by the depositor the amount of $400,000.00 deposited in cash originated from 
the sale of jewels, paintings, papyrus and other valuable goods by Dana Năstase`s aunt, Tamara 
Cernasov, who had a power of attorney on the personal bank account of Dana Năstase. 
According to this document 11 valuable paintings, 3 English manuscripts on parchment dated 
1784 – 1827, Doum Nancy and Lalique vases, valuable furniture and 30 pieces of gold 
jewellery weighing 600 grams were in the apartment of Tamara Cernasov, who was 91 and 
lived alone.  There were no clear proofs these goods were the property of the vendor, as Tamara 
Cernasov didn`t show the Notary any document to certify ownership but only a declaration of 
good faith. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
66 ONPCSB = Oficiul Naţional pentru Prevenirea si Combaterea Spălării Banilor = National Office for Preventing 
and Fighting against Money Laundering (En). 
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4.2.3) The content type used for presenting Năstase`s corruption 
 
Most of the information about Adrian Năstase is presented as News (53%), followed 
by Event type reporting (25%), Editorials (10.5%), Reportage (2.1%), Investigation (1.6%), 
Interviews (0.8%) and Systemic analysis (0.5%). The fact that the main types are news, events 
and editorials indicates clearly that the Romanian press does pay attention to the topic of 
corruption by the former Prime Minister and comments on it, but the low scores registered by 
investigation and reportage indicate that no deeper research or analysis into the seemingly 
corrupt acts have been done. 
 
Table 4.3: Corruption Coverage by Content Type 
Content Type Number Percent 
Investigation 6 1.6% 
Systemic Analysis 2 0.5% 
Editorial 39 10.5% 
Event 94 25% 
Reportage 8 2.1% 
Other topics 21 5.6% 
News 196 53% 
Interview 3 0.8% 
Total 369 100% 
 
 
4.2.4) The tone used in presenting Năstase`s corruption?  
 
More than half of the content about Năstase is presented in a negative tone (51%), 
followed at a long distance by neutral tone (38%). Only 11% of the content was delivered in a 
positive note.  
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Table 4.4: Content Coverage by Tone 
Tone Number Percent 
Positive 42 11% 
Negative 188 51% 
Neutral 139 38% 
Total 369 100% 
 
4.2.5) The information sources of corruption coverage in Năstase`s case 
 
The most frequent sources of information are the Romanian institutions of the legal 
system such as the Court, the Prosecutors` Office and Police (34%) and journalists following 
the Court cases Năstase was involved in. Politicians are a source of content as well (31%) due 
mostly to their declarations.  
Experts in different fields linked to Năstase`s corruption cases are the least used source 
for information (3%). Oppositional voices which form a support group for Adrian Năstase are 
part of these sources, particularly newspaper Jurnalul Naţional, Antena 3 TV Station and their 
owner, politician Dan Voiculescu, as well as politicians Victor Ponta. These oppositional 
voices will be explored in the second part of this chapter. 
 
Table 4.5: Corruption Coverage by Information Sources 
Information Sources Number Percent 
Police/Court / Prosecutors` 
Office 
135 34% 
Politicians 112 28% 
Experts 10 3% 
Journalists 125 31% 
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Anonymous or other sources 15 4% 
Total 397 100% 
 
 
4.3) Political Corruption Presented as an Emergency to be Addressed (Frame Analysis) 
 
If frames are central organising ideas for making sense of relevant events and 
suggesting what is at issue and, news and info have no intrinsic value unless embedded in a 
meaningful context which organizes and lends its coherence (London, 1993), what did the 
episodic, personality and thematic frames focus on in the case of Adrian Năstase or, put it in a 
different way, what are the main aspects of corruption presented by journalists when reporting 
the case of Adrian Năstase? 
A total of 3,418 frame units were identified: 71% (2,438) are episodic frames, 22% (768) are 
personality centred frames and only 6% (212) are thematic frames.  
 
Table 4.6: Corruption Coverage by Episodic/Personality Centred/Thematic Frames 
Frame Types (Units) Number Percentage 
Episodic 2,438 71% 
Thematic 157 6% 
Personality centred 768 22% 
Total 3,418 100% 
 
 
4.3.1) Episodic Frames 
 
A) A Prime Minister in Court procedures. 
In the process of the press informing the public about Năstase`s corrupt activity, most 
of the episodic frames focused on Court activity (50% - 1,228 units): 35% (860 units) focused 
on Court procedures during Năstase`s trials, 13% (328 units) focused on Court decisions and 
motivations and 2% (40 units) mention the Judges who declared Năstase guilty of corruption 
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and sentenced him to prison. The units describe in detail all the steps followed during the 
procedures, lacking any comments of the journalist reporting.  
B) A Prime Minister`s corrupt activity. 
The frames focused on Court activity are followed at a large distance by those focused 
on Năstase`s corrupt activity (19% - 454 units). 16% (384 units) describe Năstase`s corrupt 
acts, 0.3% (8 units) talk about consequences of corrupt acts and 3% (66 units) are linked to 
corruption cases of others. Most articles present Năstase`s corrupt acts as discoveries made 
during the Court trials. 
15% (370 units) are dedicated to those who facilitated Năstase`s corrupt activity: 7% (178 
units) just mention the facilitators, particularly his wife, Dana Năstase, and the officials Irina 
Jianu and Ioan Păun.  6% (158 units) mention the type of corrupt activity they undertook and 
only 1% (34 units) explain why they did it. The reasons the facilitators proceeded with corrupt 
acts can be organised in three categories: the wish to be appointed and maintained in public 
offices such as Irina Jianu who wanted to be the Chief Inspector at the State Inspectorate in 
Constructions, fear as in the case of Cristina Popa, who declared during the Court hearings that 
“the import of goods from China was done unlawfully. I made the false invoices at the request 
of Irina Jianu as I was afraid. The delivery notes were not real” (Stoica a, 2013) and pecuniary 
rewards in the case of the other facilitators, Irina Jianu and Ioan Melinescu. 
C) A Prime Minister upset with the legal system 
10% of the frames (232 units) show the suggestion made either by Năstase or his 
supporters that the legal system in Romania is used as a political tool and 3% (66 units) mention 
other remedial actions such as Năstase being fired from the position of Professor at the Law 
University in Bucharest and losing his rights to practise as a barrister as well as his position 
with the Bucharest Bar.  
D) Journalists and experts criticizing Adrian Năstase.  
 5% (42 units) present journalists and experts criticizing Năstase. Professor and political 
analyst Alina Mungiu Pippidi declares that “Năstase and loyalties towards such types of human 
or politics belongs to the past” (Mungiu-Pippidi a , 2014) after noticing that the anti-corruption 
legislation was adopted in Romania due to the fact that Adrian Năstase convinced his 
supporters in 2003 that without it Romania would not be accepted in the EU and it was applied 
because President Traian Băsescu supported the Minister of Justice, Monica Macovei, and 
Daniel Morar (Chief Prosecutor of the National Anti-corruption Department DNA). Adrian 
Năstase got to be sentenced himself due to the fact that Mircea Geoană (the President of PSD 
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after Năstase lost the presidential elections) managed to get PSD MPs to vote for Năstase`s 
MP`s immunity to be revoked (Mungiu-Pippidi b, 2014). 
 Political analyst Vladimir Tismăneanu calls Năstase “a Julien Sorel of dynastic 
Communism”, “a paradigmatic case of hubris, a delirium of grandeur and a suicidal narcissism 
to which, in a toxic combination, should be added a unique rapacity, an unsated appetite to 
become rich” (Tismăneanu a, 2014) 
Journalists Cristian Tudor Popescu appreciated the decision to send Năstase to prison as being 
correct and wanted to ask Năstase if he was considering whether to commit suicide following 
the second conviction too (Macarie, 2014).   
 
4.3.2 Personality Frames 
 
A) A Prime Minister - official symbol of corruption and greed 
Most personality frames describe Năstase`s negative traits (25% - 191 units) while only 
15% (118 units) present him in a positive light. An interesting aspect is that although there are 
editorials talking about Năstase`s negative character traits, such as his corruption, notorious 
arrogance (he is called “He himself”, “the Emperor of Eggs”) and cupidity, a major part of the 
frame units (45%) repeat parts of the court motivation accompanying the prison sentences. 
Năstase is seen by Judge Ionut Matei as “the embodiment of corruption within the Romanian 
political class”. The Court reminds that the facts of Năstase`s case put it at the highest level of 
corruption, as those involved were a Prime Minister who used public office to obtain economic 
benefits from public servants who chose to behave this way more or less of their own free will 
in order to make sure they kept their public offices.  
Năstase`s acts are considered by the Court to be beyond the classic corruption 
understood as giving and receiving bribes. His facts include as well other criminal acts 
associated to corruption (such as blackmail) or directly linked to corruption (such as money 
laundering and false accounts) or provided by special laws (such as using false documents at a 
border control). The Court thinks that this multitude of criminal acts, developed during a long 
period of time (2 years), shows the defendants` wish to hide the serious acts of corruption done 
by Adrian Năstase as Prime Minister, helped by his wife, and then, after their disclosure, their 
wish to hinder or to obscure their revelation. 
 Năstase is seen as not having any inhibition in acting in the purest mafia way. The 
Court motivation points out as well that his insincere behaviour during the trial, coupled with 
the permanent attempt to present himself as a victim of Justice and to give a political 
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connotation to any judicial process against him, demonstrate that he did not understand the 
importance of the social values affected by his criminal behaviours nor the way the state of law 
works, preferring to look for scapegoats beyond his person (Attila, 2014). 
 Due to his corrupt behaviour, Năstase is considered to be a “monster of polished greed” 
(Toma, 2013), a “thief with vanities and a big ego” (Toma, 2013), he is the “Renaissance 
portrait of the most industrious thief Romania has ever had” (Toma, 2013), he is the 
“embodiment of corruption in politics”, “He is an insightful charlatan, juggler, pervert, and 
slippery with standards, style and crime, subtleties probably gained absolutely excruciatingly 
by belonging to certain minorities! He is at the same time ingenious, a strategist and cunning 
as he gambles massively on the rocky imbecility of the masses as well as on the collective 
memory which is extinguished faster than a burning coal thrown in the wate” (Toma, 2013). 
He is seen as well “a deplorable case of self-corruption, of self-destruction, of real 
political suicide” (Tismăneanu b, 2014). His rapid wealth is based on greed and he “gathers 
useless things because he is empty inside, but he takes care to give the impression of elegance 
and refinement on the outside” (Toma, 2013). 
B) A Prime Minister with good behaviour in prison  
Frames presenting Năstase in a positive light present mostly declarations of other PSD 
members about Adrian Năstase as well as positive feature presented by the Court in the 
motivation to the decision to release Năstase from prison early. Năstase is seen by the judges 
as having very good behaviour during detention due to the fact that he participated in 
educational activities, wrote three scientific papers and was rewarded eight times. 
C) A Prime Minister with few political supporters 
19% (147 units) are about politicians supporting Adrian Năstase. All of them are PSD 
members who consider Adrian Năstase to be “the best Prime Minister Romania has ever had” 
(Prime Minister Victor Ponta), “a political convict, a case comparable to Iulia Timoshenko” 
(Prime Minister Victor Ponta), a “high calibre politician”(Valeriu Zgones, PSD MP), “a very 
strong voice in the Romanian public life today” who will manage to “influence certain 
decisions in the party through his personality” (Victor Hrebenciuc PSD MP), “an intellectual 
with competences which need not be argued, a human who has an opinion, a human who read 
and has been reading a lot, a human who has the capacity to be always creative(…)” ( Ecaterina 
Andronescu, PSD Vice-President), a politician from whom Prime Minister Victor Ponta has 
always had lots of things to learn and who will remain “the same model of wisdom and political 
maturity” (Prime Minister Victor Ponta) , a “real statesman”(former Prime Minister Tăriceanu).  
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Ion Iliescu (PSD, former President of Romania) declares he would have pardoned 
Năstase. Another PSD Vice-President, Marian Vanghelie, declares that the prison sentence was 
too much and sending Năstase to prison created a dangerous example: “What is happening now 
is the creation of a very dangerous example. Nowhere in the EU, no former prime-minister of 
politician of Năstase`s calibre passes through similar experiences. I think it is too much, no 
matter what he did, good or bad. Irrespective of the fact that he is guilty and he has to pay. I 
think we are creating now a very dangerous example and this will not help democracy in 
Romania at all”.  
D) A Prime Minister with even fewer political critics. 
Only 5% (36 units) are units presenting politicians criticizing Năstase. Former Minister 
of Justice, Monica Macovei, thinks that “too many people from the Communist period, such as 
Năstase, have power, and this led to the contamination of the political class”. She underlines 
as well that “it would be a shame for Romania if people such as Năstase will still have a role 
in politics and it is a shame as well that during his prison term he gave political advice and 
commented on what happened in Romania`s public life”. 
10% (80 units) are dedicated to Năstase`s suicide attempt and 7% (57 units) refer to 
Năstase`s political declarations.  
E) An upset Prime Minister in prison 
Năstase in prison and Năstase`s declarations about the Court decisions have each 5% 
(37 units). 
Adrian Năstase`s prison sentence is seen as being “horrific and just”, and as having cancelled 
his political future (Pippidi Mungiu a, 2014) not a political condemnation (Câmpeanu, 2013). 
He is a real and convicted criminal who likes to call himself “politically convicted” (Cautiş, 
2014).  Adrian Năstase had to be sentenced to prison because his family had always had public 
functions, hence he could not justify the big wealth displayed, as no honest person working in 
a public office can get so wealthy (Pippidi Mungiu a, 2014). 
Those supporting him are “only a gang of politicians and leaders of opinion he fed while 
he was Prime Minister” (Pippidi Mungiu a, 2014). Attention is drawn to the fact that even 
though he did many good things for Romania as Prime Minister “he chose as well to do some 
bad things. This was his choice, and presenting Adrian Năstase`s mandate only with its positive 
features is dishonest” (Pippidi Mungiu a, 2014). 
His condemnation is seen as a success for the legal system and a lesson for politicians 
from which the entire political class should learn (Avram, 2014). Nonetheless “Adrian Năstase 
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represents for Romania the end of a terrible fight the legal system has been having with the 
political realm” (Botezatu, 2014) 
Năstase`s condemnation is as well an opportunity to draw attention to the political 
irresponsibility of Romania`s leaders who do not fear “sanctions from their internal public. 
This public is convinced, thanks to the never-ending manipulation campaigns, that Adrian 
Năstase is the victim of Traian Băsescu, that he was sentenced in an unjust way, that he is a 
political convict, that everything is a dirty vendetta as the former Prime Minister says” 
(Tapalagă a, 2014). 
F) A corrupt Prime Minister as a symptom of a wider problem 
 Only 0.3% (3 units) describe Năstase as a symptom of a wider problem. It is mentioned 
that the decision in the “Quality Trophy” case represented a crucial test for the Romanian legal 
system in its fight with high corruption, and its importance is underlined as well by the attention 
paid by European and American officials to this case (Ciuperca a, 2012). The press quotes as 
well the Court`s motivation for the sentence in the “Quality Trophy” case, which says that “the 
corruption of the political class in Romania personified by Adrian Năstase in 2004 is a 
phenomenon which can`t be tolerated by Romanian society, and the legal system is obliged to 
respond firmly each time it deals which such a case, as a proof that the state of law is not an 
illusory matter, and it works to the benefit of its own citizens” (Ciuperca b, 2012).   
 
4.3.3) Thematic Frames 
 
Although it would have been expected that an episodic case such as Adrian Năstase 
might generate a larger debate at a systemic level, hence thematic themes, only 157 frames 
were identified. 95% (149 units) are about the legal system and political corruption, 5% (8 
units) talk about attacks against the legal system.  
A) Legal system and political corruption 
Adrian Năstase and Dan Voiculescu are presented as powerful men who put their stamp 
on Romanian politics, justice and media. The powerful Dan Voiculescu is seen as the result of 
making his media trust obey political commands, while the powerful Năstase was created by 
using the levers of power he obtained as head of government and head of party. He was the 
creation of his party as well as of the political system. As a result, he encouraged and took 
advantage of an institutionalised corruption and politicised the legal system profoundly 
(Cincea, 2014). 
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Attention is paid to the Romanian collective mind, where there is the strong idea that 
as long as the politicians steal to become rich, the regular citizens are going to be forgiven for 
small thefts from the state budget. This is seen as a trap, as the appetite to tolerate high level 
corruption would decrease considerably if the population were to be held accountable for tax 
evasion, fraud and bribery (Domnisoru, 2014). 
Attention is paid as well to the process of modifying laws in order to get corrupt 
politicians out of prison. The mentioned laws refer to: a) changing the definition of conflict of 
interests so that contracts of public acquisitions signed by public servants who have a personal 
interest  (such as the public servant signing an acquisition contract with the company led by 
his son or wife) are not to be considered a conflict of interests anymore, b) changing the status 
of MPs so that they would not be considered similar to public servants, with the result that the 
legal system could not investigate them for abuse, traffic of influence and taking bribes linked 
to their positions, c) the draft stipulating amnesty for infractions punished with a maximum of 
6 years in prison and pardon for those punished with a maximum of 7 years in prison, both 
maximum punishments for corruption. These changes are seen as attempts to create for MPs a 
legal shield against the legal system by limiting the powers of the institutions of the anti-
corruption system as well as by allowing Parliament to control some of these institutions 
(Lupea, 2013).  
The wave of changes in the anti-corruption legislation is seen as the system fighting 
back: in November 2013 alone the Court handed down 23 definitive criminal sentences, which 
sent to prison 90 very important people. The new laws are seen as the result of negotiations 
between groups of interests given that most MPs got elected due to the support of the local 
oligarchy (the so called “local baron`”), an oligarchy which knows it will receive generous 
funds for the electoral year 2014 and does not want to be disturbed by the anti-corruption bodies 
(Guran, 2013). 
B) Attacks against the legal system 
One of the constant attacks against the legal system is the accusation that the National 
Anticorruption Department (DNA) is manufacturing political files. It is an accusation largely 
promoted by Adrian Năstase, Dan Voiculescu and their supporters, who consider the prison 
sentences for corruption to be the personal revenge of President Băsescu, and DNA a tool in 
his hands. On the other side, these attacks are seen as a desperate attempt to save the status-
quo and reinstate the corrupt system created after 1989 (Câmpeanu, 2012) in which politicians 
in high positions, such as Năstase, could afford to play power games and expect detailed reports 
about their corruption files from the Chief Prosecutor in person.  
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4.4) Lack of Ethics within the Romanian Press 
 
 1% of the episodic frames are about journalist`s ethics and media as a political tool. Only 2% 
(13 units) are about journalists supporting Năstase.  
 Journalists backing Năstase and journalist`s lack of ethics. 
A good example of journalistic lack of ethics as well as Communist wooden language 
is provided by the tribute article published by Jurnalul National on the occasion of Năstase`s 
first release from prison: “Adrian Năstase`s nightmare which started on 21 June 2012 has 
finished! Romania`s former Prime Minister tastes the first day of freedom after his time in 
prison at Jilava Penitentiary as a result of the judicial masquerade over the “Quality Trophy”. 
Adrian Năstase, the political prisoner of Traian Băsescu`s regime, proved as well during the 
tough circumstances he passed through his intellectual and moral superiority compared to the 
detestable brigade of tormentors who wanted him defeated, destroyed as a human being, 
exhausted as a politician and drained as a Professor. The most effective Prime Minister of post-
communist Romania is getting out from prison enforced by the solidarity of his friends, 
protected by the warmth of his family and, most important, aware of the feeling that his 
innocence is supported now by millions of people. Jurnalul National`s campaign to break down 
the accusations of the National Anticorruption Department (DNA)`s prosecutors, as well as the 
unjust verdict of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, have had, we think, effect. The verdict 
of conditional release does not erase the responsibility belonging to Băsescu`s supporters who 
instrumented the judicial farce of a detestable trial meant to crush the strongest political 
adversary of the un-lawful President Băsescu. The first day of liberty has the bitter-sweet taste 
of a battle won with much endurance against a reprobate machine. Attention! The hellish 
mechanism did not stop once Adrian Năstase was released.  Under the umbrella of a fight 
against corruption, Băsescu’s guillotine is set to make other victims, using the same procedures 
and the same unscrupulous lieutenants used against Adrian Năstase! 
 Signed: Jurnalul National” (Jurnalul National b, 2013). 
The same newspaper published a special, reverential article dedicated to Năstase on the 
occasion of his birthday (Vintila R, 2014). 
Laurenţiu Mihu, România Liberă, draws attention to the degree to which the media got 
involved in celebrating Adrian Năstase`s first release from prison: the show organised to 
honour Năstase`s return to freedom benefitted by the “involvement to the point of absurdity of 
the media trust controlled by Dan Voiculescu (apart from the madness of Antena 3, Jurnalul 
National dared to compare Adrian Năstase`s destiny with the one of Iulia Maniu and others 
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killed in the Communist prisons), as well as by the contribution of a public institution, the 
public TV channel – TVR whose servility made headlines between 2000 and 2004 when, using 
public funds, it turned the Prime Minister into an idol with the air of a Prince” (Mihu, 2013). 
Cristian Câmpeanu, Editorialist at România Liberă, analyses Adrian Năstase`s 
interview after his release from prison. He considers that the interview was an act of “public 
obscenity” and its manipulative scheme originates in Hitler`s propaganda. The editorialist 
recalls that according to Hitler the best propaganda needs to be based on a “great lie, such a 
revolting lie that no decent and rational person could accept”, Năstase built his interview on a 
revolting lie, appealing to the feelings of the masses and not their brains (Câmpeanu, 2013).  
Journalist Ion Cristoiu approaches the problem of ethics by ridiculing the interview 
done by Antena 3 with Adrian Năstase by comparing it to very low taste TV shows: “Adrian 
Năstase hurried to take part in the Sinteza Zilei show on Antena 3. After 300 days of silence 
he was set to lose his media virginity with Mihai Gâdea, Dan Voiculescu`s mouthpiece. In 
loose TV shows from some TV channels you can often see low quality starlets paid to describe 
the ordeals (awful ordeals, they think!) they have been passing through after being dumped by 
the thirteenth footballer. Positioned as comfortably as possible for the viewers who masturbate, 
the starlet is working hard to look as bereaved as possible while her nerves are about to explode 
because she has asked too little money for her live broadcast. The journalist pretends to be 
impressed to tears although deep in her mind she is asking herself if it is worth sleeping with 
the new Chief Editor. This is how Sinteza Zilei with Adrian Năstase and Mihai Gâdea was on 
Wednesday night” (Cristoiu, 2013).  
 Ion Cristoiu continues by explaining that the entire media show was prepared with the 
purpose  of turning Adrian Năstase from a convict for corruption into a saleable political 
product: “as in the case of TV shows with starlets paid to grieve during the live broadcast, it 
was obvious from a mile off that both, the guest and the reporter, were pushing hard to find 
proofs from Năstase`s time in prison in order to advertise and sell Năstase as a victim who 
needs to be felt and, of course, voted for”(Cristoiu, 2013).                                                                                                                    
Cristoiu draws attention as well to the journalist`s lack of ethics as biased behaviour: 
“Mihai Gâdea assumed the role of the old hag who commiserates over the fence with the female 
neighbour pregnant and dumped by her husband. He (Mihai Gâdea) was watching Năstase with 
the wet eyes of a sad calf who did not know who his dad was in the entire herd. He (Gâdea) 
was asking kitschy questions which resulted in crazy and involuntarily comic sequences” 
(Cristoiu, 2013). 
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Evenimentul Zilei states that “Jurnalul National published the interview with Adrian Năstase 
as it is one of the clients the state companies used to feed with billions of money invested in 
advertising when Adrian Năstase was Prime Minister” (Evenimentul Zilei, 2013). 
Journalist Cornel Nistorescu took a stand against Antena`s 3 attempt to portray Adrian 
Năstase as a victim: “(…) I like to think it is an exaggeration, that many people have 
exaggerated about Adrian Năstase, and a race which has not finished yet seems to have 
transformed him into a winner. He is not a winner yet. His race has not finished. We are 
confronted with an excess of pathos. I saw on TV today a president from Organisation 31 from 
Sector 1, who was telling us that he was born today for the second time, that he is the spiritual 
child of Adrian Năstase.  People, let`s be serious!” (Musat, 2013). 
  Under 1% of the units focused on: solution to the problem of Năstase`s corruption and 
declarations of experts. Just 0.2% (6 units) mentioned Adrian Năstase`s fortune.  
 
 
4.5) Conclusions 
  
The Romanian press presents Adrian Năstase as a corrupt Prime Minister dragged 
through Court proceedings and upset with a legal system that wants to hold him accountable 
for his acts. The press devotes a lot of space to the Court proceedings as well as the corrupt 
acts, mentioning as well the facilitators and their reasons.  
The researched material describes the court proceedings, the corrupt acts and the facilitators, 
and it is a medium for transmitting the support as well as the criticisms of journalists and 
politicians.  
From the point of view of the latent point of communication, the analysis clearly 
indicates the Romanian press is not a monolithic block, as its different sides present corruption 
according to their own interests. We could easily see from the results of the content analysis 
that while most of the written press condemns Năstase`s corrupt behaviour and supports the 
justice of his prison sentence, it takes at the same time a clear stand against the journalists from 
Jurnalul National and Antena 3, both owned by Dan Voiculescu`s media group “Intact”, which 
have showed an un-reserved and unlimited support for Năstase.  
It is easy to see that Adrian Năstase is backed by a very controversial part of the media 
due to its owner, politician Dan Voiculescu, who, like Adrian Năstase, complains about being 
politically harassed via the legal system. Backing Adrian Năstase is as well an opportunity to 
look at the ethics of the journalists belonging to Voiculescu`s media Trust (Jurnalul National, 
 126 
 
Antena 3 TV), especially by contrast with those criticising him. It is easy to see as well that 
Năstase has relatively little support among politicians. His biggest supporter is Prime Minister 
Victor Ponta, his “political child”. Ponta owes Năstase his political career as well as his 
academic achievements, as Năstase coordinated his controversial, plagiarised PhD thesis.  
A very big contrast is visible throughout the researched material between Năstase, the powerful 
politician and Năstase`s image presented by the press by publishing the motivations of the 
Court decisions, a strong dichotomy between “He himself” and the image of a common 
criminal. Although the Romanian press clearly reports corruption, the researched material does 
not contain any obvious suggestions about ways to think about the problem of corruption, apart 
from the suggestion made by the thematic units that corruption is part of the Romanian 
collective mind and change has to start with each member of society.  
From the perspective of a press, part of the solution, it would have been expected that 
Adrian Năstase`s prison sentences for corruption should have generated a strong debate about 
the problem of political corruption in Romania, which could have been quantified via thematic 
frames. In fact, nobody actually discusses the problem of political corruption. Journalists write 
about what Năstase did, what he says, how he is, who backs him and how, but there is no real 
debate, no real dialogue or monologue about political corruption, what it means, what its effects 
are and what would be the solutions to remedy it. It is in fact a behaviour which keeps the line 
indicated by journalist Matei Udrea, quoted in the second chapter of this thesis, about what 
happens in the scientific Romanian world related to the study of corruption:  
“It is difficult to find a specialist in corruption in Romania. Scientists start dialog with an honest 
warning: “We haven`t studied the phenomenon! It is a paradox: we have to deal daily with this 
plague, foreigners talk about it, we talk about it, it affects our everyday life, but few are those 
who put it under the magnifying glass of science” (Udrea, 2013).  
A symptom of this lack of real debate is that some editorials are published on most of 
the researched websites and blogs almost as if trying to fill the space for debate with the 
episodic case of Năstase, instead of seeing the problem in perspective as well.  Another 
symptom is the fact that most of the episodic frame units were about the Court proceedings, 
which confirms what one of the interviewed journalists, Mihai Tatulici, stated about the 
Romania press: there is no news in the Romanian press. Everything is a report about what the 
Court did, what the Court said, etc. We could almost say that Năstase`s prison convictions for 
corruption are a missed opportunity for a real debate about political corruption in the Romanian 
press.  
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Chapter 5: Dan Voiculescu (Case Study II) 
 
As with the previous case study, I argue that, as part of a society tolerant to corruption, 
the Romanian press manages to report corruption but it fails to be part of the solution by holding 
the political elite to account. As in the previous case study, I argue that this tendency can be 
recognised in three ways: 
 The first is the fact that while the Romanian press should be a strong component of the 
resistance to corruption, it fails to perform any role as a whistle-blower or as an external 
mechanism to detect and bring corruption to the knowledge of the public and authorities: the 
investigative reporting is minimal, and most of the content comes from official channels.  To 
support this statement, news depiction of political corruption in Romania is explored to assess 
the prevalent cases presented and sources of news corroborated with the content type of news 
and content coverage by tone. 
The second way is the fact that the Romanian press fails to frame political corruption 
as an emergency that should be a priority for the public and political elite. That is the cases of 
corruption are not presented by the press in a manner that would indicate a serious debate with 
potential consequences for the government`s practices, while progress in this area comes due 
to external pressure from the EU. To support my statement, the frame analysis employed will 
scrutinise the main aspects of corruption presented by journalists when reporting political 
corruption, including an overview of the social universe presented by the news (who the main 
actors are, how are they linked in the political network, how are they presented by the press). 
The third way refers to the fact that the Romanian press shows little concern and 
reflection about any potential lack of ethics, understood as corruption and biased, unethical 
behaviour affecting journalists reporting political corruption, so failing to draw attention to the 
shortcomings within their profession. 
 
5.1) Methodology 
 
A) Frequency Analysis 
- Which are the most frequently presented topics about Voiculescu`s corruption?  
- What is the content type used for presenting Voiculescu`s corruption? 
- What tone was used in presenting Voiculescu`s corruption?  
- What are the information sources of corruption coverage in his case? 
 128 
 
 
 
The following steps have been accomplished:  
5. On-line research was undertaken to identify all the articles containing the name “Dan 
Voiculescu”. 1,504 articles were identified. 
6. An initial monitoring of these 1,504 articles was conducted in order to identify all the articles 
comprising the name “Dan Voiculescu” which had corruption as the main topic. Based on this 
initial monitoring I identified that the most frequently presented topic about Voiculescu`s 
corruption is the privatisation of the Food Research Institute (383 articles). A significant 
numbers of articles were registered for issues such as: the media blackmail that Voiculescu and 
his daughter, Camelia, were involved in (82 articles); corrupt judges linked to Voiculescu`s 
court cases (56 articles); Voiculescu`s involvement with the former Communist Securitate (36 
articles) and Voiculescu`s involvement in the Communist Securitate`s business activities (20 
articles).  
7. As Critical Discourse Moments are essentially moments of crisis (Chilton b, 1987), times when 
“discourse on an issue is especially visible” and “they stimulate commentary in various public 
forms by sponsors of different frames, journalists and other observers” (Chilton b, 1987), I 
identified the period between 2011 and 2014 as comprising the moments when the frequency 
of published material about Dan Voiculescu`s corrupt acts was highest (626 articles). 
 
 
 
Table 5.0: Number of Articles by Newspaper / Blog 
RL EVZ JN Gandul 22 Hotnews 
352 289 130 189 214 330 
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Table 5.1: Critical Discourse Moments 
Year RL EVZ JN G 22 HotNews TOTAL 
2005 6 0 0 0 3 13 22 
2006 13 7 2 3 3 14 42 
2007 18 3 1 1 7 7 37 
2008 11 2 6 3 4 4 30 
2009 8 3 4 5 8 8 36 
2010 17 11 7 0 1 12 48 
2011 35 25 10 14 8 35 127 
2012 65 45 5 36 31 43 225 
2013 94 81 30 58 59 79 401 
2014 85 112 65 69 90 115 536 
  
Total: 626    Critical Discourse Moments: 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 
 
8. As media events are those events which attract particular attention by the media and are 
characterised by a noticeable intensification of the communicative process, I identified those 
events linked to Voiculescu`s corrupt acts within the critical discourse moments. These events 
were preceded or followed by an increase in the frequency of the news items. When this 
happened, I took into account the preceding of following months as well. As a result, I analysed 
the news items published during the following months in: 2013 (July, September, October), 
2014 (April, May, June, July, August, September). A total of 363 articles were analysed. 
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Table 5.2: Content Analysis - Events 
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
2011 2 1 12 3 6 8 2 2 3 5 3 5 
2012 9 7 5 3 16 13 9 4 12 5 13 10 
2013 27 18 21 17 26 19 2 17 37 32 22 11 
2014 13 10 16 37 32 21 85 100 58    
 
LINE OF EVENTS 
September 2013: Voiculescu is sentenced to 5 years in prison. The Court decision is not final. 
October 2013: Voiculescu and his daughter are sent to Court for blackmail involving 
Voiculescu`s media group, Antena Group. 
 Voiculescu announces he intends to start the procedures for suspending the Head of State for 
the third time.  
April 2014: First Court hearing in Voiculescu`s corruption file. 
 Voiculescu launches his book: “The Social Democrat Union – the idea that brought President 
Traian Băsescu to his knees”. 
 Evenimentul Zilei daily discloses that Voiculescu was a business partner of the former 
Communist Security and had knowledge about their secret bank accounts. EVZ provides 
information about the confidential commissions paid by Voiculescu.  
 The Judge from the Appeal Court who is supposed to sentence Voiculescu is arrested for 
corruption on the day Voiculescu`s verdict is due. An entire corruption network among judges 
is discovered. 
 Voiculescu loses the trial started by his cousin for providing the Communist Security with 
information about her.  
May 2014:   
 More information emerges about the corruption of the Appeal Court judge. 
 More information emerges about the businesses developed by Voiculescu with the Communist 
Security. 
June 2014: One of the judges who should sentence Voiculescu for corruption retires.  
July 2014: The Court decides Voiculescu should continue to be criminally investigated. 
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August 2014: Voiculescu is sentenced to 10 years in prison for corruption. He is put in 
prison. 
Table 5.3: Examples of News Coverage 
 
1. “EXCLUSIV. INTERCEPTĂRI. Cum l-a obligat judecătorul Mustaţă pe MEME STOICA să-I 
dea mită dacă vroia să iasă din puşcărie”67 (Gherguţ O., 2014 in România Liberă). 
2. “Portret. Dan Voiculescu, mărirea şi decăderea unui mogul. De la brokerul de putere care a 
suspendat preşedintele României la zece ani de puşcărie”68 (Hotnews, 2014 in Hotnews). 
3. “EXCLUSIV EVZ. Dosarele ICE DUNĂREA. Misiunea lui Dan Voiculescu in afacerile 
Securităţii. Tranzacţia ratată cu tancuri”69 (Sica I., 2013 in Evenimentul Zilei). 
4. STENOGRAME: Interceptări despre DOSARUL ICA. Judecătorul Dan Mustaţă, acuzat de 
CORUPȚIE, voia să dea soluţie favorabilă lui Dan Voiculescu: “Şi, bă, in caz de ceva…. Că e 
loc!”/” Da, da, da. Da!”70 (Stoica I., 2014 in Evenimentul Zilei). 
5. Judecătorul Stan Mustaţă, revoltat de frauda lui Dan Voiculescu. “60 de milioane să iei cu 100 
de mii? Aş lua şi eu!”71 (Stoica I., 2014 in Evenimentul Zilei). 
6. “Portretul golanului la tinereţe şi la bătrâneţe”72 (Tapalagă D., 2011 in HotNews). 
7. “INCOLȚIT în JUSTIȚIE, Văranul reacţionează agresiv. Dan Voiculescu îşi asmute dulăii 
asupra editorialiştilor”73 (Tabacu H., 2014 in Evenimentul Zilei).  
8. Dosarul ICS – DAN VOICULESCU. Dosar finalizat in 2230 zile de la începerea urmăririi 
penale”74 (Hotnews, 2014 in Hotnews). 
9. “De ce nu ies românii în stradă ca să-l apere pe Dan Voiculescu. 5 August 2014 e finalul unei 
epoci”75 (Andronic D., 2014 in Evenimentul Zilei).  
10. “Dan Voiculescu, 10 ani de închisoare:” O să scriu cărţi”76 (Ziarul Românescu, 2014). 
 
 
                                                          
67 “EXCLUSIVE. PHONE TAPPING. How Judge Mustaţă obliged Meme Stoica to give him bribe if he wanted to 
get out of prison”. 
68 “Portrait: Dan Voiculescu, the rise and the fall of a mogul. From the power broker who suspended a Head of 
State to 10 years in jail”. 
69 “Evenimentul Zilei exclusivity. ICE Dunarea files. Voiculescu`s mission in Securitate`s businesses. Failed 
transaction with tanks”. 
70 “Stenographs: Tapping in ICA case. Judge Stan Mustaţă accused of CORRUPTION wanted to give Dan 
Voiculescu a favourable sentence: “…if anything…there is room. Yes, yes, yes. YES!”. 
71 “Judge Stan Mustaţă revolted by the fraud committed by Dan Voiculescu. “To receive Euro 60 millions for 
Euro 100 thousands? I would do it too!”. 
72 “The portrait of the thug in its youth and its old age”. 
73 “Cornered by the Legal System, Varanus Reacts Aggressively. Dan Voiculescu Sets his Dogs on Columnists”. 
74 “Case finalised 2,230 days after the debut of criminal research. ICA File – Dan Voiculescu”. 
75 “Why aren`t Romanians taking the streets to defend Dan Voiculescu. August 5, 2014 is the end of an era”. 
76 “Dan Voiculescu, 10 years in prison: “I shall write books””. 
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B) Frame Analysis 
- What are the main aspects of corruption presented by journalists? 
- What are the suggested ways to think about the problem of corruption? 
- Any suggestions about how to remedy the problem of corruption? 
- Any journalist ethics? 
 
If frames are central organising ideas for making sense of relevant events and 
suggesting what is at issue, and news and info have no intrinsic value unless embedded in a 
meaningful context which organizes and lends its coherence (London, 1993), what did the 
episodic, personality and thematic frames focus on in the case of Dan Voiculescu or, to put it 
in a different way, what are the main aspects of corruption linked to Voiculescu presented by 
journalists? 
 
 
5.1.1 Dan Voiculescu - Presentation 
 
 
Photo source: http://m.stiri.tvr.ro/article/47162  
 
Family and educational background.  Born in 1946, Dan Voiculescu is a Romanian 
politician and business man who has had a particular interest in doing business in the mass-
media field. He has often declared that he came from a very modest family. He graduated 
international trade in Bucharest at the Academy of Economic Studies (ASE). 
Political background. Voiculescu founded the Humanist Party of Romania (PUR) in 
1991 which promoted a third way, between Capitalism and Socialism.  PUR managed to get 
seats in the Parliament in 2000 due to an alliance with PDSR, the predecessor of PSD (Social 
Democrat Party) as it is today. PUR changed its name in 2005 to become the Conservative 
Party (PC) and adopted conservative values. Between 2000 and 2004 PUR supported the Social 
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Democratic (PSD) government and formed a coalition with PSD in 2004 in order to win the 
Presidential elections. The PSD-PUR coalition led by former Prime Minister Adrian Năstase, 
their candidate for the Presidency, lost the elections, and PUR left PSD in order to help the 
winner, the Truth and Justice Alliance (ADA), led by Traian Băsescu, to form the new 
government led by a liberal Prime-Minister, Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu. As a result of the 
general election Voiculescu became a member of the Romanian Senate.  PC (formerly PUR) 
left the government in 2006 but in 2008 obtained seats in Parliament due to cooperation with 
PSD. Together with the Liberal Party (PNL), PC formed the Centre-Right Alliance and, at 
Voiculescu`s suggestion, PSD, PNL and PC formed the Social Liberal Union (USL) in 
February 2011.  
In 2012 the government was dismissed due to a no confidence motion, and Victor Ponta, the 
leader of the Social Democrat Party (PSD) and representative of USL, was appointed Prime 
Minister.  
The immoral solution. The decision made by Prime Minister Tăriceanu to accept PUR, 
a small party supported by just 6%77 of the population, in the governmental coalition was 
controversial. It was admitted that one of the reasons PUR was invited into the government 
was the Voiculescu family’s media power. The newly elected President, Traian Băsescu, called 
this association “an immoral solution”, and Tom Gallagher, a British academic from Bradford 
University and specialist in Romania, noted that Voiculescu was a potentially major problem 
if the government decided to introduce legislation that would challenge vested interests which 
had profited through the questionable sale of state assets (Condon, 2005).  
Suspending the acting Head of State. Twice.  
First suspension. As an MP Voiculescu strongly opposed President Băsescu by 
accusing him as well as the reformist Minister of Justice, Monica Macovei, of infringing the 
Constitution and abusing power. In March 2007 Voiculescu set up a special parliamentary 
committee to investigate whether President Băsescu had indeed infringed the Constitution and 
pushed through Parliament the legislation that led to a national referendum to decide whether 
Băsescu should remain in office. Although in April 2007 the Parliamentary Committee run by 
Dan Voiculescu managed to suspend the acting Head of State, the national referendum that 
followed re-affirmed Băsescu as President.  
Second suspension. Traian Băsescu, the Head of State, was suspended for the second 
time in 2012, after Dan Voiculescu publicly announced the step. The Opposition strongly 
                                                          
77 PUR obtained 6% of the votes at the local elections in the summer of 2004. 
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alleged that USL had severely infringed the rule of law and committed large-scale fraud in 
order to obtain a referendum result that would dismiss President Băsescu and organize early 
Presidential elections. The result of the national referendum was to reinstate president Băsescu, 
and Voiculescu`s corruption file continues its progress through the Court.  
Voiculescu was re-elected in 2008 and again in 2012.  PC led by Voiculescu rejoined 
PSD in 2008 in a coalition to contest the general elections. Voiculescu was re-elected as an MP 
in the 8th college in Bucharest, becoming as well the Vice-President of the Senate of Romania.  
Secret Police Involvement. After many years of denial, Voiculescu admitted in 2006 
that he had cooperated with the former Securitate, Romania`s internal intelligence service 
during the Communist time. He admitted the cooperation after the information was publicly 
released by Romania`s National Council for the Study of the Securitate`s Archives (CNSAS). 
The information appeared around the time Voiculescu was named to be a Deputy Prime 
Minister in Tăriceanu`s government, and he was not allowed to take up the position.   
According to CNSAS Voiculescu cooperated with the former political police using the 
name “Felix”. Voiculescu challenged the decision of CNSAS, but the Court of Appeal in 
Bucharest rejected his appeal in February 2006 and defended its decision by showing that the 
informative notes written by Voiculescu injured the fundamental rights and liberties of the 
people he monitored (Evenimentul Zilei, 2010). According to CNSAS, Voiculescu was 
recruited by the Securitate in 1970 and he acted under the code name “Mircea”. His mission 
was to collect information about foreigners, as he worked as German translator for the 
Norwegian ice hockey team, as well as about foreign students at the Academy of Economic 
Studies (ASE).  
Due to unsatisfactory results the cooperation with the former Securitate stopped, but it 
was resumed in 1973 when he used the cover name “Felix”. He was used in contra-espionage, 
providing information about employees of foreign companies that did business with Romania. 
During this period, he gave information about further individuals, including two relatives, a 
cousin and her husband, Paraschiva and Victor Silaghi, who decided not to return to Romania. 
His reports were handed to the board of the company he worked for or to a Securitate Officer 
(Centrul de Investigatii Media, 2013) 
Voiculescu continued to challenge the Court decision. The legal battle ended in 
February 2013 with a final Court decision stating clearly that Voiculescu was a former 
Securitate informer. Voiculescu`s betrayed relatives submitted a criminal complaintaccusing 
him of false declarations, as he had stated at the beginning of his MP’s mandate in 2004 that 
he had never cooperated with the Communist Securitate. Paraschiva and Victor Silaghi wrote 
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in the complaint submitted to the Court that “Voiculescu gave false information to the 
Communist Securitate for decades causing extremely severe damage” and asked for 
compensation of Euro 21,000. Dan Voiculescu brought a counter suit against his cousin, asking 
for Euro 136,000 in damages. Voiculescu lost the trial (Ziarul Romanesc, 2014).  
Voiculescu`s businesses before the fall of Communism. After completing his studies in 
international trade at the academy of Economic Studies in Bucharest, Voiculescu was sent to 
work with Vitrocim, a foreign trade company.  In 1982 Voiculescu gave up working in this 
state company and became the representative of the Cypriot company, Crescent Commercial 
and Maritime Ltd Cyprus, in Romania. It seems that Crescent had privileged relations with the 
Communist Securitate via the international trade company “ICE Dunărea”.   
The daily Evenimentul Zilei wrote about Voiculescu`s involvement and described in 
detail how ICE Dunărea was the most important covert company belonging to the Centre of 
External Information (CIE) subordinated to the State Security Department (DSS). It explained 
as well that this company was bringing foreign currency for Nicolae Ceauşescu and the 
Securitate and was involved in transactions with diamonds and munitions (Stoica b, 2013). It 
has been alleged that after the Revolution in 1989, Voiculescu got some of the money of the 
former Communist Security. These accusations have never been proved. However, questions 
remained about the source of the capital he used to build his commercial and media empire 
after 1992 (Hotnews a, 2014).  
Voiculescu`s businesses after the fall of Communism 
Voiculescu set up Grivco Holding in 1992 (short for “Grupul Industrial Voiculescu & 
Co”)78 for international trade purposes in industry, energy, agriculture, commerce, aviation and 
media. Grivco Group developed a multitude of businesses done directly with the state, for 
example a controversial lease on the lands belonging to the State Assets Administration 
(Agenţia Domeniilor Statului) or businesses developed together with state companies such as 
Oltchim, Govora Factories, energy companies, etc (Hotnews a, 2014).  
 He got involved in the media and launched the daily, Jurnalul Naţional, and Antena 1, 
the first commercial television station in Romania. Intact Media Group is the most notorious 
company of Grivco`s Group and comprises the television stations (Antena 1, Antena 2, Antena 
3, Antena Stars, Antena Internaţional, Euforia Lifestyle TV, ZU TV, GSP TV), radios 
(Romantic FM, Radio ZU) and publications (Jurnalul Naţional, Gazeta Sporturilor, BBC Top 
Gear, BBC Good Food, BBC Science World) (Intact Media Group, 2014). Voiculescu owns as 
                                                          
78 Grupul Industrial Voiculescu & Co: (Eng) Industrial Group Voiculescu & Co. 
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well the Intact Printing House and the “Mereu Aproape” Foundation. Dan Voiculescu 
transferred his media trust to his daughter, Camelia Voiculescu, in 2006. Starting in 2002 – 
2003 Antena 1 became an aggressive player in the political arena as Dan Voiculescu used the 
increasing influence of this television station to get his little political party, PUR (later PC) into 
Parliament by forming political alliances with the Social-Democrat party (PSD) or the National 
Liberal Party (PNL).  
Antena 3 TV station was set up in 2005 to compete with the news TV station belonging 
to Sorin Ovidiu Vântu, Realitatea TV. Antena 3 rapidly become popular due to its anti-
Băsescu`s campaigns, much radicalised after Băsescu`s suspension as Head of State in 2007. 
Antena 3 has become a poisonous political instrument used by Voiculescu against his biggest 
political enemies, especially President Băsescu, as well as against his enemies in the legal 
system. The intensity of the media campaigns increased when Voiculescu’s corruption trial 
approached the final verdict.  As a result of these pressures, the European Commission 
mentioned the media attacks against key-figures in the legal system in its Monitoring and 
Verification Reports in 2013 and 2014, without naming Antena 3 explicitly. Antena 3 was also 
involved in blackmail of cable companies to buy advertising.  
Voiculescu had the habit of lending money to people close to him, journalists or 
politicians. One of Antena 3`s managers, journalist Mihai Gâdea, the producer of “Sinteza 
Zilei”, the main political talk-show of Antena 3, owes Voiculescu about Euro 200,000 as does 
Dan Constantin, the Minister of Agriculture and the President of the Conservative Party 
(Hotnews a, 2014).  
Voiculescu is considered to be one of the richest people in Romania. The Top 300 
richest Romanians launched by Capital Magazine in 2009 states that his fortune at that time 
was of Euro 1.5 – 1.6 billion (Buzas, 2009). More recently Voiculescu appeared in a list of the 
top 5 Romanian oligarchs compiled by Theodore Tanoue, the Political Councillor of the US 
Embassy in Bucharest. Voiculescu ranked 2nd, behind Dinu Patriciu and in front of Sorin 
Ovidiu Vântu, Ion Niculae and Gigi Becali.  Theodore Tanoue emphasized Voiculescu`s large 
fortune as well as his connections with the Communist Securitate: “Although Dan Voiculescu 
insists the role he played in the Securitate wasn`t bigger than the role played by any other 
Romanian and that he served his country earning money with difficulty, still his position during 
Communism, as Manager of a very important company of the Securitate, suggests that he was 
rather a high rank officer in the Securitate and not just a simple co-operator”(cited by Fati, 
2011).  Voiculescu is seen as well as one of the main culprits for Băsescu`s suspension. 
Theodore Tanoue thinks that the main purpose of the political party created by Voiculescu is 
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to protect his own business interests as the party lacks ideology and a political programme and 
acts according to” opportunistic” criteria (cited by Fati, 2011).  
Corruption allegations: money laundering regarding funds obtained through the 
National Lottery, illegal dealings with energy, illegal privatisation of the Food Research 
Institute.  
 
 
5.2) Romanian Press as Part of the Resistance to Corruption 
 
5.2.1) Most Frequently Presented Case of Political Corruption 
 
 
Photo source: http://www.evz.ro/dosarul-ica-dan-voiculescu-fotografii-grivco-tower.html  
 
The Privatisation of the Food Research Institute is Voiculescu`s most frequently 
presented case of political corruption. It is as well the only case for which there exists a final 
Court decision and as such this is going to be the main case researched.  
The history of the case. Between 1991 and 2003, Voiculescu and his accomplices 
developed a series of fraudulent commercial and financial operations to help Grivco SA (one 
of Voiculescu`s companies) to win the tendering process for the package of shares of the Food 
Research Institute (ICA) from the State`s Assets Administration at a much smaller price than 
the real commercial value of the land, in discriminatory and non-transparent conditions due to 
the under-evaluation of the assets and equity. 
In July 2003 Corneliu Popa, the President of the Administration Board of State Assets, 
authorised without a mandate from the Romanian state the opening of the privatisation of the 
Food Research Institute (ICA). He established a value of the share package 94.5 times smaller 
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than its real commercial value. False documentation was produced to suggest that the 
requirement of publicizing the intention to privatise had been fulfilled. The pack of shares was 
bought for Euro 104,730 while its real value was Euro 7,900,929. At stake were 36,676 sqm of 
land and 9,983 sqm of buildings in Băneasa, one of the most expensive areas in Bucharest.  
The fake tendering was attended only by Voiculescu`s Grivco SA and by Gheorghe 
Mencinicopschi, ICA`s Managing Director and member of the Shareholders and member of 
Voiculescu`s Humanist Party (later Conservative Party). An increase of the capital based on a 
fictional handing over of two pieces of equipment from Grivco to ICA took place in 2004. 
Grivco`s shares got into Voiculescu`s personal ownership by February 2005 and he placed 
them in his daughters’ names.   
Voiculescu was sent to Court in December 2008 charged with using his influence and authority 
as the leader of a political party in order to obtain money, assets or other undeserved benefits 
for himself or someone else, as well as money laundering (Hotnews b, 2014)  
 
5.2.2) The content type used for presenting Voiculescu`s corruption 
 
Similar to the case of Adrian Năstase, most of the information about Dan Voiculescu is 
presented as News (53%), followed by Event type reporting (33%), Editorials (10%), 
Investigation (2%), Reportage (1%) and Interviews (1%). This indicates clearly that, similar 
to Adrian Năstase, the Romanian press does pay attention to the topic of corruption by Dan 
Voiculescu and comments on it but the low scores registered by investigation and reportage 
indicate that no deeper research or analysis into the seemingly corrupt acts have been done. 
 
 
 
Table 5.4: Corruption Coverage by Content Type 
Content Type Number Percent 
Investigation 7 2% 
Systemic Analysis - -  
Editorial 38 10% 
Event 118 33% 
 139 
 
Reportage 3 1% 
Other topics 1 0.1% 
News 191 53% 
Interview 5 1% 
Total 363 100% 
 
 
 
 
5.2.3) The tone used in presenting Voiculescu`s corruption  
 
More than half of the content about Voiculescu is presented in a negative tone (62%), 
followed at a long distance by neutral tone (37%). Only 1% of the content was delivered in a 
positive note.  
 
Table 5.5: Content Coverage by Tone 
Tone Number Percent 
Positive 2 1% 
Negative 226 62% 
Neutral 135 37% 
Total 363 100% 
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5.2.4) The information sources of corruption coverage in Voiculescu`s case? 
 
The most frequent sources of information are the Romanian institutions of the legal 
system such as the Court, the Prosecutors` Office and Police (45%) and Politicians (30%), 
followed by the journalists (19%) monitoring the evolution of the Court case Voiculescu was 
involved in. Different experts are a source of content as well (3%) due mostly to their 
declarations. Police (2%) and Voiculescu`s daughters (1%) are the least used source for 
information.  
 
Table 5.6: Corruption Coverage by Information Sources 
Information Sources Number Percent 
Police 8 2% 
Court / Prosecutors/Judges 162 45% 
Politicians 110 30% 
Parliament - - 
Experts 11 3% 
Journalists 69 19% 
Press Agencies - - 
Penitentiary - - 
Doctors - - 
Editor`s Office - - 
DV`s daughters 3 1% 
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5.3) Political Corruption Presented as an Emergency to be Addressed (Frame Analysis) 
 
A total of 2,539 frame units were identified, distributed like this: main character: 593 
(23%), the role of the media: 402 (16%),  accomplices: 347 (15%),  describing and mentioning 
corrupt acts 370 (14%), court procedures: 228 (9%), how is Dan Voiculescu evaluated: 117 
(5%), consequences of the corrupt acts: 133 (5%), how are corrupt acts evaluated: 79 (3%), 
who evaluates corrupt acts: 71 (3%), how to solve the problem: 54 (2%), who evaluates Dan 
Voiculescu: 51 (2%), journalist`s ethic: 29 (1%), why they did it: 20 (0.78%), other media 
moguls: 11 (0.43%), political mixture in the press: 10 (0.39%), how not to solve the problem: 
7 (0.27%), initial source of political corruption disclosure: 5 (0.19%), pressure put on Justice: 
3 (0.11%), communist way of thinking in the media: 3 (0.11%).  
 
Table 5.7: Distribution of Frame Units  
Frame Units Number Percent 
Main character 593 23% 
The role of the media 402 16% 
Accomplices 347 15% 
Describing and mentioning corrupt acts 370 14% 
Court procedures 228 9% 
How is Dan Voiculescu evaluated 117 5% 
Consequences of the corrupt acts 133 5% 
How are corrupt acts evaluated 79 3% 
Who evaluates corrupt acts 71 3% 
How to solve the problem 54 2% 
Who evaluates Dan Voiculescu 51 2% 
Journalist`s ethic 29 1% 
Why they did it 20 0.78% 
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Other media moguls 11 0.43% 
Political mixture in the press 10 0.39% 
How not to solve the problem 7 0.27% 
Initial source of political corruption disclosure 5 0.19% 
Pressures on the Legal system 3 0.11% 
Communist way of thinking in the media 3 0.11% 
 
Main characters involved. 23% of the episodic frames describe the main characters 
involved one way or another in topics about political corruption. 
The characters mentioned that appeared in most frame units are: Dan Voiculescu (339), Judge 
Stan Mustaţă (52), Judge Camelia Bogdan (39), Judge Mihai Alexandru Mihalcea (37), Judge 
Florică Duţă (19), Laura Codruta Kovesi, Head Prosecutor of the National Anticorruption 
Authority/DNA (11), Traian Băsescu, President of Romania (10). Under 10 units were 
registered by: Klaus Johannis, Mayor of Sibiu Town and Presidential candidate (8), Codruţ 
Sereş, former PC Minister of Economy (8), Antena 3 TV station (8), Victor Ponta, PSD Prime 
Minister of Romania (6), Marian Căpăţână (5),  Camelia Voiculescu, Dan Voiculescu`s 
daughter (5),  Corina Voiculescu, Dan Voiculescu`s daughter (4), Monica Macovei, former 
Minister of Justice and member of the European Parliament (4), Bercea Mondialu, member of 
a criminal gang (3), Mircea Băsescu, the brother of President Traian Băsescu (3), The Superior 
Council of Magistrates/CSM (3), Gheorghe Mateuţ, Voiculescu`s barrister (3), Maria Vasii, 
Voiculescu`s Barrister (2), Journalists from Antana 3 TV station (2), Mariana Curea, the 
Registrat of Judge Stan Mustaţă (2), Tiberiu Niţă, the General Prosecutor of Romania (2). 
Politicians: Daniel Constantin (Minister of Agriculture), Adrian Năstase, Cătălin Voicu,  Ion 
Iliescu, Ovidiu Silaghi, Relu Fenechiu, Adrian Videanu, Bogdan Olteanu, Liviu Dragnea, 
Mircea Geoană as well as media owners Sorin Ovidiu Vântu and Sebastian Ghiţă,  journalist 
Robert Turcescu, the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), Police representative, Pavel 
Abraham, Popular Movement Party, Judge Graţiela Constantin and Emilian Eva, the prosecutor 
who sent Voiculescu to Court were mentioned just once.  
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Table 5.8: Main Characters Involved 
Main Characters Involved Number of Frames 
Dan Voiculescu 339 
Stan Mustaţă, Judge 52 
Camelia Bogdan, Judge 39 
Mihai Alexandru Mihalcea, Judge 37 
Florică Duţă, Judge 19 
Laura Codruta Kovesi, Head Prosecutor of the National Anticorruption 
Authority / DNA 
11 
Traian Băsescu, President of Romania 10 
Klaus Johannis, Mayor of Sibiu and Presidential candidate (The 
current President of Romania) 
8 
Codrut Sereş, Former PC Minister of Economy 8 
Antena 3 TV Station 8 
Victor Ponta, PSD, former Prime Minister 6 
Mariana Căpăţână  5 
Camelia Voiculescu, Dan Voiculescu`s daughter 5 
Corina Voiculescu, Dan Voiculescu`s daughter 4 
Monica Macovei, former Minister of Justice and MEP 4 
Bercea Mondialu, member of a criminal gang 3 
Mircea Băsescu, the brother of former President, Traian Băsescu 3 
The Superior Council of Magistrates (CSM) 3 
Gheorghe Mateuţ, Dan Voiculescu`s barrister 2 
Journalists from Antena 3 TV Station 2 
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Mariana Curea, the Registrar of Judge Stan Mustaţă 2 
Tiberiu Niţă, the General Prosecutor of Romania 2 
Daniel Constantin, Minister of Agriculture 1 
Adrian Năstase, former Prime Minister 1 
Cătălin Voicu, politician 1 
Ion Iliescu, former President of Romania 1 
Ovidiu Silaghi, MP 1 
Relu Fenechiu, MP 1 
Adrian Videanu, politician 1 
Bogdan Olteanu, politician 1 
Liviu Dragnea, politician 1 
Mircea Geoană, politician 1 
Sorin Ovidiu Vântu, media owner 1 
Sebastian Ghiţă, MP & media owner 1 
Robert Turcescu, journalist   
The Romanian Intelligence service (SRI) 1 
Pavel Abraham, Police representative 1 
Popular Movement Party 1 
Graţiela Constantin, one of the Prosecutors who sent Voiculescu to 
Court 
1 
Emilian Eva, another Prosecutor who sent Voiculescu to Court 1 
 
Judge Stan Mustaţă and Judge Florică Duţă were part of the team of judges judging 
Voiculescu`s case. Judge Stan Mustaţă was arrested on the day a verdict in Voiculescu`s 
corruption case was due and accused of selling sentences for money or assets. A verdict 
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pronounced by him would have been very significant, as according to the new Penal Codes his 
verdicts were final and enforceable. Judge Florică Mustaţă lied in order to postpone a new 
hearing in Voiculescu`s trial and requested to be retired after Judge Stan Mustaţă was arrested.  
Judge Camelia Bogdan and Judge Mihai Alexandru Mihalcea took over Voiculescu`s 
case and sent Viculescu to prison for 10 years, final decision. Camelia Bogdan had previously 
judged one of Sorin Ovidiu`s Vântu criminal files. She increased the speed of the procedures 
and conducted 15 Court hearings in just four months (November 8, 2010 – March 22, 2011) 
before giving a final decision. She was strongly contested by Voiculescu`s barristers and 
challenged to the end. Camelia Bogdan is as well the Judge who discovered that the cardiology 
consultant who gave Sorin Ovidiu Vântu medical notes testifying that he had a heart problem 
and could not attend Court was in fact a Gynaecologist.  
Judge Mihai Alexandru Mihalcea refused to parole Sorin Ovidiu Vântu in 2013 due to the fact 
that he did not make the effort to be re-educated nor distinguished himself in any positive way. 
Laura Codrut Kovesi, the Head Prosecutor of the National Anti-Corruption Authority 
(DNA), drew the attention of the media during an interview on the State Television (TVR) to 
the fact that the deeds Voiculescu has been prosecuted for would be foreclosed in December 
2014 unless the judges pronounced a verdict before then: “it is important for a criminal file 
which has been in the Court for more than six years to be finalised with a decision (…) we 
shouldn`t stay and wait for the foreclosure deadline”  as otherwise “we could become 
suspicious about those who postponed the trial” ( Dumitru, 2014). 
Traian Băsescu, the Head of State, is the one Voiculescu considers to be guilty for his 
troubles with the legal system. In return, President Băsescu describes Voiculescu as “a rotten 
informer who denounced his family and relatives to the Communist Security, and whose 
employees say what they are paid to say. Antena 3 has only employees.  If you called them 
journalists, you ennobled them” (Tapalagă b, 2014). 
Mentioning and describing corrupt acts accounts for 14% of the media frames. The 
most described case is the corruption concerning the privatisation of the Food Research 
Institute (269) followed by the corruption of Judge Stan Mustaţă and how he wanted to help 
Voiculescu (34).  
Based on the papers released by the National Anticorruption Authority (DNA), the 
Romanian press describes in detail the way Judge Stan Mustaţă and his criminal group worked. 
It includes almost daily conspiratorial meetings in the apartment of Ion Boraciu, one of the 
accomplices. The way of communicating avoided the use of mobile phones. The criminal cases 
in which Judge Mustaţă could pronounce a favourable final sentence or could carry out traffic 
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of influence with other judge-colleagues were identified by using ECRIS, the database system 
of the Court of Appeal in Bucharest.  Favourable Court decisions were offered in any criminal 
case, no matter how serious the offence.  His accomplices would contact the potential bribers 
or those interested in buying influence. Their addresses were identified via the same ECRIS 
system. If the culprits refused to give bribes of buy influence, they would be threatened with 
unjust verdicts even though they were entitled to an acquittal as in the case of the famous 
football manager, Meme Stoica.  
The level of the bribes requested was according to the financial power of the culprits 
and their financial power was established according to the market value and notoriety of the 
barristers representing them.  The money was retrieved by one of the accomplices and the 
amounts were shared equally among the members of the group led by Mustaţă. One or two 
files were arranged monthly.  
Judge Mustaţă was backed up by Mariana Curea, his Registrar at the court of Appeal 
Bucharest.  
According to the Romanian press, Judge Mustaţă might have considered helping Voiculescu, 
as the stenographs released by the National Anti-Corruption Authority (DNA) show that 
Boraciu, one of Mustaţă`s accomplices sent to ask for bribes for favourable sentences, showed 
his availability to get a favourable sentence for Voiculescu in the ICA case after the first Court 
hearing and the details of the criminal file were discussed with two “mysterious” barristers 
(Stoica a, b, 2014).  
Later, the script of the discussions between Judge Mustaţă and his accomplices shows they 
were in difficulty due to the notoriety of the case, which would have brought them under the 
spotlight. “Mustaţă and his accomplices considered initially giving up the ICA case. The 
reason: the decisions given by the Judge were receiving attention from public opinion and this 
would destroy their plans. As such, the entire group was vulnerable.  
5% (133) of the frame units are about the consequences of the corrupt acts. Most of 
them (83 units) describe the consequences specific to the ICA case: the state budget lost Euro 
60 million. The rest of the units describe the consequences of corruption for different areas of 
society:  moral decay of the Romanian society; moral decay of Romanian public life where 
responsibility had been abdicated; an isolated Romania, far from the European trends and 
always in danger of abandoning the rule of law; a capitalism built on robbery and controlled 
by the representatives of the Communist system; lack of clarification in politics.   
The consequences for the legal system are broadly mentioned. The Romanian legal 
system has become a weak and unfair system in which: suspects of fraud are released; criminal 
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investigations against judges accused of taking bribes are stopped; the legal system is 
bargaining with the political arena as much lighter sentences are given to those convicted for 
corruption; judicial decisions favour criminals.  A dysfunctional and mostly propagandist 
media are the consequences of corrupt acts for the media.  
Accomplices (15% - 347 units) are presented in detail by the Romanian press. The most 
presented ones are Voiculescu`s accomplices in the Institute of Food Research Institute (ICA) 
case, followed by Mariana Curea, Judge Mustaţă`s Registrar.  
Dan Voiculescu`s accomplices in the ICA case were state authorities: The National Authority 
for Fiscal Administration (ANAF), the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), politicians and 
former ministers and managers of public institutions: 
Gheorghe Mencinicopschi: nutritionist and former Manager of the Food Research Institute. He 
participated together with Grivco in a fake tendering. He was sentenced to eight years in prison 
and lost his family home in Otopeni for abuse in performing his duties and false private 
signature.  
Sorin Pantiş, former Minister of Communications and then one of Grivco`s managers. He was 
sentenced to seven years in prison for complicity in establishing a lower value of the institute 
compared to the real one and presenting false documents.  
Corneliu Popa, former Manager of the Agency for State Assets (ADS), was sentenced to eight 
years in prison and forbidden to perform any public function for five years afterwards. He was 
found guilty of intentionally under-valuing assets belonging to the state.  
Sandu Jean Călin, former Chief of the Judicial Department of the Agency for State Assets 
(ADS), was sentenced to six years in prison for intentionally under-valuing the assets belonging 
to the Food Research Institute (ICA).  
Vlad Nicolae Săvulescu was sentenced to six years in prison for intentionally under-valuing 
the ICA`s assets by 75 times.  
Flaviu Adrian Pop, member of ICA`s board, was sent to prison for five years for undervaluing 
the ICA.  
Gheorghe Sin, Academician and former member of ICA`s board, was sentenced to four years 
in prison for complicity in intentionally undervaluing state assets.  
Constantin Baciu, former representative of the Ministry of Agriculture in the General Meeting 
of the Shareholders, received a suspended sentence of four years in prison for complicity in 
intentionally under-valuing state assets.  
Petre Alexandru, Grigore Marinescu and Viorica Ene, former censors at ICA, received a 
suspended sentence of three years to prison.  
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 Other accomplices often mentioned are those working together with Judge Stan 
Mustaţă. Mariana Curea, his Registrar, who identified the convicts and defendants willing to 
pay bribes for favourable sentences by using the ECRIS system of the Appeal Court of 
Bucharest. She was monitoring as well in order to see if any phone tapping mandates were 
issued on the name of Mustaţă.  
Florian Alexandru was close to the dubious clan Camatari and Ion Boraciu was a business man 
and owner of the house in Colentina, Bucharest, where the meetings with Stan Mustaţă used to 
take place. Florin Alexandru and Ion Boraciu would get in touch with the “clients”, their 
relatives and barristers and ask money to receive favourable Court decisions or to traffic 
influence if other judges were in charge of their case.  
The reasons for corruption presented by the press are mostly material benefits, money and 
goods. Some of the accomplices, Gheorghe Mencinicopschi, Sorin Pantiş and Cătălin Jean, 
were compensated as well with financing to attend events abroad and with being maintained 
or appointed in new, well remunerated, positions.  
The initial source of political corruption disclosure. The involvement of the Romanian 
Intelligence Services in the case of Judge Stan Mustaţă as well as the cooperation of his 
accomplices with the Prosecutors investigating the case are broadly described by the written 
press: “in order to jam potential tapping, mobile phones were forbidden from the bathroom, the 
tap water was allowed to run and the toilet was flushed often. Despite all this the audio-video 
instruments set up by the Romanian Intelligence Services registered faithfully all the meetings” 
(Gherguţ a, 2014).  
Who evaluates corrupt acts. The material researched indicates that the evaluation of the 
corrupt acts comes mostly from the prosecutors (59), followed by the journalists (9) and 
politicians (3).  
How are corrupt acts evaluated. Most of the frame units identified present the facts as 
being political corruption and money laundry.  Some of the units consider the corrupt facts as 
being “dubious or illegal activities” and draw attention to the fact that the reforms of the legal 
system can be reversed.  
How to solve the problem. Although only 2% (54 units) of the frame units focus on the 
question of how to solve the problem of political corruption, the Romanian press provides a 
few answers. The most mentioned one is the idea that the culprits should be criminally 
investigated and sent to prison (21) and a part of their wealth should be confiscated (20). The 
reform of the legal system is the third preferred option defined as: securing the independence 
of the leaders of the fundamental institutions in the legal system and professionalism of the 
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judges. Forbidding civil rights and balancing the power relationship between political parties 
and state are the least proposed solutions.  
How not to solve the problem. However, the Romanian press has an idea about how not to 
solve the problem: by blaming the politicising of the Legal System, by suing journalists 
reporting cases of political corruption, by solving the cases of corruption through political 
negotiation, avoiding the legal system, by doing political deals between the Head of State and 
the Prime Minister about appointing the new Chief Prosecutor, by lack of political will as well 
as by removing prosecutors who finalise major cases of political corruption.  
Court procedures. Although a considerable number of units were dedicated to Court 
decisions and Court motivation, most of the units focus on the Court hearings (125) as they 
provide a clear image of how Dan Voiculescu tried to postpone a final decision until the 
foreclosure deadline. The Romanian press let us know that 2,145 days elapsed between the 
anti-corruption prosecutors starting the criminal investigation in the ICA case and the final 
verdict. This means 5 years, 10 months and 16 days. 2,073 days have passed since Voiculescu 
was sent to Court. This means: 5 years, 8 months and 5 days. We find out as well that 3 Courts 
judged the case: the Tribunal in Bucharest (20 hearings), the High Court of Justice (39 hearings) 
and the Court of Appeal Bucharest (12 hearings), a total of 71 Court hearings.  Dan Voiculescu 
resigned twice from the Senate, once in June 2012 and again in January 2013.  As a 
consequence of his resignation, his criminal case was moved from one Court to another. A total 
of 17 panels of Judges deliberated in the ICA case and 13 judges and prosecutors led the court 
trials. One of the Judges, Stan Mustaţă, was arrested (Cozmei, 2014) 
How Dan Voiculescu is evaluated. Dan Voiculescu is mostly evaluated by journalists, 
followed by politicians such as President Băsescu and experts in corruption and political 
marketing such as Monica Macovei and Dan Andronic.  
Most of the frame units (52) are about Dan Voiculescu`e negative traits. He is presented by the 
Romanian press as: “Varanus79”, “toxic mogul”, “guilty”, “informer”, “Felix” (his name as 
informer of the former Communist Securitate), “the man of the Communist Securitate”, “a 
rotten informer who betrayed his family so that he would have a nice life”, crook, culprit, “the 
last fossil of the old world”, “a Terminator in misery”, “a cancer of society”, “poor old man 
sick of grandeur”, “the Professor”, “suspect of stealing Ceauşescu`s money”, “beast of prey”, 
“a too big fis”, “oligarch”, “power broke”, “nabob”. He is seen as well as someone 
“misrepresenting the problem”, “capable to easily trick the legal system”, “capable of dodgy 
                                                          
79 Varanus = a type of crocodile that lives in Africa, Asia and Australia.  
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manipulation to avoid going to prison”. He is seen as” creating a pocket party”, the” owner of 
a political party always in power”, “capable of obtaining high political positions”, always 
“influencing the political life in Romania”, he is” the system”. He is seen as well as the creator 
of television stations for brainwashing who doesn`t understand his criminal conviction.  
Other media moguls. The frame units identified as linked to Voiculescu`s ICA case 
refer to other media moguls as well. Sorin Ovidiu Vântu is seen as someone who controlled the 
mass-media, the sources of money and politicians like no one before due to an exceptional 
relationship with the intelligence services, very sensitive to his demands (Andronic, 2014).  
Sebastian Ghiţă is the new media mogul in Romania. He is accused of building an empire with 
money from public contracts he obtained with the help of the Social-Democrat (PSD) Prime 
Minister, Victor Ponta. He is accused as well of returning the favour by doing propaganda for 
Ponta ignoring the rules of journalistic correctness (Băsescu cited by Romania Libera, 2014). 
The frame units show that his purposes are similar to those of other media moguls: the wish to 
control the political decision makers, to instate prime ministers and heads of state. The means 
used are similar as well. 
 Media mogul Dinu Patriciu is mentioned as well. He is presented as someone who made 
a mountain of money from a “lucky” privatisation, invested more than €100 million in mass-
media and controlled the National Liberal Party for a while. He ended up tired, exhausted, 
almost bankrupt and with a few trials in Court (...) He died this year of cancer in London where 
he spent his last years (Andronic, 2014). 
Political mixture in the press. The relationship between Prime Minister Ponta and the 
big media trusts is a recurrent theme in the articles about the relationship between media and 
politics and consequently the pressures put by the political arena on journalists. As an example, 
the Romanian press mentions the case of Mircea Diaconu, an independent candidate who asked 
Voiculescu`s media trust for support in order to win elections for the European Parliament 
(Cristoiu, 2014).  
The role of the press is visible by the type of content it is providing:  
It informs about: developments in a criminal case, corrupt judges and their acts, Court 
decisions, Dan Voiculescu`s fortune, details of Dan Voiculescu`s life and career, conflicts 
between Dan Voiculescu and other politicians, potential solution to the corruption problem.  
It explains: how corruption took place, why Voiculescu was condemned, and the significance 
of Voiculescu`s prison sentence for the legal system, for the media, for the political arena, for 
Romanian society. It explains as well the consequences of political corruption and the thinking 
of the wrong-doer.  
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It describes: how Dan Voiculescu tried to put pressure on the prosecutors investigating his 
case, the methods used by politicians to postpone a final decision in a criminal case, how the 
media moguls act.  
It discloses: acts of political corruption, occult methods used by politicians to get power and 
money and put pressure on other politicians and state institutions, pressures put by politicians 
on journalists, deals between Dan Voiculescu and other politicians. 
It investigates corruption and comments about corruption cases.  
It transmits the views of politicians, experts and journalists about corruption and about Dan 
Voiculescu`s case as well as Voiculescu`s and Voiculescu`s family point of view about his 
Court trial and sentence.  
It accuses the political involvement in the Legal System.  
The Romanian press plays as well a very negative role: it makes propaganda to support 
Voiculescu and save him from going to prison; it allows itself to be used as a tool to put pressure 
on the Legal system in exchange of financial support. As a consequence, the Romanian press 
is seen as practising blackmail, mob rule against representatives of the Legal System, and 
media terrorism. Voiculescu`s media in particular are seen as the origin of political actions with 
impact: the suspension of the Head of State, the mobilisation of people to vote, the polarisation 
of opinion: those supporting a political leader and those not supporting that political leader, as 
in the case of President Băsescu.  
 
5.4) Lack of Ethics Within the Romanian Press 
 
Given the context, the journalist`s ethic becomes a very sensitive and necessary aspect.  
The journalists employed by Voiculescu particularly are seen as being plasticine journalists: 
they support their corrupt owner and his political game despite a clear verdict of political 
corruption and a prison sentence. They try to impose the idea that Voiculescu`s clear verdict 
of political corruption is the result of a political command, as if the legal system in Romania 
were a mechanism politically used. From outside Voiculescu`s trust, his journalists are seen as 
paid to continuously lie and to brain wash in order to defend him. More than this, Oreste, one 
of the journalists that used to work for Voiculescu describes how Voiculescu`s very faithful 
journalists such as Mona Nicolici, Gabriela Vranceanu Firea, Niels Schnecker, Andrei 
Zaharescu and Mirel Palada accepted to be placed in key positions in the political arena 
(Breazu, 2013).  
 152 
 
 The Romanian press describes Voiculescu`s media trust mode of operation, resembling 
the communist times: “step by step he created in his media trust a team of mercenaries. He 
paid them very well for years and he is still doing it. Varanus created a “blood thirsty” public 
with a perfidious skill by borrowing from the miserable Golden Age journalism all the mould 
and gangrene. You basically don’t want to mess with them. They behave as a pack. They mostly 
lie and they must please Voiculescu with every word. Unfortunately, very many important 
people do not want to get into their mouth. This is why very poisonous political movements 
that compromise us for many years take place. In 2012 the suspension of the Head of State was 
attempted by infringing all possible laws. The Judges are currently avoiding attendance at 
Court hearings about Voiculescu`s criminal acts.   
Varanus`s trial has been lasting for very many years and he used all the tergiversations in order 
to avoid going to jail. Despite the fact that all the people who follow this case have understood 
Voiculescu`s manoeuvres, he still shouts and makes press conferences. Many people play along 
out of fear or because they are well paid. Most do not get involved” (Tabacu, 2014).  
 
 
 
 
5.5) Conclusions 
 
It is easy to notice a fundamental difference between the cases of Adrian Năstase and 
Dan Voiculescu. Adrian Năstase represents the symbol of the fallen star: he lost the presidential 
elections to a candidate promoting an anti-corruption agenda, lost the leadership of his party 
and got back among his peers where he had many things to answer for. On the other hand, 
Voiculescu represents “the system” itself: always in power, always having the right people in 
the right place.  
The Romanian press presents Dan Voiculescu as a politician with strong connections 
in the Communist past who wants to promote himself as a victim of the new lot of politicians 
despite the fact that a clear Court investigation and verdict have demonstrated his corrupt acts.  
The press devotes a broad space to the Court procedures, to explaining how the corrupt acts 
took place and what the role of accomplices was. Linked to Voiculescu`s case is the case of 
Judge Stan Mustaţă, which brings a new light on the dealings between politicians and the 
representatives of the legal system.  
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Similar to the case of Adrian Năstase is the role of Voiculescu`s media trust which appears as 
a poisonous element within the Romanian mass-media, an instrument to support corrupt 
politicians, an agent of propaganda and a tool with which stained politicians and media owners 
want to bring down Heads of State and governments of the day according to their own will.  
As in Adrian Năstase’s case, it would have been expected that Voiculescu`s prison 
sentences for corruption would have generated a strong debate within the press about the 
problem of political corruption in Romania, but only a few frame units were identified about 
the consequences of Voiculescu`s conviction for Romanian society, the political arena and the 
legal system. Most of the information about corrupt acts committed by Dan Voiculescu is 
presented as News, followed by Event type reporting. Editorials. Investigation, Reportage and 
Interviews have no noticeable presence within the press output about this case. As in the case 
of Adrian Năstase, these figures indicate that the Romanian press pays attention to the topic of 
corrupt acts committed by Dan Voiculescu and comments on them, but it does not do a deeper 
research or analysis into the seemingly corrupt acts that have been done. The Romanian 
journalists do not seem to be willing to use the information available either to continue 
investigation or to attempt to discover other similar corruption cases. They simply report the 
information received from official channels. They fail to discuss the topic of political 
corruption per se.  
 The topic of journalists’ ethics occupies a small place too in the reporting of the 
Romanian press, although the information is available and the journalists acting unethically are 
named and presented together with their deeds. As in the case of Adrian Năstase, the Romanian 
press has a minimal reporting of the lack of ethics among journalists reporting political 
corruption, and a debate about this issue is far from its preoccupations. 
To a large degree, Voiculescu`s case has been another missed opportunity for debate about 
political corruption in the Romanian press.  
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Chapter 6: EADS80 – Microsoft (Case Study III) 
 
EADS and Microsoft are linked to two corruption cases which have in common a 
number of politicians and companies involved in corrupt dealings over a period starting with 
the Government led by Adrian Năstase (2000 – 2004) and continuing until today. I chose to 
analyse this case due to the number of high ranking Romanian politicians involved, and also 
because the scandal surrounding it started shortly before the beginning of the electoral 
campaign for the Presidential elections.  It is a case which, as Romania`s former head of State, 
Traian Băsescu, declared, shows a clear x-ray of politicians and political corruption in Romania 
since 2000 (Vintila, 2014).  In this respect, the Microsoft – EADS case is very different from 
the previous two. It provides us not with the image of just one politician, his acts and his 
strategies to escape the long arm of the legal system. Instead we see the image of how a corrupt 
practice survives over a decade, irrespective of who is in charge, and who are those who help 
this happen.  
As with the case studies 1 & 2, I argue that the Romanian press reports corruption but 
it fails to become part of the solution by holding the political elite to account in the case of 
EADS – Microsoft. I show that in this case the Romanian press fails to perform its role as a 
whistle-blower or an external mechanism capable to detect and bring corruption to the 
knowledge of the public and authorities by providing any investigative reporting, but instead 
most is based on content provided by official channels. News depiction of political corruption 
is explored to assess the prevalent topics presented and sources of news corroborated with the 
content type of news and content coverage by tone.  
Similar to the previous two cases, I demonstrate that the Romanian press fails to frame 
political corruption as an emergency that should be a priority for the public and political elite. 
The corruption cases are not presented by the press in a manner that would indicate a serious 
debate with potential consequences on the government`s practices, and progress in the area 
comes due to external pressure from the EU. Frame analysis is employed to scrutinise the main 
aspects of corruption presented by journalists, including an overview of the social universe 
presented by the news (who the main actors are, how they are linked in the political network, 
how they are presented by the press). I demonstrate as well that the Romanian press shows 
little concern and reflection about any potential lack of ethics affecting journalists reporting 
political corruption, drawing attention this way to the shortcomings within their profession.  
                                                          
80 EADS = European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company 
 155 
 
6.1 Methodology 
 
The Microsoft – EADS scandal started in July 2014 and had its highest intensity up to 
the end of the electoral campaign for the Presidential elections at the end of October. Due to 
the short period of time involved as well as due to the high number of high ranking officials 
involved I decided to analyse all the articles published by the selected newspapers and 
magazines.  
 
A. Frequency Analysis 
 
- What is the content type used for presenting the Microsoft – EADS case? 
- What tone was used in presenting Microsoft – EADS corruption?  
- What are the information sources of corruption coverage in this case? 
 
Table 6.0: Number of Articles Analysed by Newspaper 
Year RL EVZ JN G 22 HotNews TOTAL 
2014 55 26 8 16 21 11 137 
 
 
Table 6.1: Examples of News Coverage 
1. “Traian Băsescu: M-aş bucura dacă ar ieşi şi EADS. Acest dosar face şi el o radiografie a clasei 
politice”81 (Vintilă C., 2014 in Evenimentul Zilei). 
2. “Sistemul ticăloşit a migrat de la Năstase la Băsescu”82 (Pora A., 2014 in Revista 22). 
3. “La modă, turnătorii din lumea grangurilor”83 (Golea G., 2014 in Jurnalul Naţional).  
4.” Tripleta Niro-Cocoș-Pinalti, în subteranele afacerii Microsoft-EADS”84 (Gherguţ O., 2014 in 
România Liberă). 
5. “Băsescu spune că informațiile în dosarul Microsoft nu pornesc de la milionarul Alexandru Bittner. 
Nu l-a căutat nimeni prin SUA”85 (Biţă D., 2014 in România Liberă). 
                                                          
81 “I Would Be Happy If EADS File Would Start. This File Presents As Well an X-ray of the Political Class”. 
82 “The Reprobate System migrated from Nastase to Băsescu”. 
83 “The Informers from the High-Up Society Are Fashionable”. 
84 “The Trio Niro – Cocos – Pinalti in the undergrounds of Microsoft – EADS business”. 
85 “Băsescu says the information in Microsoft file do not start from millionaire Alexandru Bittner. Nobody 
looked for him in the US”. 
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6. “PENALII din spatele CANDIDAȚILOR la prezidenţiale. În top, Ponta şi PSD”86 (Bechir M., 2014). 
7. “Fostul Ministru, Gabriel Sandu, investigat la DNA in Dosarul Microsoft”87 (Biţă D., 2014 in 
România Liberă). 
8. “MEGADOSAR DE CORUPŢIE: contracte suspecte în valoare de 1 miliard de euro. Vezi lista 
preliminară a politicienilor care au semnat achiziţiile”88 (Attila B., 2014 in Gândul). 
9. “Laura Codruţa Koveşi: Mita pentru contractile cu Microsoft şi EADS, în jur de 60 milioane de 
Euro”89 (Hotnews c, 2014 in Hotnews). 
10. “Cătălin Harnagea, fostul şef al SIE, explică ce a căutat DNA la el acasă: Are legătură cu EADS”90 
(Ciocan O., 2014 in Gândul).  
 
B. Frame Analysis 
 
- What are the main aspects of corruption presented by journalists? 
- What are the suggested ways to think about the problem of corruption? 
- Any suggestions about how to remedy the problem of corruption? 
- Journalist`s ethics? 
 
Table 6.2: Corruption Coverage by Episodic Frames 
Frame Types (Units) Number Percentage 
Episodic 1,699 100% 
 
6.2 Romanian Press as Part of the Resistence to Corruption 
 
6.2.1 Presentation of the corruption cases:  EADS & Microsoft (IT acquisitions) 
 
The National Anti-corruption authority (DNA) started investigation in July 2014 
concerning the acquisitions of IT contracts valued at over €1 billion, based on clues that those 
in charge of the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Communications, the Ministry of 
                                                          
86 “The criminals behind the Presidential candidates. Ponta and PSD are at the top” 
87 “Former Minister, Gabriel Sandu, investigated by DNA in Microsoft File”. 
88 “Mega-dossier of corruption: Suspicious contracts worth 1 billion euros. See preliminary list of politicians 
who have signed procurement”. 
89 “Laura Kovesi: Bribes for contracts with Microsoft and EADS, around 60 million euros”. 
90 “Cătălin Harnagea, the former Head of the Romanian External Intelligence Services (SIE) explains why DNA 
visited him home: He is linked to EADS file”. 
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Education and the General Secretariat of the Government abused their offices and took bribes 
from companies seeking to get contracts for IT products including software for the security of 
the state borders. The contracts started being signed after Adrian Năstase`s election as Prime 
Minister, and the bribes were taken in 2004. One of the four big contracts researched refers to 
the Incorporated System for the Security of the State Borders. The contract, worth € 534 
million, was signed between EADS Deutschland GmBH and Romania`s Ministry of Interior 
and was extended in 2009 with a further €200 million.  
 
6.2.2 The content type used for presenting EADS - Microsoft corruption 
 
Similar to the previous two case studies, most of the information about EADS - 
Microsoft is presented as Events (51%), followed by News type reporting (34%), Editorials 
(6%) and Investigation (6%), Interview (2%) and Reportage (1%). 
This indicates clearly that the Romanian press does pay attention to the topic of corruption 
done by former and current ministers involved in the Microsoft – EADS case and comments 
on it, but the low scores registered by investigation and reportage indicate that no deeper 
research or analysis into the seemingly corrupt acts has been done. 
 
Table 6.3: Corruption Coverage by Content Type 
Content Type Number Percent 
Investigation 8 6% 
Systemic Analysis  0 
Editorial 8 6% 
Event 71 51% 
Reportage 1 1% 
Other topics 0 0 
News 46 34% 
Interview 3 2% 
Total 137 100% 
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6.2.3 The tone used in presenting the EADS – Microsoft case 
 
Almost the entire content about EADS – Microsoft corruption is presented in a negative 
tone (81%), followed at a long distance by neutral tone (18%). Only 1% of the content was 
delivered in a positive note.  
 
Table 6.4: Content Coverage by Tone 
Tone Number  Percent 
Positive 2 1% 
Negative 111 81% 
Neutral 24 18% 
Total 137 100% 
 
 
6.2.4 The information sources of corruption coverage in the EADS – Microsoft case? 
 
The most frequent sources of information are the institutions of the Romanian legal 
system such as the Court, the Prosecutors` Office and Police (42%) and Politicians (36%), 
followed by the journalists (19%) monitoring the evolution of the case. The statements of 
different experts and businessmen are a small source of content (1%).  
 
 
Table 6.5: Corruption Coverage by Information Sources 
Information Sources Number Percent 
Police 0 0 
Court / Prosecutors/Judges 58 42% 
Politicians 50 36% 
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Parliament 0 0 
Experts 1 1% 
Journalists 26 19% 
Businessmen 2 1% 
Total 137 100% 
 
 
 
6.3 Political Corruption Presented as an Emergency to be Addressed (Frame Analysis) 
 
6.3.1 Frame Analysis – Results 
 
Most of the unit frames (72%) refer to political corruption. They focus on describing 
the actors involved, the corrupt acts, how the corrupt acts are evaluated, the consequences of 
the corrupt acts, the motivation for corruption and suggestions of how to solve the problem.  
Only 21% (366 units) of the frame units refer to the press, and these focus on describing the 
role of the media, the political mixture in the press and journalists’ ethics. 
The lowest number of units (6%, 110 units) refer to the legal system and focus on the stages of 
the criminal investigation, the initial source of corruption disclosure and pressures put on the 
legal system.  
 
 
 
 
Table 6.6: Categories of Frames 
Category of Frame Number of Units Percent 
Frames referring to political corruption 1,223 72% 
Frames referring to the press 366 21% 
Frames referring to the legal system 110 6% 
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Table 6.7: Summary of the Frame Numbers 
Frame Number of Units Percent 
Main actors 721 42% 
The role of the media 364 21% 
Describing and mentioning corrupt acts 248 15% 
How are corrupt acts evaluated 106 6% 
Criminal investigation – Stages / Shows the role 
of the Romanian authorities in charge 
71 4% 
 Consequences of the corrupt acts 55 3% 
Who evaluates corrupt acts 48 3% 
Why they did it 40 2% 
Initial source of political corruption cases 
disclosure 
37 2% 
How to solve the problem 5 0.29% 
Pressures put on legal system 2 0.11% 
Political mixture in the press 1 0.05% 
Journalist`s ethic 1 0.05% 
 
6.3.2 The actors91 involved 
 
The frame units presenting the actors involved are the most numerous ones, (721 units, 
42%) and describe a diverse fauna populated with allegedly corrupt characters.  
At the top of the corrupt acts are the politicians, former ministers currently MPs and state 
secretaries. The Romanian press writes about them often describing: their position when 
corruption took place, the corruption they were involved in, their position today and the 
                                                          
91 See Annex for photos. 
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accusations brought against them as well as the manner in which the present bodies they belong 
to, particularly the Romanian Senate, have tried to block the start of criminal investigation 
against them.  Prime Minister Victor Ponta received a more detailed presentation: a proper look 
back in his political past as well as a presentation of all the corrupt politicians around him. 
At the bottom are the intermediaries, a special category of people linked to each other 
by long standing family, friendship and business connections. They are the real dealers, people 
that thrive irrespective of the minister in office, irrespective of the political party in power.  As 
such the Romanian press pays more attention to them and the companies they use for their 
dealings than to the top politicians involved.  
Main actors. Top Romanian politicians are presented by the press as having committed 
corruption since 2009:  
Şerban Mihăilescu. One of Romania`s long standing Social-Democrat (PSD) MPs, 
Mihăilescu is presented by the Romanian press as being accused of encouraging the abuse of 
public office, traffic of influence and money laundry. Mihăilescu is being investigated for 
determining another minister to sign Government Decisions and the contract for Microsoft 
licences according to the conditions he negotiated while he was minister. He is being 
investigated for determining another minister to accept the technical and financial offer sent by 
Fujitsu Siemens Computers, without informing about judicial impediments due to the fact that 
Fujitsu Siemens was not the sole distributor of Microsoft licences, without giving details about 
the manner in which the price was established nor the price asked by Microsoft or the discount 
agreed by the Romanian government and the sale price established by Fujitsu Siemens 
Computers. He is being investigated as well for asking and receiving between April and 
November 2004 a share of $20 million sent by Fujitsu Siemens Computers to the account of 
some off-shore companies. The money was requested as payment for the consultancy and 
technical assistance he provided by using his public office in order to seal the contract with 
Microsoft according to the conditions imposed by Fujitsu Siemens Computers.  
Ecaterina Andronescu is another long-standing Social Democrat (PSD) MP. She was 
the PSD Minister of Education in Năstase`s government (2000 to 2003) as well as in Emil 
Boc`s government (2008 to 2009).  Her MP immunity has been suspended and she is under 
criminal investigation for abuse of public office, bribery, traffic of influence and money 
laundry. She is accused of: approving the budget for the “Electronic Educational System” as 
well for the programme concerning the Microsoft licences while initiating and approving 
Government Decisions which favoured two Romanian companies, Compaq and Siveco, as well 
as their co-operators. She apparently falsely certified these two companies were part of a 
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consortium. Andronescu established quotas of participation for other companies and favoured 
the Romanian company Siveco by helping it and its co-operators seal the deal without going 
through a tendering process. As a result, the state budget was affected as the products and 
services were bought at higher prices than the real market prices: the prices for licenses were 
30% - 40% higher, the ones for computers and software were up to 50% higher. Andronescu 
is also accused of asking from Siveco and its co-operators undeserved benefits, money or 
computers, for herself and others, in order to develop projects with the Ministry of Education 
between 2001 and 2009.  
 Valerian Vreme is a Democrat Liberal MP and former Minister of Communications 
between 2010 and 2012. His MP immunity has been suspended as he is currently investigated 
for abusing public office and forgery. 
Daniel Funeriu was the Democrat-Liberal Minister of Education and Research between 
2009 and 2012.  
Valerian Vreme and Daniel Funeriu are accused of using a note approved by Prime Minister 
Emil Boc based on which the Ministry of Communications bought directly an educational 
software programme although this purchase should have taken place based on a Governmental 
Decision. They are accused as well as the Ministry of Education asked for 72,990 more 
educational licenses than were necessary, so overspending by €5.4 million.  
Dan Nica was the Minister of Education between 2000 and 2004 and Deputy Prime 
Minister between 2008 and 2009. He is currently a member of the European Parliament. He is 
accused of taking bribes, doing traffic of influence and money laundry. Like Şerban 
Mihăilescu, Nica is being investigated for asking and receiving between April and November 
2004 a share of $20 million sent by Fujitsu Siemens Computers to the account of some off-
shore companies. The money was requested as payment for the consultancy and technical 
assistance he provided by using his public office influence in order to seal the contract with 
Microsoft according to the conditions imposed by Fujitsu Siemens Computers.  
Alexandru Athanasiu was one of Romania`s Prime Ministers on an interim basis from 
13 to 22 December 1999. He served as the Social-democrat Minister of Education between 
2003 and 2005. Athanasiu is accused of abusing public office, taking bribes, traffic of influence 
and money laundry.  He is accused of the same deeds as Ecaterina Andronescu. 
Mihai Tănăsescu was the PSD Minister of Finance between 2000 and 2004 and an MP 
(member of the Chamber of Deputies) between 2004 and 2007.  Tănăsescu is under criminal 
investigation for abusing public office while Minister of Finance, of taking bribes, traffic of 
influence and money laundry.  
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Tănăsescu is accused of approving the budget for the “Electronic Educational System” as well 
for the programme concerning the Microsoft licences while initiating and approving 
Government Decisions which favoured two Romanian companies, Fujitsu Siemens Computers 
and Siveco, as well as their co-operators.  As a result, the state budget was affected as the 
products and services were bought at higher prices than the real market prices: the prices for 
licenses were 30% - 40% higher; the ones for computers and software were up to 50% higher. 
He is accused as well that between June 2003 and November 2004 he asked for and received 
via intermediaries bribes from Fujitsu Siemens Computers` turnover as a result of the licencing 
contract with Microsoft. As such, € 82,000 got into the bank account of one of Tănăsescu`s 
relatives from the account of a company in Liechtenstein. The investigation shows that the 
company in Liechtenstein was controlled by one of the intermediaries, who received money 
from a company fed exclusively with money from Fujitsu Siemens Computers.  
Gabriel Sandu was the Liberal-Democrat Minister of Communications between 
December 2008 and September 2010. He was arrested by the National Anticorruption 
Authority (DNA) as suspected of public office abuse while a minister, taking bribes, traffic of 
influence and money laundry. He is accused of requiring a bribe of €1.8 million from Fujitsu 
Siemens Computers in order to make a due payment, to supplement the budget as well as to 
overlook some deficiencies. He demanded and received €2.7 million in 2009 in order to seal 
the licensing contract with Microsoft and its additional acts. The required amount of money 
was transferred in the account of a company controlled by himself (Essim Partners Ltd.) based 
on consultancy contracts for bogus commercial activities.  
 Sandu worked very much through intermediaries and the Romanian press described the 
mode of operating. According to the statement of a witness, un-official meetings were taking 
place between those interested to renew contracts with the Minister in charge, Gabriel Sandu, 
in the office of one of the intermediaries, Dorin Cocoş. Money was required during these 
meetings in order to seal the deal. For example, Minister Sandu Gabriel asked for € 2.7 million 
and the intermediaries asked for € 9 million (Dorin Cocoş) and 3.99 million (Gheorghe Ştefan). 
A company, Barringwood Investment Limited, was set up in order to receive the money 
Adriana Țicău was the PSD Minister of Communications between July and December 
2004.  She is suspected of public office abuse, taking a bribe, traffic of influence and money 
laundering. Țicău is suspected of approving the budget for the “Electronic Educational System” 
as well as the project for licensing Microsoft. She is suspected as well of initiating and 
approving drafts of Governmental Decisions meant to favour Fujitsu Siemens Computers, 
Siveco and their co-operators. As a consequence, the State budget was prejudiced, as the 
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products and services were bought at higher prices than the real market prices: the prices for 
licenses were 30% - 40% higher; the ones for computers and software were up to 50% higher. 
Victor Ponta. A Law graduate, Victor Ponta is a Prosecutor who worked within the 
Supreme Court of Justice by dealing with anti-corruption and money laundering between 1998 
and 2001. He got into politics in 2001 under the wing of the Prime Minister at that time, Adrian 
Năstase, and was appointed as head of the Control Authority in the Romanian Government. In 
2004 he was appointed as Delegate Minister in charge with the Control of the Programmes 
based on International Funding and Monitoring the Monitoring of the Application of the EU 
Aqcuis.  
In 2002 he became the leader of the Youth Organisation of the Social Democrat Party 
(PSD) and was elected as PSD`s Vice President in 2006. He was elected as the President of 
PSD in 2010 and became Prime Minister in 2012. His mandate is seen in rather bleak colours. 
One black spot on his mandate is the fact that in 2012 his government, by infringing the law, 
managed to determine the Parliament to vote for the suspension of President Băsescu in just 
three days. The referendum that followed in order to reinstate or dismiss Băsescu as President 
of Romania was not valid due to a lack of quorum, so President Băsescu could continue his 
mandate. Another black spot is the accusation that Victor Ponta plagiarised his PhD thesis. The 
plagiarism was confirmed by the Ethics Committee of the University in Bucharest, the same 
institution which provided him with the PhD Diploma in Law. Although the Ethics Committee 
proved the plagiarism, the Ministry of Education, led by the PSD Minister Ecaterina 
Andronescu, created a National Committee of Ethics especially for this case. The Committee 
decided that Ponta didn`t plagiarise.  
Ponta`s Government is seen as “shimmering with unkept promises, overwhelming tax 
measures, the decrease of strategic investment, the lack of vision” (Alexandrescu, 2014). As a 
result, “the latest EU economic reports blatantly contradict the triumphal declarations of PSD 
government concerning the economic growth and, on the contrary, indicate an economic drop 
which places Romania at the bottom of the EU” (Alexandrescu, 2014). 
Other low moments in Ponta`s mandate presented by the Romanian press are: the 
accusation that he was a covert Intelligence Officer within the External Intelligence Services 
(SIE) while working as prosecutor, the support provided to the PSD MPs and their allies in 
their attempt to pass the Law of Amnesty and Pardon which would have led to the release from 
prison of many politicians convicted for corruption.  
Victor Ponta is presented by the Romanian press as being surrounded by a deeply 
corrupt oligarchy comprising notorious politicians such as: Victor Hrebengiuc, Ilie Sârbu, Dan 
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Şova and Liviu Dragnea. Victor Hrebenciuc is the PSD member that negotiated the formation 
of PSD governments and the coordinator of Ponta`s Presidential campaign. He was arrested for 
the traffic of influence done to illegally reconvey 43,000 hectares of wood in Moldova. Ilie 
Sârbu is Ponta`s father in law and a significant PSD member, former Minister of Agriculture. 
He is being criminally investigated too in the same business as Victor Hrebenciuc. Dan Şova 
is presented as a very good friend of Victor Ponta and former Minister of Infrastructure. He is 
involved in the same business with Hrebenciuc and Sârbu. The Romanian press presented the 
stenographs of a discussion between Hrebenciuc and Şova in which Şova promises to mobilise 
the PSD in order to promote the Law of Amnesty and Pardon if promised to become the leader 
of the party after Ponta`s departure.  
Liviu Dragnea was the Manager of Ponta`s Presidential campaign. He was sent to Court 
together with 74 members and heads of electoral commissions in October 2013 for attempting 
to rig the referendum to reinstate President Băsescu in 2012. The Court trial provided the public 
with the image of 300 witnesses, in fact electors in whose name PSD members voted, brought 
to the Court by coaches to testify to the fact they in fact did not vote. (Bechir, 2014). 
The Romanian press describes as well that Victor Ponta might be involved in the Microsoft 
case, as one of the informers indicated that Claudiu Florică, the boss of Fujitsu Siemens 
Romania, tried to put pressure on Ponta while he has in charge with the Control Authority in 
Năstase`s government with the purpose to make Ponta start an investigation at the Ministry of 
Education in order to oblige Siveco, the company that had the contract with the Ministry of 
Education, to make room for his company.  In order to thank Ponta for his support, Fujitsu 
Siemens Romania donated via its partners computers to the the HQ of the Youth Organisation 
of PSD (Biţă, 2014)  
The Romanian press clearly describes the corruption mechanism that has been used by 
most of the Romanian ministers of Communications and Education since 2000: the Romanian 
companies wishing to get the contract with the state in order to sell Microsoft products had to 
bribe the ministers (and pay the intermediaries generously) for receiving contracts without 
public tendering or any process allowing competition. As these companies have to recover the 
loss registered due to all the bribes paid, the Romanian Ministries order much more than 
necessary and the “selected” companies provide them at prices 30% to 50% above the market 
price. The Romanian press describes a circuit in which all the actors involved win apart from 
the state budget and, indirectly, the Romanian tax payer.  
The Intermediaries have been largely mentioned by the Romanian press.  Most of them 
are presented as being part of an “underground” group focused on linking the political parties 
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in power with those in opposition in order to obtain illegal contracts (Gherguţ b, 2014) The 
most notorious names from this group, are: Dorin Cocoş, Gheorghe Ştefan (Pinalti), Dumitru 
Nicolae (NIRO), Alexandru Bittner, Remus Truică, Adrian Petrache, Dinu Pescariu, Claudiu 
Florică, Doru Boştină and Cătălin Harnagea.   
Controversial businessmen Dorin Cocoş and Dumitru Nicolae as well as Gheorghe Ştefan, the 
Mayor of Piatra Neamţ Town, are the most mediatised names due to their connections with 
Elena Udrea, the closest politician to the President of Romania, Traian Băsescu.  
Dorin Cocoş is considered to be probably the most important character in the Microsoft 
– EADS saga as his role was to link politicians irrespective of the political party and companies 
which intended to obtain contracts at overrated prices. He is notorious as well due to the fact 
that he had been the husband of Elena Udrea until their divorce in the summer of 2013 and was 
close to President Traian Băsescu.  He is presented as being someone very well connected to 
all the political parties; his business partners link back to Năstase`s Government.   
The Romanian press describes in detail Cocoş`s involvement: the contract for Microsoft 
licenses expired in 2009 during the Liberal Democrat – Social Democrat Coalition led by Prime 
Minister Emil Boc. Prime Minister Boc refused to give the contract directly to Fujitsu Siemens 
led by Claudiu Florică, as Adrian Năstase did, and asked for tendering.  Claudiu Florică got in 
touch with tennis player Dinu Pescariu, a close aid of Dorin Cocoş, in order to put him in 
contact in the hope that Cocoş might support him during the tendering process. Dorin Cocoş, 
helped by Gheorghe Ştefan, the Liberal Democrat Mayor of Piatra Neamţ who had influence 
over Gabriel Sandu, had the role of linking the Social Democrat Party (PSD) with the Liberal 
Democrat Party (PDL) in order to attract Gabriel Sandu, the Liberal Democrat Minister of 
Communications, into the business. Meetings were arranged and intermediated by Dorin Cocoş 
between Claudiu Florică and Gabriel Sandu. Businessman Dumitru Nicolae (NIRO) got in the 
game as well with the role of providing the guarantee letter. Claudiu Florică won the tendering 
and the bribes were broken down and directed by Dorin Cocoş. The contact persons and the 
bank accounts of the companies where the bribes were to be sent were indicated to Claudiu 
Florică by each of the beneficiaries.  
 The Romanian press notes that for the role he played, Dorin Cocoş received a bribe of 
€ 9 million in Switzerland. The money travelled from the bank account of D. Con. Net fed 
exclusively with money from Microsoft to the bank account of Barringwood Investment Ltd, 
a company controlled by Dinu Pescariu. Cash was retrieved by Dinu Pecariu and personally 
handed in bags to Cocoş. Dumitru Nicolae received € 3 million, Gabriel Sandu, the Minister 
of Communications received a total of € 4.1 million (€ 2.3 million from Dinu Pescariu and € 
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1.8 million from Barrister Boştină who made sure the documents involved in the tendering 
were legal), Gheorghe Ştefan received about € 4 million and Dinu Pescariu received € 3 
million.  
Elena Udrea intended to run for the position of the Head of State in the autumn of 2014 
enjoying the openly declared support of the Head of State at that time, Traian Băsescu. The 
Romanian press notices that her image problems during the electoral campaign came after 
Cocoş was arrested in the Microsoft case and the fact that the divorce took place after the first 
information about the case appeared in 2013.  
Gheorghe Ştefan (Pinalti) is the Liberal Democrat Mayor of Piatra Neamţ and close to 
the Social Democrat Party. He is presented as well as having an important role in the Microsoft 
file together with Dorin Cocoş and Dumitru Nicolae: to link politicians from different parties 
and the companies that wanted to obtain state contracts at overrated prices.  
Businessman Dumitru Nicolae (NIRO) is a controversial businessman and owner of 
NIRO Group. He likes to call himself a “gipsy”.  He has been previously involved in corrupt 
dealing with Microsoft Licenses, as in 2003 he did traffic of influence involving the Minister 
of Communications at that time, Dan Nica, and the State Secretary, Şerban Mihăilescu, so that 
the same Fujitsu Siemens, controlled by the same Claudiu Florică would win the contract. Dinu 
Pescariu helped again laundering the money received as bribes. Dumitru Nicolae received for 
this deal $7.65 million.  
The Romanian press mentions as well that the PSD Prime Minister Victor Ponta and 
his family own three luxury apartments in a residential complex built by NIRO, and that NIRO 
associated in 2006 with Elena Udrea and Dorin Cocoş in order to develop a real estate project 
but the project failed. Dumitru Nicolae admits that among his employees there are 20 former 
officers from the Communist Securitate to whom he gave key positions. One of his business 
partners, Colonel Constantin Salistra, died in suspicious circumstances in 1993 and his 
spokesperson, Colonel Ion Badea, was the spokesperson of the National Anticorruption 
General Prosecutors Office (PNA), the predecessor of DNA, until 2005.  
Businessman Alexandru Bittner is presented as a close aide to the former Prime 
Minister, accused and convicted for corruption, Adrian Năstase.  A millionaire currently living 
in the USA, Bittner is presented as being one of the main beneficiaries of the contracts signed 
during Năstase`s government (2000 – 2004). One news blog, Stiripesurse, announced that 
Bittner cooperated with the FBI in the Microsoft case, but President Băsescu declared the 
information was not correct (Biţă, 2014). Bittner is presented as well as being part of the lobby 
trio involved in the EADS case.  
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Remus Truică is the former Chief of Cabinet92 of Adrian Năstase when he was Prime 
Minister. He is presented as somebody who had become one of the richest Romanians in just 
10 years, starting from the moment he began working for Adrian Năstase. The Romanian press 
describes the search at his villa, a real palace spread over hundreds of square meters surrounded 
by 10 hectares of land and comprising a pool, a football and a tennis pitch as well as a pavilion 
for picnics.  He is considered to be an important link in the long chain of intermediaries in the 
Microsoft case.  
Adrian Petrache is presented as being close to Dorin Cocoş and Adrian Năstase and 
business partner on real estates with Alexandru Bittner. Like Cocoş and Bittner, Petrache is 
presented as part of the lobby trio involved in both the EADS and the Microsoft case.  
Claudiu Florică is one of the characters involved in both the Microsoft and the EADS 
cases. He was the coordinator of Fujitsu Siemens Computers business in Romania.  
Dinu Pescariu is a former Romanian tennis player who become close to Dorin Cocoş. 
Similar to Claudiu Florică, he is presented by the Romanian press as one of the characters 
involved in both the Microsoft and EADS cases. He is presented as well as being the main 
administrator of the bribes via his companies.  
Doru Boştină is presented as the Barrister who drafted the documents used by the group 
for their dealings and provided them with legal assistance. 
The Romanian press pays special attention to the long term persistence of these 
characters, who not only link different, often opponent political parties but represent at the 
same time a bridge over time and one of the main instruments facilitating the continuation of 
the same corrupt practice.  
The Informers. The National Anticorruption Authority (DNA) was informed about the 
dealings in the Microsoft case by the denunciations made by Claudiu Florică, Dinu Pescariu 
and Doru Boştină after the criminal investigation officially started in July 2014, in the hope 
that they would escape unpunished or receive lenient punishment.  Other people such as the 
former State Secretary during the Năstase Government, Eugen Bejenariu, and Dan Nica, a 
former Minister of Communications, made denunciations as well. Perhaps the most spectacular 
denunciation is the one of Cocoş`s close aid, Dinu Pescariu. The Romanian press states that 
Pescariu offered to help DNA demonstrate he gave Cocoş the cash. It emerged that in order to 
hide the source of the money, Cocoş signed with Pescariu loan contracts which appeared in 
Elena Udrea`s wealth declarations which state that Pescariu gave them two loans, one of € 
                                                          
92 Chief of Cabinet is the equivalent of Private Secretary. 
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500,000 and another one of €200,000. In order to get rid of these debts, Dorin Cocoş 
manufactured 21 receipts confirming he had paid the money back to Pescariu. The receipts had 
different dates and were written and signed by Cocoş and Pescariu with different pens. Pescariu 
took the receipts as well as the pens, all were confiscated by the prosecutors during a house 
search. A few stenographs were published by the press during the electoral campaign showing 
a discussion between Dorin Cocoş and Dinu Pescariu in which Cocoş mentions someone called 
“Elena” who agrees to the forgery of receipts in order to hide the bribes. 
 
6.3.3 Presenting Political Corruption 
 
How the corrupt acts are evaluated.  The Romanian press takes over the descriptions 
of the facts provided by the National Anticorruption Authority, which is in fact the main 
producer of frames about political corruption.  The facts are described as: corruption, money 
laundering, bribery, traffic of influence, abuse of public office, fraud, setting up criminal 
groups. 
The consequences of the corrupt acts are presented by the Romanian journalists as 
being: money stolen from the state budget, exaggerated acquisition prices, damaging, and 
illegal contracts for the Romanian state, lacking guarantees and infringing the tendering 
legislation, the result of huge commissions paid to intermediaries. The most mediatised 
consequence of the corrupt acts is the damage of over €1 billion done to the state budget. The 
Romanian journalists draw attention as well to the broader consequences: the lowest wages in 
the EU, generalised poverty, the lack of road infrastructure as well as poor infrastructure in 
Education and Health Systems.  
The motivation of doing corruption is given by the benefits, in goods and money, for 
both, politicians and intermediaries.  
The Romanian press suggests as well a few solutions for solving the problem of 
corruption: Romanians to give up their indifferent attitude, to be more careful about the 
manipulation done by the mass-media, especially by TV channels Antena 3 and Romania TV, 
to pay more attention to what the elected politicians are doing and in the case of a clear verdict 
of corruption, the money to be recovered and returned to the state budget. The anti-corruption 
institutions to be consolidated.  
The role of the press appears from the manner in which the Romanian press presents 
the two corruption cases:  
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It informs about the names involved in the Microsoft – EADS cases and describes in detail the 
corrupt acts done by each of them.  It informs about the legal procedures applied during the 
criminal investigation and describes the initial source of the disclosure of political corruption 
cases. It informs about the benefits the culprits received as a result of their corrupt acts, this 
way explaining the magnitude of corruption. It transmits the views of the politicians about the 
Microsoft – EADS cases, including the points of view of those politicians accused of 
corruption. It provides information about the informers that cooperated with the DNA and 
presents the evolution of the companies involved in corruption. It monitors the activity of the 
legal system and the Parliament linked to this case. It describes how the culprits benefit by the 
protection of other politicians, the involvement of other Romanian institutions such as the 
Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) and the Romanian External Intelligence Service (SIE) as 
well as the manner in which the culprits try to escape from the situation.  
It draws attention: to the consequences of political corruption, to the passive attitude of the 
population to political corruption, to the manipulation by the media, to the fact that Romanians 
do not pay enough attention to the acts of their elected politicians.  
It presents stenographs showing how culprits intended to hide bribes, as well as the manner in 
which the Parliament tried to protect the MPs who should have had their political immunity 
cancelled in order to be criminally investigated for corruption.  It transmits information about 
other cases of corruption and corrupt politicians and draws attention to the consequences of 
solving the two cases for Romanian society.  
A potential political interference in the press is signalled by the journalists in an article 
published by a Romanian freelancer, Vlad Georgescu, in the Huffington Post, about the EADS 
case. The article points to corrupt acts done by Romanian politicians including Elena Udrea 
and minister Ioan Rus, Romanian businessmen such as the world renowned former tennis 
player Ion Țiriac, and indicates a potential involvement of German politicians such as the 
former Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder. The article appeared in the Romanian press, although 
journalists Cătălin Antohe and Ion Cristoiu wondered if it was not a diversion organised by the 
Romanian External Intelligence Service (SIE) a few days before the end of the electoral 
campaign for the Presidency designed to harm one of the candidates (Elena Udrea) (Antohe, 
2014).    
The Romanian press pays considerable attention to the stages of the criminal 
investigation backed up by the fact that the Court/Prosecutors/Judges are the source of news 
about political corruption in 42% of the cases.  
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The Romanian press describes as well the initial sources of corruption disclosures. The press 
informs that the National Anticorruption Authority (DNA) started the criminal investigation in 
May 2013 as a result of a notification received from the Chancellery of Prime Minister Victor 
Ponta. The notification pointed to a report that resulted from an investigation done by the 
Control Authority under the supervision of Prime Minister Victor Ponta about illegal contracts 
for renting and expanding educational licences by the Ministry of Communications for the use 
of the Ministry of Education. The inspectors sent by the Control Authority investigated only 
the ministers Daniel Funeriu and Valerian Vreme, who were part of the opposition, hence Mr. 
Ponta`s political adversaries. The anti-corruption prosecutors analysed the documents sent by 
the Prime Minister`s Control Authority and discovered that the illegal contracts started being 
signed in 2001, when Victor Ponta`s mentor in politics, Adrian Năstase, was Prime Minister. 
The investigations showed that other PSD ministers continued the practice of signing illegal 
contracts.  The Romanian press announces that the first notification sent to the Anticorruption 
Authority about these contracts happened in 2005, when the Democrat Minister of Education 
at that time, Mircea Miclea, complained about the exaggerated prices of software and 
computers for schools.  
The FBI is presented as a potential source of information, as the Romanian press 
publishes that the American authorities informed their Romanian counterparts about one year 
and half ago about illegalities done in the Microsoft-EADS contracts. The information was 
confirmed by the head of the Romanian External Intelligence Service (SIE) at that time, Teodor 
Meleşcanu, but denied by President Băsescu. Another source presented by the Romanian press 
is the Romanian freelancer in Germany, Vlad Georgescu, mentioned above. 
 Pressures put on the legal system. Only a few frame units present how the Romanian 
MPs try to save their allegedly corrupt colleagues from having their political immunity waved 
and allowed to being criminally investigated by Prosecutors.  For example, the Romanian 
Senate decided to suspend its session for the Presidential elections one day early in order to 
avoid voting against their PSD colleagues, Şerban Mihăilescu and Ecaterina Andronescu. This 
manner of approaching the fight against corruption annoyed Romania`s ally, the United States, 
and the Romanian press did not miss the opportunity to mediatise the reactions coming from 
the USA as Victoria Nuland, the Under Secretary of State for Euro-Asian Affairs, asked shortly 
after the scandal started how could certain leaders from Central and Eastern Europe sleep 
peacefully under the blanket of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty (the article which obliges all 
NATO members to react in case one of them is attacked) while they defend corrupt people 
from the Legal System: “Internal threats to democracy and freedom are equally worrying in 
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Central Europe. The cancer of economic downfall and corruption threaten the dream pursued 
by so many people who fought for it in 1989 in the whole region. We have political leaders in 
Central Europe who take advantage of the NATO and EU membership, we find leaders in the 
region who seem to have forgotten the values these institutions are based on. We would ask 
these leaders: How can you sleep under the blanket of Article 5 of NATO while you are talking 
about “non-liberal democracy”, a theory amounting to nationalism, restricting the freedom of 
the press and demonising the civil society? I would ask the same thing about protecting the 
corrupt officials against criminal investigation, ignoring the Parliament when it is convenient 
to you or protecting the dirty businesses which increase the dependency of your countries on a 
foreign source of energy, despite the declared liberal policy” (Filimon, Simion, Biţă, 2014) 
 
 
6.4 Lack of Ethics Within the Romanian Press 
 
The only piece of material about ethics appears in an opinion article by Gabi Golea, 
who draws attention to the fact that the developments in the world of informers reporting 
political corruption mixed with political interests and the interests of prosecutors have a 
poisonous result. He underlines that before the fall of Communism in Romania, informers were 
considered to belong to the underworld, used by the Police to watch thieves and having a very 
short life as they were soon discovered by those they monitored (Golea, 2014). 
The development of IT technologies raised the level of “professionalism” so the 
informers started being the ones who carry recording equipment, and thanks to that the 
evidence collected from the interior of different state institutions became the quasi-universal 
means used by Prosecutors when submitting their cases. This method has become inefficient 
in time, and this is how there appeared the instigator introduced into the area under surveillance 
to initiate compromising discussions. The journalist draws attention to the fact that sentences 
taken out of context and put together with information from other recorded discussions could 
be used to compromise people who have to be removed, on command, from the game, as 
important political and economic interests are hijacked with the help of the informer “created” 
at the right moment (Golea, 2014).  
The journalist warns that the independent status of investigators is in doubt due to the 
manner in which “the result” of the informer`s work is delivered with the purpose of 
compromising, “calming down” or warning certain people. The journalist describes a list of 
luxury informers, comprising businessmen in the Top 300 (Nelu Iordache), the Police General, 
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Dan Fatuloiu, barrister Doru Boştină, who betrayed his own client and even the brother of 
President Traian Băsescu, Mircea Băsescu (Golea, 2014).  
 
 
6.5 Conclusions 
 
The previous two case studies tell us the different stories of two politicians who have 
two significant points in common: they both emerged from the very high ranks of the Romanian 
Communist society and they both committed serious acts of corruption for which they were 
sent to prison. The difference between the two is that Adrian Năstase started being criminally 
investigated after he lost the presidential elections in 2004 and shortly after that the leadership 
of his party. He was no longer protected by the system. Dan Voiculescu was in the opposite 
situation: he was convicted for corruption and sent to prison at the top of his political influence. 
Supported and surrounded by the media empire he had built, elected as Senator in the Romanian 
Parliament, discreetly supported by all the charities and NGOs he had set up over time, he went 
to prison for corruption. 
 As I mentioned in the Introduction, the Microsoft – EADS case is very different from 
the previous two as it shows how a corrupt practice survives over a decade, irrespective of who 
is in charge, and who are those who help this happen. It shows that corruption in Romania is 
done not only in isolated cases by politicians that manage to get in very high positions with 
access to contracts and financial resources but it is a widely spread practice which points to the 
fact that corruption in Romania in systemic. It shows as well that the problem does not lie only 
in the politicians, who temporarily occupy a position until the next election, but in a system 
carefully hidden from the public, comprising a group of business people, the “intermediaries”, 
who managed to survive and thrive over time no matter which parties formed the Government 
or Opposition. 
 The presentation of the nine ministers involved shows that the mechanism is the same, 
each new minister inherits it from the previous one. It is difficult to think that nine officials did 
not realise that what they were doing was not legal. More than this, the case of Minister Gabriel 
Sandu shows that each minister was “instructed” in “how things work” by the intermediaries. 
Another significant aspect that emerges from this case is how extended corruption is, as PSD 
Prime Minister Victor Ponta might have thought that notifying the Anticorruption Authority 
(DNA) he would damage only his political opponents. The case affected instead mostly his 
Party members.  
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The case is indeed an x-ray of corruption committed by nine ministers and their helpers 
in the Ministries of Communications and Education. Perhaps similar acts have happened in 
other institutions, as for example, it is often considered that the reason Romania does not have 
more roads and motorways or more projects using EU funding is due to the corruption in the 
Ministries in charge.  
 The Romanian press plays mainly a role of providing information.  Its main source is 
the National Anticorruption Authority. The low number of editorials and opinion articles, only 
eight, is significant, as though the Romanian journalists either do not understand the entire case 
or are afraid to comment about it. Its coverage is very similar probably due to the fact that this 
particular case of corruption affected politicians from all the important political parties and 
brought forward the business characters behind them. 
The researched material provides us with the main aspects of corruption the journalists 
present. It suggests as well ways of thinking about the problem of corruption: political 
corruption in Romania does not appear at single cases of politicians who lost power, such as 
Năstase, or have become so toxic that the legal system feels compelled to do something about 
it as in the case of Voiculescu. It is a pervasive phenomenon that spreads over decades, has its 
own mechanism of survival and reproduces itself in the same manner. The survival mechanism 
is based on corrupted businessmen available to be on good terms with everyone in the political 
arena and corruptible characters that become ministers and allow themselves to do…. what 
everybody before them did. Perhaps the most illustrative of all is the message posted on his 
Facebook account by probably the most toxic media mogul Romania has ever had: the newly 
released from prison, Sorin Ovidiu Vântu. It is a hatred message addressed to all the 
Romanians, particularly to those called “the Facebook generation” which had an important 
contribution to turning the results of Presidential elections in November 2014: “I want to tell 
that you are all fools. You are fools, suckers in the full meaning of the word. We are the dealers. 
There is no point in damning us, we do not care. We are resources hoovers, we take everything 
you produce. (…) said that if your vote mattered, we would not allow you to vote. This is how 
it happens here too: if your vote would matter, be convinced we would not allow you to vote! 
All you are doing is to change some of us with others of us. We are the ones who do the 
combinations, we are above. We have relations everywhere, no matter who comes to power. 
We make money anyway. What are you doing? You are the “I cannot afford” generation. You 
have absolutely nothing.  You cannot afford houses; you cannot afford cars. You cannot even 
afford prostitutes. You have to leave the country in order to make it. No, no, you should not 
leave as less workers will remain to produce the money we will take. Do you want to change 
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us? You have only one chance: change the political system as it is! Otherwise you will continue 
to be our slaves.  Read my posting below and you will see what I think the political system is 
and what you are to us.  When you spit on us, we (he points towards his t-shirt on which one 
can read: “Bitch Inside”) say that it is raining. Happy Holidays! “(Băiaş I, 2014). 
It is worth mentioning that the researched material does not suggest how to remedy the 
problem of corruption. The entire written press is focusing on the mechanism and the 
magnitude of the corruption in this case, but not much attention is paid to potential solutions.   
As in the previous two cases, the Romanian press fails to open a proper debate about political 
corruption, its consequences and potential solutions. It fails to reflect about its own role in 
dealing with it and likes mostly to transmit to its public information made available by the 
Anticorruption Authority. Attention paid to journalists` ethic is minimal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 176 
 
Chapter 7: Interviews 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
I have argued at the beginning of this thesis that the Romanian media can play a key 
role in the resistance to political corruption, being part of the solution and not of the problem. 
This might be difficult to achieve when the media is just an instrument used by certain 
categories of society. Political economy of the media stands on the idea that those who have 
the power and wealth will use all means to retain them irrespective of consequences. The media 
in this context is just an instrument whose role is to defend and promote the economic, social 
and political interests of the privileged groups in society (Chomsky & Herman, 1988).  The 
critical political economy of the media on the other hand, has a more nuanced position: the 
economy is intertwined with the political, social and cultural realms, and in order to understand 
the processes at work, attention needs to be paid to long term changes, the balance between 
private enterprise and public intervention, justice, equity and moral good (Murdock & Golding, 
2005). 
 This research looks at the relationship between the media and the political realm and 
the impact of this on the quality of the journalistic product. The significance of the critical 
political economy of the media proposed by Murdock and Golding (2005) for the research 
resides in the emphasis it puts on political life. It resides as well in the emphasis on the ethical 
approach to media power.  Critical political economy of the media indeed scrutinises justice, 
equity and public good seen as the result of the communicative activity in a society where 
political life is a special area of general economic dynamics (Murdock & Golding, 2005). In 
the context of the general economic dynamics, different ways of financing determine visible 
consequences on the products of the media. As such, from the perspective of the consequences 
on the products of the media, the three case studies analysed in the previous chapters show how 
the Romanian press presented the most notorious political corruption cases between 2004 and 
2014. The case studies offer an image of the products of the media by showing how the 
Romanian press reports political corruption, displaying its own shortcomings. The section 
dedicated to interviews with journalists and political analysts looks into the reasons behind the 
performance of the Romanian press and focuses on production as a central point where answers 
should be looked for. The critical political economy of media model proposed by Murdock & 
Golding (2005) defines production as the starting point of analysis and follows three core tasks: 
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to investigate the manufacture of cultural goods understood as the production of meaning and 
the exercise of power; to investigate the political economy of texts; and to explore the political 
economy of cultural consumption. Attention will be paid to the ethical aspects as the basis of 
some of the mistakes of the Romanian media. 
The analysis of the media production as a result of the exercise of power addresses two 
fundamental issues: the pattern of ownership of the media and its consequences in terms of 
control over the media`s activities, and the nature of the relationship between state regulation 
and media institutions. If we consider the pattern of ownership and its control over the media 
as the result of exercising power, a justified question arises: what characterises the relationship 
between media owners and the political realm in Romania?  The answer is important, as in a 
field dominated by media owners helped by a supporting or non-existent legislation, media 
owners could use their rights to control the flow of information and open debate, so curbing 
democracy.  
How does the relationship between media owners and the political realm influence the 
Romanian journalists? Critical political economy of the media in Murdock and Golding`s view 
sees the production of communication as the result of the interests producing it, but a special 
role is acknowledged for those working for the communication bodies. To understand the 
consequences of the relationship between media owners and the political arena, the human 
resource is assessed through its aspirations, codes & professional ideologies, and freedom to 
exercise autonomy given the economic constraints (2005: 74).  This requires the study of how 
human resources in the media do their work, the way sources of power and authority build 
agendas and the connection between the market and work situations.  
By following this structure, I argue that the Romanian media has not yet reached the 
point in which it can be an effective instrument to hold political power to account, as it is itself 
affected by a deeply corrupt relationship between the political realm, media owners and 
journalists. To gather information from journalists involved in reporting and analysing 
corruption, I used a questionnaire structured in four directions following the main coordinates 
of critical political economy of media as defined by Murdock and Golding (2005): media 
ownership, media regulation, the relationship with the political arena and the characteristics of 
the Romanian journalists and their working conditions. Relevant information was gathered by 
using questions regarding behaviours, beliefs, attitudes and attributes. 25 journalists specialised 
on reporting politics and working for the mainstream media were approached to give me an 
interview. Only 11 answered positively even though I was recommended by trustworthy 
sources. The content of the interviews explains the reason for the reluctance of the others. 
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The first section of the chapter focuses on media ownership and lack of ethics. The 
second section explores the state of the Romanian journalists that is supposed to be professional 
and perform according to the standards of unbiased reporting in a work environment often 
lacking any clear and transparent procedures. This section explores topics such as education, 
professionalism, economic conditions, the relationship with the media owner and political 
realm. It closes by exploring the solutions suggested by the interviewees. The third section is 
dedicated to conclusions.  
 
 
7.2 The Romanian Press 2005 to Today: Media Ownership & Lack of Ethics  
 
Cristoiu (2012), Țăranu (2011), Tatulici (2012), Păcuraru (2011) and Savaliuc (2012) 
describe the media ownership as dominated by a group of rogue characters. A Romanian 
journalist and political analyst Voinescu described the Romanian press as being very 
oligarchic: “there are 10-12 persons that manage newspapers, do radio and television shows, 
invite each other on them and who exhaust the embodiment of the press” (Voinescu as cited 
by Coman, 2014: 45). 
As representatives of a highly oligarchic media, the media owners are described by interviews 
as “bosses” or “moguls” on which the journalists are highly dependent. They are described as 
being a closed circle of people that have made money and are doing business mainly in illegal 
ways. They do not address a real demand on the market. They invest in the press without any 
preliminary market research, as obtaining a profit from the press is not their main objective. 
Cristoiu explains: “Tell me if you have ever seen in Romania someone who, like in an 
American movie, started from a little shop in a bloc of flats. Let’s say he started in the kitchen, 
because this is how it was during the `90s, and now he has the biggest network of shops in the 
country. There isn`t anybody. Nobody grew in a healthy way. Nobody had first a monthly 
dedicated to bees, and with the money obtained this way started publishing a weekly and so 
on… No, they all got rich overnight, and this is why we do not have capitalists. This is why we 
do not have managers in the press, this is why no press institution has any preoccupation with 
survival or competition. If you ask any media boss, none of them will be able to tell you why 
they set up that newspaper. I have had many meetings with people wanting to invest in the 
press in the last 10 years. The first question I asked them was: why do you want to set up that 
newspaper? They couldn`t explain, they couldn`t tell me that they wanted to publish the X 
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publication dedicated to, let`s say, blue jeans, because there were many people interested to 
read about blue jeans. They didn`t have a target market” (Cristoiu: 2012:13). 
The fact that the Romanian media owners could be considered a rogue group is 
supported by accusations and prison sentences which have become a common occurrence: 
Sorin Ovidiu Vântu, the owner of Realitatea -  Catavencu media company, was  convicted for 
blackmail and forgery; Dan Adamescu, the owner of Medien Holding Trust which publishes 
the daily România Liberă, was sentenced to four years in prison for corruption; Adrian Sârbu, 
the owner of MediaPro trust, was accused of tax evasion, money laundering, forgery and 
embezzlement and is currently being investigated; Dan Voiculescu, politician and the owner 
of Intact Media trust, was sentenced to 10 years in prison for corruption; Sebastian Ghiţă, 
politician and the owner of Romania TV, was sent to Court for corruption and is currently being 
investigated; Dan Diaconescu, politician and the owner of DDTV and OTV television stations, 
was sentenced to five years in prison for blackmail.  
Cristoiu (2012), Tatulici (2012), Țăranu (2011) and Păcuraru (2011) explain that this 
rogue group resulted from a post-communist transition marked by economic difficulties which 
facilitated the access of the wrong people to the media. This happened due to the fact that from 
an economic point of view, the transition from Communism confronted a press not used to 
following financial purposes with the need to find finance for an increased number of 
publications. As the emerging advertising market was very limited, the new press owners 
turned to the state.  
Cristoiu (2012) explains that most of the old communist newspapers were privatised by being 
bought by the members of the editorial offices. The journalists had to sell their shares due to 
economic difficulties and these got into the hands of people outside the press. The newest 
newspapers were set up by new owners. He explains: “The newspapers which became state 
newspapers were privatised through a huge fraud as they were never bought. If we talk about 
corruption, the corruption started with the press. Fraudulent privatizations took place as the 
newspapers were not auctioned. 
It would have been normal for them to be put up for auction and to be bought by whoever 
wanted them. No, this didn’t happen. Through a stunt called the “Mebo method”, the 
employees took shares, but even more shares were taken by the bosses who got installed 
through the revolutionary power in 1989” (Cristoiu, 2012:4).  
Most of the new owners came from those people who had made money illegally and decided 
to protect themselves by buying or setting up newspapers, TV stations and media holdings. 
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Most of them prefer to own TV news stations, as this type of asset gives them the power to 
obtain contracts from the state for the businesses they develop in parallel with their media:” 
Look, at the present moment there are 8 TV news stations. None of the people who set up these 
TV stations said: there is a niche (…) As in commerce, in production…you research the 
market… No, everybody wants to have TV news stations because with the TV news you have 
power, the power to obtain contracts. What power do you have if you want to do set up a 
television station dedicated to bees? None.  Maybe this TV is more effective, it could bring you 
money. The most effective television stations in Romania are those dedicated to popular music, 
but they do not have any power either. There is no point if they are not news stations” (Cristoiu, 
2012:13). This way the profits are the result of the corrupt relationship between media owner 
and politician.   
 Dan Voiculescu, sentenced to prison for obtaining the HQs of his media empire via 
corruption, is the most notorious example of how businessmen and politicians who already 
have or take control over media institutions use them as instruments to get political or business 
advantages, to the prejudice of the public’s right to be properly informed (AMP, 2005/2006). 
Țăranu (2011) emphasises that not all media moguls are as visible as Dan Voiculescu. 
He explains: “These moguls are not always the sponsors, such as Voiculescu, who is a visible 
mogul. There are and will continue to be semi-visible or completely invisible moguls who 
control chunks of the Romanian press better than the visible moguls, because they generate 
press campaigns against their competitors, or rival political structures, they generate press 
campaigns against legislative or citizens` initiatives which could damage their businesses” 
Țăranu, 2011: 4). This situation is supported and enhanced by the lack of any regulation 
concerning media ownership. As such, there is no form of transparency of media ownership, 
making any anti-trust research impossible because of the very incomplete data. The situation 
is even worse for the online press. There is as well no legal measure to impose the transparency 
of media`s finance sources. 
Research done by Liliana Preoteasa confirms that hiding media ownership is one the 
features of politicians who acquire media with the purpose of gaining power and influence, due 
to the lack of legal provisions to force media outlets to reveal their real owners. She gives the 
example of Mediafax, the biggest news agency in Romania, whose real owners had been kept 
secret, putting into question the credibility of thousands of pieces of news daily spread 
throughout Romania (Preoteasa, 2014). 
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The relationship media owner – political class is based on barter. The relationship 
media owner – political class is explored by seven of the interviewees (Cristoiu, Țăranu, 
Tatulici, Păcuraru, Rogozanu, Savaliuc and Avădani). It is described as a relationship based on 
interest, in which politicians and media owners work hand in hand, in a complicity in which 
the media owners have political interests and politicians are looking for support for their 
political purposes. It is an ambiguous relationship in which the media owners penetrated the 
political class, being the same people.  
Overall, this relationship has grown more and more complicated. The Romanian press 
was initially used to support political parties or groups, but once people who had made money 
illegally decided to acquire media as protection, the media started being used primarily to 
promote the interests of the media owner and not the interests of a political group. This 
relationship has evolved, and today the relationship between media owner and politicians is 
one of short term barter: the politician pays for articles and campaigns and the media owner 
uses his media assets to support the politician according to the chances this one has to 
administer public money and give him something back. 
 Extra capital is received at the beginning of electoral campaigns, which is the particular time 
when media owners are looking for money to finance their “dark activities”. Savaliuc explains 
the mechanism at work: “Almost all the media bosses have political interests and look for 
financing for their dark activities from their media trusts with money from politicians and 
business people around these politicians. The relationship between the two parties is based on 
interest. The politicians in power usually attack the press and those from the opposition supply 
it with subjects about their adversaries in power. Usually, at the beginning of the electoral 
campaigns the media bosses get extra capital. The media institutions are generally enslaved 
and it is known which serve those in power and which are against them (Savaliuc, 2012: p:5) 
As a result, deliberate and systemic distortions in the output of the press are a common 
occurrence.  
The reports issued by Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei explain that this phenomenon 
became even stronger due to the contribution of the economic crisis in 2008 to the aggravation 
of the Romanian media landscape. A depressed advertising market affected the budgets, 
followed by waves of dismissals, resignations, re-groupings and wage reductions. 4,000 
journalists lost their jobs in 2009 and at the beginning of 2010. The control of politicians over 
mass-media institutions became much more powerful by means of advertising contracts, while 
the press groups’ employers proved to be engaged in supporting one or another of the 
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presidential candidates (AMP, 2009). Concrete cases were identified of favourable news being 
bought with public funds. (AMP, 2009). 
The relationship media owner – journalist is profoundly unbalanced. This state 
emerged very early after the fall of the Communism as a result of a corrupt process of 
recruitment.  Journalist Cătălin Zarojanu explains that 90% of the post-communist journalists 
came to this profession due to personal connections, as the cases of those who became 
journalists by presenting good material to a publication were very rare: “As for recruitment 
selection procedures, let us be serious – they are rare and fictitious” (Zarojanu, 2001). Nicolau 
explains the implications of this corrupt process of selection: “the absence of a contest means 
selection according to other criteria: friendship, favouritism, political ties. Therefore, 
automatically, the person who named you is more important than the criteria that you have to 
fulfil. You have to be more concerned about not having any arguments with the person that 
appointed you than about doing your job properly” (Nicolau, 1999: 121). What resulted is a 
feudal type of mechanism where each media owner worked hard to create its own group of 
“vassals” (Coman, 2004). 
Explored by 8 interviewees (Cristoiu, Țăranu, Tatulici, Păcuraru, Rogozanu, Savaliuc, 
Avădani, Horsley), the relationship media owner - journalist is described mostly as 
“obedience”, “subjugation”, “slavery”; two interviews described it as “depending on both 
parties” and “mutual servitude”.  
The relationship has evolved over time from the stage in which the media owner depended on 
the good quality of the work done by journalists, through an intermediate stage in which the 
media owner started getting involved in the policy of the newspaper, to today’s media owner, 
the “pork butcher” (Cristoiu, 2012: 9). The “pork butcher” is the owner that makes the editorial 
policy, imposes on the journalists the subjects and content to write and generally considers 
himself a journalist as well. Cristoiu describes them as: “The “pork butcher” owner is the guy 
whose lover tells him: “I do not like how presenter X looks”. And he fires presenter X next 
day. The owner who goes, and I met such a situation, a news television owner who went to the 
restaurant. The owner of the restaurant, who was a friend of his, told him that he didn’t like 
how the presenter, who was broadcasted directly, was reading the news. So the television owner 
made a phone call and replaced the presenter right then, only to show the restaurant owner how 
powerful he was. And this is even more serious…because you don’t even have the freedom to 
say: look, we make a newspaper, we make a television programme, this is our orientation. And 
the manager eventually says: let us translate everything in journalistic terms…No, the “pork 
butcher bosses” are journalists already” (Cristoiu, 2012: 9).  
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Although proper editorial office relationships have not disappeared completely, many 
journalists experience oppression and self-censorship: they are obliged to write paid-for articles 
meant to denigrate or enhance the reputation of the persons or issues targeted.  Some owners 
face blackmail in their business and political dealings and defend themselves against attacks 
from their political and business enemies via journalists, key-employees in their media assets.  
The autonomy of journalists is not guaranteed by anybody and the distribution of 
correct journalistic material often implies a willingness to risk confronting the media owner. 
Rogozanu explains that: “Autonomy has become a strictly personal matter. It is not guaranteed 
by anybody.  You can gain your right to distribute the correct journalistic material if you take 
risks, if you confront and if you are indispensable to them. Many lose their will to fight all the 
time for this thing. The argument of the owner is always a financial one” (Rogozanu, 2012:3). 
Few journalists dare to do it, and only if they are indispensable to the media owner. The degree 
of autonomy allowed to journalists is defined depending on three elements: the rank of the 
journalists, the power of the editorial boss, the vision and the needs of the media owner, i.e. if 
he wants to make a media business or just needs to use the media as an instrument. The 
relationship between the media owner and journalists is under strain from the very beginning 
as only a few journalists try to negotiate their contracts, most sign them as presented.  
The situation is a bit different in investigative journalism. The relationships between media 
owners and journalists are usually based on trust, as the journalist can produce results only if 
protected by the media institution that hired him and if freedom of expression is allowed. 
Savaliuc describes this relationship by mentioning that:” It depends on both of them. They are 
relationships of trust usually. The investigative journalist can’t be effective without the 
protection of the media institution which hired him and without freedom of expression. The 
bosses are tempted to censor the inquiries when they affect the interests of some of their 
acquaintances or to ask for their exacerbation in order to get an advertising contract. I could 
say that at present some bosses understand the importance of having professional investigative 
journalists, but the financial resources are sparely allocated for this kind of journalism” 
(Savaliuc: 2011:3).  
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7.3 The Romanian Press 2005 to Today: The Romanian Journalist 
 
The interviews undertaken present a dramatic portrait of the Romanian journalist in the 
last decade, facing enormous challenges in all the aspects which should prepare and allow them 
to develop their journalistic activity in a professional manner.  
Education is considered by Tatulici (2012), Țăranu (2011), Diamandi (2012), Avădani (2012) 
and Horsley (2012) as being one of the major factors with a negative impact on professional 
journalistic activity. The education of journalists is viewed as precarious due to an excessive 
focus on financial gain at the expense of quality. Tatulici thinks that: “There is the idea that the 
journalists with experience look back on the young generation with contempt. I do not have 
this bent. I think there are many talented journalists in the young generation. It is just that they 
are victims of the phenomenon called “Romanian education”. They are victims. I can’t 
reproach them anything if nobody really educated them nor showed them the ways where they 
could find what they need, and especially nobody trained them to use associative thinking, 
which is the essence in journalism: to know lots of things and to link them together producing 
a new idea or a new formulation or even a memorable formulation” (Tatulici, 2012:4-5).  
The techniques of journalism coming from the West do not fit Romania. As a consequence, the 
market is flooded with journalists that are not properly trained, lacking the practice of using 
associative thinking, lacking knowledge and understanding of the political world, being almost 
incapable to understand the relationship between politics and society, with a very weak critical 
perspective and finding it hard to get out from their own paradigm. As a result, the 
homogenisation of futile questions which appear 24 hours/day has led to boredom and to the 
wooden language the Romanian journalist is famous for. The Romanian journalist is incapable 
of high quality reportage or political and economic analysis and has a huge language handicap. 
Țăranu explains: “The journalist today is very ill prepared from the point of view of political 
science. He/she has a very weak critical perspective, is very easily influenced, has difficulties 
to get out of his or her own paradigms. He/she is pretty formless when it comes to social change. 
They are almost incapable of understanding the relationship between politics and society. They 
try to stay together with politicians, at their level, extremely close, without having the social 
experience an MP has beyond their parliamentary activity. This is why you can meet, I give 
you an example, completely futile questions which appear 24 hours /day such as: “What would 
you do if?” Why should you ask such a question if: 1) that fact hasn’t happened yet; 2) there is 
a multitude of possibilities, of possible futures. What if? What if…why is it absolutely 
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necessarily for that to happen? Why shouldn’t something else happen, from A to Z? This 
homogenization of questions leads to the boredom and to the wooden language most journalists 
have. There are just a few better journalists, and most of them do not appear on TV” (Țăranu: 
2011:10-11).  
Tatulici confirms this view: “The majority of Romanian journalists today are quarter-learned 
(less than half-learned), ambitious, aggressive, their main quality is to carry the microphone or 
the voice recorder. You can see that many of the live radio or TV broadcasts are actually 
transcriptions.  Reportage doesn’t exist; political, social and cultural analysis of a certain 
calibre doesn’t exist anymore. These are things which are still done by the old journalists. The 
young ones do not have access to this kind of thing, as they do not have the proper “equipment”.  
Plus, the language handicap is huge. The main problem I have had as an employer in the last 
22 years was for the candidates to pass the Romanian language test. I have to tell you that more 
than 80% of over 5,000 people I have hired in the last 22 years didn’t know the semantic content 
of the word “fortuitous”. They don’t know what it means. Most of them say it means “forced”, 
only a small minority say it means “incidental”. So…this is the starting point. The portrait of 
the journalist today is dramatic” (Tatulici, 2012:5).  
The condition of the Romanian journalist is dealt with by 5 of respondents (Cristoiu, 
Tatulici, Țăranu, Avădani, Savaliuc), who see the Romanian journalist as lacking talent, over-
worked and struggling for money. The value of journalists is judged according to the quantity 
of material delivered and not according to the quality or complexity of the work done. While 
chasing for material which they deliver at a low, sometimes shockingly bad quality, Romanian 
journalists are pressed by the media owner, disregarded by authorities and not protected by 
anybody. Due to the high number of journalists available on the Romanian media market, the 
media owner treats journalists as an easily disposable element, not a valuable asset for their 
company.  
The attitude of journalists is addressed by 6 of the respondents (Horsley, Cristoiu, Tatulici, 
Avădani, Rogozanu, Savaliuc). They are seen as superficial and demotivated by financial and 
work conditions. Savaliuc explains: “The older generations embrace massively other fields of 
activity and younger journalists have difficulties in affirming themselves because of the 
unsuitable professional environment as well as of the permanent uncertainty concerning their 
jobs due to the fact that many press institutions went bankrupt in the previous years” (Savaliuc, 
2012:4).  
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  For example, in February 2013, the journalists from România Liberă went went for 
the seconf time in a half a year on an unlimited strike as they hadn`t being paid for three months 
(Ziare.com, 2013). A similar situation was happening to the journalists working for Jurnalul 
Naţional: the journalists were putting their names donw on a list to borrow money from Marius 
Tucă, the Manager of the neespaper, as they hadn`t received their wages for three months 
(Reporter Virtual, 2013). 
The lack of enthusiasm comes as well from the fact that the media owners turned their 
media trusts into propaganda units meant to bring down ministers as a result of personal 
vendettas and not due to objective investigations done by journalists. As such the Romanian 
journalist is reduced to the condition of an ordinary employee, weakened by economic 
measures and tough owners and experiencing a feeling that their work is pointless. BBC 
journalist, William Horsley, states as a known fact that “most Romanian media organisations 
are unwilling to hire BBC or ex-BBC journalists because they are viewed as likely to show too 
much independence of mind, in contrast to Romanian journalists whose whole career has been 
spent in Romania and who are thus likely to be conditioned or inured to toeing whatever line 
they are told to take or even knowingly to falsify the facts or the articles they write” (Horsley, 
2012:4).    
Cristoiu (2012), Țăranu (2011), Tatulici (2012), Avădani (2012), Păcuraru (2011), 
Savaliuc (2011), Rogozanu (2012) indicate that the organisation and representation of 
Romanian journalists is a major difficulty, with a serious impact on the practice of journalism. 
Although there are about 35 association of journalists, the typographers` and journalists` trade 
unions included, most of them are inactive, are managed by people without reputation and 
leadership, and their capacity to impose themes or ethical principles on the public agenda is 
low. Only three organisations stand out, The Romanian Press Club, MediaSind Trade Union 
and the Association of Journalists in Romania. None of them has enough authority and 
determination, and they are led by people who use them for private purposes. 
The high number and overwhelming influence of the media owners in the Romanian press is 
considered to be the main reason that Romania does not have and cannot have such a 
representative organisation.  Any attempt by any organisation to become representative for the 
Romanian press could be quickly and easily discredited by the journalists working for a media 
owner. The second cause is the nature of the Romanian journalists themselves, who are not 
organised, do not believe in being organised and prefer to ally with the owner and not with 
their colleagues in the office. Ioana Avădani considers that one solution might be in 
professional solidarity: “I think that professional solidarity is the thing that should be primarily 
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consolidated. An abuse against a journalist rarely arouses reactions at national level (excepting 
the cases when the infringement is serious or spectacular).  Unfortunately, journalists are 
aligned on the division lines between their bosses so that one can find, in the provincial towns 
where the community is small and everybody knows everybody, journalists that don’t speak to 
each other or “hate” each other just because they work for bosses who are political adversaries 
or economic competitors” (Avădani, 2012:7). 
The consequences of lacking organisation and representation within the press 
environment affect the journalists` everyday practice. They are easily expendable so they try 
to survive in a tough market, forgetting about any ethical dimension. They are easily compelled 
to pay more and more newly introduced taxes as politicians dislike them.  
Cristoiu (2012), Țăranu (2011), Tatulici (2012), Avădani (2012), Păcuraru (2011), 
Savaliuc (2011), Rogozanu (2012) and Horsley (2012) show that the work ethic is missing in 
this challenging environment. Journalists are seen as mercenaries without any moral compass. 
Disgraceful deviations are performed, many journalists indulging in such behaviour. Most of 
them just blindly carry out the orders given by the media owners pursuing their own interests; 
they know they will survive as long as their owner is in business. Cristoiu exemplifies: “As 
long as the boss brings money from home he actually pays you the way he pays his driver or 
chambermaid” (Cristoiu, 2012:11).  Once the owner gets bankrupt they are hired by another 
one. The Romanian journalists know what to say in order to not upset their media owner and 
some of them got to the point where they voluntarily deform news to curry favour.  
As a direct consequence, an attitude of contempt towards journalists is encouraged by 
both the possibility for politicians to go directly to the media owner to solve their problem, as 
well as by the lack of ethics and professional standards displayed by media trusts. This makes 
the Romanian press an easy prey for the negative and dangerous generalisations promoted by 
politicians. They exploit this vulnerability to promote the idea that all Romanian journalists are 
crooks, corrupt and serving obscure interests, and no legal measures are proposed to protect 
journalists.  
Agenţia de Monitoriare a Presei provides an image of the interactions between 
politicians and journalists during TV political shows: every day, TV studios invite 
representatives of political parties and “analysts” of the most unusual kind. Several times a day, 
in marathon-like shows, they discuss “topics of the day” and begin arguing on any subjects, 
accusing one another of political bias and manipulation. The protagonists live in a continuing 
unattested conspiracy and journalists make no efforts to clarify things (AMP, 2010/2011). 
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Cristoiu (2012), Țăranu (2011), Tatulici (2012), Avădani (2012), Păcuraru (2011), 
Savaliuc (2011), Rogozanu (2012) and Savaliuc (2012) indicate that Romanian journalists are 
embarrassed and reluctant to talk about the field they work in. Țăranu thinks that the feeling of 
imposture and lack of professionalism are the maim reasons: “many of them are not 
professionals. Because they do not feel sure what the press means. There isn’t an inheritance 
of the press; there aren’t people who have always belonged to the press. Most of them came to 
the press from elsewhere without knowing very clearly what the press meant, and they always 
have the feeling of imposture. Because of this they feel embarrassed to tell the most common 
things although they discuss them among themselves. I think the feeling of imposture is the 
strongest one. (…) Here (in journalism) is like in politics: most of these people do not have 
professions. If they had had a profession they would have known it very well, wouldn’t they? 
Because being a journalist is a profession. If they had had journalism as profession they would 
have known the answers and would have been more open, especially in front of a professional 
body. They are not professional, so they withdraw very fast into their shells in order to not 
make mistakes (Țăranu, 2011:16). 
Savaliuc (2012) too indicates that behind this lack of ethics is a massive lack of 
professionalism and efficiency. The autonomy of journalists depends on the will of the 
journalists themselves, as nobody can force them to write something they do not agree with, 
and the excuse that they might face dismissal is available only to those who do not know how 
to find strong subjects.  
Categories of journalists are addressed by Cristoiu (2012), Tatulici (2012), Țăranu 
(2011) and Savaliuc (2012). The Romanian press comprises three types of journalists. The least 
populated one, no more than 20, is the category of independent journalists, who have absolute 
editorial freedom from their Chief Editor or media owner. They gained their independence 
from their bosses after many years of work. They are older journalists, over the age of 50, and 
they enjoy public prestige. They are kept by their media owners exactly because they are 
autonomous. The most populated category of journalists are the ones who do not have any 
independence, and this is the main reason their media owner keeps them. In this category, 
remuneration is heavily used by the media owner to censor the news. The area in between 
comprises a few very high quality people who decided to keep the line of the ownership against 
their professional judgement.  
There is as well the category of investigative journalists. Only a few of them remain, 
and they were severely affected by the economic crisis. However, they have the advantage of 
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experience and better understanding of the press world, so they manage to do better than other 
journalists and have better incomes.  
Disclosing political corruption in this context is very challenging, as indicated by Cristoiu 
(2012) and Tatulici (2012).  Disclosing political corruption is presented as being empty of 
content on the one hand and deeply corrupt on the other. The lack of content comes from the 
absence of inquiries and investigations, the main instruments typically used by the media in 
the fight against corruption. The Romanian public is flooded instead by “news” that just reports 
what happens in the public arena regarding the fight against corruption, a continuous banal 
reporting of events such as “The Prosecutors` Office arrested” or “The Prosecutors` Office 
discharged”. Tatulici explains the reason behind this situation: “Due to sub financing, the media 
bark more and more feebly as they can’t finance their main instruments to fight against 
corruption: inquiry and investigation, which cost most. Bosses don’t have money to throw at 
these, as they can only be done in a very long time, 3-6 months, they suppose very high 
professional abilities, a very competent knowledge of the judicial framework, support from 
solicitors, special advisers, they are deceptive fields so the media prefer to record corruption 
scandals rather than to discover them.  
The Press makes exposures every day but these exposures are something like: “I heard that 
Boldea did some unseen businesses with land in Galati”. Then they present what the 
Prosecutors` Office or others declared. The press can’t announce a relevant corruption case. 
This happens only once or twice per year” (Tatulici, 2012: 9).  
On the other hand, Cristoiu (2012) explains, the corruption scandals that get to the press are 
the direct result of the involvement of the media owner, who gives the newspaper a dossier that 
he wants published: “Usually, newspaper X is given a dossier, the newspaper doesn’t make 
any effort to investigate, it just publishes it: a dossier on the adversary of the newspaper’s boss. 
I can’t remember, there are just few cases when a newspaper, a press trust started on its own, 
from a piece of news, a complex investigation which lasted, lets say, one month and ended up 
with the discovery of a big business. Usually the only cases of corruption that are discovered 
are those that are meant to be discovered. From my point of view, in Romania, and not only in 
Romania, things that the politicians, the Power want to keep secret are kept secret. This is 
because nobody actually makes an effort to discover what the Power wants to hide. This is 
why, each time a scandal appears, I wonder not if it is true or not. I wonder what the purpose 
of that scandal is) (Cristoiu, 2012: 8).  
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Similarly, Romania does not have real political news, as a correct and coherent debate 
about building and adopting politic policies is missing. Instead, 90% of the news consists of 
manipulation and attempted misinformation and the rest comes from not very robust sources. 
Declarations by politicians, for example, have become the main form of political news, and it 
has become enough for journalists to capture statements from notorious characters who are 
known to talk tough. As a result, the Romanian public is flooded most of the time by non-news, 
an almost total lack of meaningful content that just reports what happens in the public area 
regarding the fight against corruption such as “The Prosecutor`s Office arrested” or “The 
Prosecutors` Office discharged” (Tatulici, 2012). As a consequence, the public trust in the 
Romanian press is slowly eroded and the market mechanisms are distorted. 
 
7.3.1 Potential Solutions for the Romanian Press  
 
Opinions expressed in the interviews are mixed and indicate the lack of a clear direction 
to reform the Romanian press. Cristoiu (2012), Rogozanu (2012) and Păcuraru (2011) think 
that the Romanian press should be exposed to the real market economy via a proper judicial 
regulation passed with a significant support from the press itself. This suggestion is based on 
the idea that if the supply and demand mechanism starts working then the press will not be able 
to afford deviations as they will depend on the public and ratings and this will bring the 
necessity for the press to have at least a minimum of independence.  Of course, this depends 
on implementing another solution: the reform of the political class, which would give up their 
arrangements with media owners and start seeing the press as what it should be, both as public 
service and industry.  
Tatulici (2012) and Țăranu (2012) consider that the Romanian press should build a 
serious trade union organisation to defend the rights of journalists and to pay attention to what 
happens to the press, not only in the capital, Bucharest, but in the rest of the country as well. A 
condition should be enforced that anyone who has not been part of the trade union for at least 
2 years should not be allowed to be part of the press.  
Savaliuc (2012) considers that a good solution would be tax reductions on journalists` 
incomes, but that would be a discrimination against other professional categories. He considers 
as well that the press will specialise and become professional in time according to the public 
and its need for information. Rogozanu (2012) sees the solution in an increased solidarity of 
the state media so that it would become a serious agenda setter for the rest of the media. 
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All the above suggested solutions could have a more or less significant impact on the 
state of the Romanian media. Playing according to the rules of an open market economy forces 
the economic actors to improve and become competitive. It forces them as well to become 
more focused on the sources of financing. Current economic rules allow enterprises to continue 
their activities, despite not being in profit, for as long as the financing of activities is ensured. 
As such, in places where the activities that bring finance are not scrutinised by the legal system, 
such a solution could have an opposite effect to the desired one, resulting in a much stronger 
and protected barter relationship between the media owners and political realm.  
Building a trade union might help in protecting the Romanian journalist against abuses, 
but due to its Communist past Romania does not have a strong tradition of free trade unions. 
More than this, the enhanced fight against corruption in the last years exposed massive 
corruption at the heart of the existing trade unions. For example, Marius Petcu, the former 
leader of the National Confederation of the Free Trade Unions in Romnaia – Frăţia (CNSLR - 
Frăţia93) and Sanitas Federation was sentenced in 2012 to eight years in prison for corruption, 
Bogdan Hossu, the President of Confederation “Cartel Alfa94” has been investigated for 
corruption, Marius Petcu, another leader of CNSLR – Frăţia and Sanitas Federation was 
sentenced in 2013 to seven years in prison for corruption. 
Tax reductions and financial incentives could improve the state of the Romanian 
journalist, who might start feeling more stability and less pressure to produce quantity at the 
expense of quality. However, it is improbable that this would change the nature of the 
relationship between media owners and the political realm or transform corrupt practices, 
including employment mechanisms, into ethical ones.  
 
 
7.4 Conclusions 
 
In general, the interviews see the Romanian press as passing through a continuous 
professional crisis. They describe it as a dysfunctional system not following the principles of 
demand and supply of an open market. It is stripped of any financial power to assert its 
independence, it lacks any moral content to acquire a deontological line, it is incapable of 
                                                          
93 The National Confederation of the Free Trade Unions in Romania is the largest national organisation with a 
trade union profile in Romania.  It comprises 28 professional federations from all the economic fields in 
Romania. It has branches in all the 41 administrative units (counties) of Romania. 
94 Cartel Alfa is the trade union of the workers in Romania. It comprises 41 professional federations and has 
branches in all the 41 counties of Romania.  
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organising itself in order to protect its interests and workers, and it is mostly used as a blackmail 
instrument.  A reflection of the major challenges facing Romanian society and its political 
class, the Romanian press is nevertheless seen, despite all its shortcomings, as a guardian of 
democracy in Romania. 
All the three major actors, media owners, politicians and journalists are linked to each 
other by deeply corrupt relations. These relations serve the purposes of politicians and media 
owners well but affect journalists as human resources and journalism as a profession 
negatively. The most affected of all is the Romanian public that is fed with non-news and 
manipulation instead of benefitting from the reporting of a media eager to scrutinise and unveil 
the wrongdoings of the elected ones.  
The relationship between media owners and politicians is obscure and very changeable 
according to the interests at stake. The novelty does not come from the fact that the media 
owners have a special relationship with the political realm, as everywhere in the world 
journalists want a good story and politicians want the support of the media to win votes. The 
novelty comes from the shady character of the barter. 
Such a relationship can carry unforeseen consequences for the journalists that have to 
execute the orders as well as the potential of a sudden change of the political line promoted by 
the newspaper. This is the reason why it is difficult to pinpoint the political colour of 
newspapers in Romania.  
To be a journalist in Romania in such a context proves to be a real challenge, both 
professionally and personally. Although in the triad politicians – media owners – journalists 
the journalist is the one doing the work that allows the media outlet or TV station to continue 
existing, it is by far the most disregarded category. Used at the direct convenience of the media 
owner or, indirectly, at the convenience of the politician, the Romanian journalist and his/her 
problems are in fact the most visible part of a very ineffective media system. It is easy to point 
to the lack of professional education and doubtful ethics of the Romanian journalist while in 
fact a proper framework based on standards of performance for both, media owners and 
journalists, is missing.  
Overall, the interviews describe the image of a very unstable and un-transparent media 
system which does not strive to reach certain standards of reporting while having in sight clear 
ethical guidance. It is a system in which honest, good professionals are mingling with 
unprofessional and shady characters, many of them already condemned for corruption, in a 
game which is more and more often lately interrupted by the cleansing intervention of the legal 
system.  
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 In this context, it is not difficult to see that justice, equity and the public good are in 
short supply resulting from such rogue communicative activity in Romanian society. The 
majority of interviewed journalists emphasize the financial aspect as the main culprit for the 
low quality of media products and human resource. Personal desire for high professional 
standards and moral stand are somewhere, at the back, far behind economic and relationship 
challenges of media ownership.  
Critical political economy of the media, as defined by Murdock & Golding (2005), sees 
justice, equity and public good as the value to be offered by the communicative activity in 
society. However, this is not the case in Romania. Money obtained via corruption and 
mercenary type activities are the “value” most sought after by most of journalists and media 
owners. Money, no doubt, is important for both personal and professional survival and 
development. But as long as the Romanian media owner and journalist see money as the 
ultimate goal and not an instrument to help do and provide more and better quality work, the 
Romanian media might not get out from its present pitiful state.  
It is also worth noting the sense of disengagement of the interviewed Romanian 
journalists with their own field. Thinking in the critical political economy of the media mode, 
these journalists are the representatives of one of the most important actors of the 
communicative activity in a society.  Indeed, they are some of the best journalists Romania has 
today and their opinions describe correctly the challenges of the Romanian media. But their 
discourse presents them more like spectators caught in a jaded state than main actors in a 
situation that needs solutions and rapid intervention. Although they are aware of the situation 
of the Romanian media, as well as of their importance in the Romanian media landscape, one 
cannot notice many initiatives or ideas about increasing professional standards and enhancing 
ethics. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
8.1.1 The Problem 
 
As we could see throughout this thesis, there are a few particularities that recommend 
Romania as a relevant case study to understand the transition to democracy and one of its 
biggest problems, political corruption. Although Romania passed through similar processes to 
the rest of the post-communist world, it had a few distinct traits which prevented it from 
developing at the same pace as countries such a Poland or the Czech Republic and achieving 
the status of fully instated democracy.  
The problem of political corruption in Romania should be put into historical context: 
the Romanian territories have confronted it since the Middle Ages, although a certain degree 
of awareness and resistance to its practices has always been present. This fact is historically 
recorded in the work of the representatives of the civil society who had the courage to freely 
express their discontent and whom we can see today as the resistance to a scourge which has 
brought Romania many times on the brink of destruction.   
In 1989 Romania parted violently with a patrimonial Communism which had totally 
destroyed the thriving economy this country had managed to build towards the end of the 
Nineteenth century and between the two World Wars, including the most valuable fabric of 
society (entrepreneurs, intellectuals, owners) as well as any notion of democracy, pluralism, 
freedom of speech and tolerance. In view of the lack of any organised dissent as in other Central 
European post-communist countries, a negotiated transition was not an option. Consequently, 
Romania ended up with a transition carried out by the communist elite itself, which took 
advantage of the lack of any opposition and used all the available levers to maintain its 
privileges. As a direct consequence, political corruption has become Romania`s biggest 
problem and the slow progress in tackling it left its mark on the identity of this country.  
The deficit of democracy and political corruption seem to go hand in hand in the case 
of Romania. Much attention has been paid to Romania`s progress towards democracy and 
tackling political corruption by the EU and by Transparency International, a major international 
organisation and a well-known think tank. While democratic progress has been carefully 
scrutinised since Romania expressed its intention to join the EU and NATO, the progress of 
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the judicial system in tackling political corruption has been the real deal maker in any of this 
country`s major achievements.  
 
8.1.2 Questions & Aims 
 
As part of the resistance to corruption, the media has a very important role as, apart 
from informing and educating the public, it sometimes is the only organism that can bring 
dishonest dealings to the attention of the public in those areas where the warning systems, 
including legal systems, themselves succumbed to corruption. It is important thus to understand 
how the media plays its role in a society plagued by political corruption, and what are the main 
drivers behind the manner in which it reports political corruption. 
The Romanian media, as described by the analysis of secondary documents, has three 
characteristics which legitimise an analysis of its reporting as well as of the causes behind the 
quality of its work: 1) since the end of Communism the Romanian media and the political arena 
have had a corrupt relationship caused largely by the economic hardships the media 
encountered; 2) the appearance of the new class of media owners changed the aims of the media 
from informing the public to following private interests; 3) the relationship media-political 
realm seems to have affected both the quality of the journalistic products and journalists` ethics. 
The novelty of the present research arises from the fact that, although studies on the 
general state of the Romanian media has been done, none focuses specifically on the Romanian 
press reporting political corruption. For example, much attention has been paid by the 
researchers to the Romanian press during the post-communist transition, to the journalistic 
elites in post-communist Romania, to the media ownership and owners but virtually none to 
the manner in which the media has been reporting political corruption and the elements at work 
behind this process. The debate about the role of the media in reporting political corruption in 
Romania is missing altogether. The role of this thesis is to fill this gap by answering three 
questions: how is news about political corruption reported by the Romanian press to its public, 
what characterises the relationship between the media ownership and political realm in 
Romania and how does this relationship influence the Romanian journalist reporting political 
corruption in terms of professional autonomy, daily practice, recruitment and professional 
ideology.  
 To answer these questions, I pursued three directions of analysis. Firstly, I analysed 
how news about political corruption is reported by the Romanian press to its public.  Secondly, 
I focused on the relationship between the owners of the media reporting political corruption 
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and political realm in Romania by exploring the particular political-institutional and economic 
realities specific of the Romania press-political elite nexus. Thirdly, I explored how the 
relationship media ownership – political realm influences the Romanian journalist reporting 
political corruption in terms of professional autonomy, daily practice, recruitment and 
professional ideology.  
The novelty brought by this thesis lies as well in the actual analysis of the reportage of the most 
representative cases of political corruption between 2004 and 2015 as well as in the fact that, 
via interviews, journalists were asked about their challenges and how they think about them. 
  
8.1.3 Analysis Done 
 
This research employed a discourse analysis to explore how news about political 
corruption is presented by the main Romanian newspapers and news websites. Qualitative and 
quantitative content analyses were used for the three case studies selected. The quantitative 
content analysis was conducted following an algorithm comprising critical discourse moments 
and media events and revealed the thematic universe as presented by the Romania press.  
The qualitative (frame) analysis was conducted according to its four main functions: to 
define problems, diagnose causes, evaluate actions and prescribe solutions, helping this way to 
identify the particular ways of seeing or thinking about high level political corruption, and how 
the problem is defined, explained and morally evaluated (Deacon, Pickering, Golding, & 
Murdock, 2007). Even though the media might not always perform all these functions, the 
identified patterns show the discursive components that structure the political corruption frame 
in the Romanian press, allowing this way a reflective look at the manner in which the media 
are performing these functions.  
In view of the fact that the content of the discourse always results from a value-added 
process (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989), the frame analysis of news about political corruption 
in Romania shows how the discourse about this topic has evolved and changed over time. The 
frame analysis sheds light as well on the context of the events, providing coherence and a clear 
image of issues at stake (London, 1993).  
Highly respected, good quality newspapers with medium to high circulation, privately 
owned, read by different socio-economic strata and different age groups were analysed. 
Together they represent a major source of information, especially for news such as politics and 
corruption. I have selected as well the most representative websites for presenting and 
commenting on political corruption. Unfortunately, for the purposes of this research only 
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HotNews proved to be sufficiently consistent in its reporting for the period of time researched, 
2004 - 2014. The other websites displayed problems such as establishing what author is or is 
not a real journalist, articles published in newspapers were copied in these websites even two 
or three times, and some of the websites seemed to had been built with the purpose of promoting 
a certain topic or subject and went dormant (nothing else was published) once the topic had 
become obsolete. 
Interviews with journalists and specialists in politics were employed in order to 
understand the characteristics of the relationship between owners of media reporting political 
corruption and politicians in Romania as well as in order to understand how this relationship 
affects the manner in which journalists are trained and perform their work. It is noticeable as 
well that the owners of three out of four most respected high quality newspapers are in prison 
for acts of corruption involving state property or dues.  
The interviews were semi-structured, to allow the interviewees the freedom to 
elaborate. The questionnaire was structured by following the main coordinates of critical 
political economy of media as defined by Murdock and Golding (2005): media ownership, 
media regulations and the relationship with the political arena and the characteristics of the 
Romanian journalists and their work conditions. Relevant information was gathered by using 
questions regarding behaviours, beliefs, attitudes and attributes. 
Although I encountered serious difficulties in getting the interviews, the material obtained 
provides a comprehensive image of the press and the Romanian journalist reporting political 
corruption in Romania today. 
 
8.2 Key Results 
 
8.2.1 Reportage of Political Corruption by the Romanian Press (Similarities and 
differences between case studies) 
 
There are a few similarities and differences between the three case studies when it 
comes to the Romanian press reporting political corruption. The cases themselves are different. 
Adrian Năstase is a politician who had to face the weight of the legal system only after he 
finished his mandate as Prime Minister, lost the presidential elections and consequently the 
leadership of his party. Dan Voiculescu on the other hand, is a politician who had to give 
explanations for his deeds while at the height of his career both as an MP and as a business 
man owning a media empire. The third case study, Microsoft - EADS, shows that political 
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corruption is a practice widely spread irrespective of what political party forms the government, 
and inherited from minister to minister as a normal mode of functioning and managing public 
office.  
The analysis of the manner in which the Romanian press reported the three corruption 
cases indicates that while the Romania press would like to be part of the solution to the problem 
of political corruption in Romania, it is rather a medium lacking content, as shown by the 
similarities and differences of reportage related to the three case studies. 
The first similarity is that the researched material describes an entire universe of 
political corruption. Court proceedings, corrupt acts, main political actors and facilitators of 
political corruption are largely described by a press which plays as well the role of the medium 
of transmitting the support as well as the criticism of journalists and politicians. Most of the 
information about corrupt acts committed in the three cases is presented as News and Event 
type of reporting, while Investigation, Reportage and Interviews have no noticeable presence 
within the press output in these cases.  
In none of the three cases analysed did the Romanian press present itself as more than 
a medium to report information obtained from official channels, mostly those related to the 
legal system such as the General Prosecutors` Office.  The Romanian journalists do not seem 
to follow up the information available to either continue investigation or to attempt to discover 
other cases of political corruption. The low number of editorials and opinion articles indicate 
that the Romanian journalists either do not understand the cases of corruption or are afraid to 
comment. Overall, the Romanian media cannot be seen as a whistle-blower or an external 
mechanism to detect and bring corruption to light. 
The second similarity is that while the Romanian press is faithfully reporting the 
evolution of the court cases related to corrupt politicians, there is no real debate, no real 
dialogue or monologue about political corruption as an attempt to define the phenomenon, its 
effects and proposed potential solution.  As journalist Mihai Tatulici indicated, there is no news 
in the Romania press. Everything is a report about what the Court did, what the Court said, etc. 
(Tatulici, 2012).   
A third similarity is represented by the fact that the Romanian press is not unified under 
the single purpose of reporting and condemning corruption. On the contrary, it takes different 
sides and presents political corruption and its main actors according to its own interests.  
A fourth similarity, obvious mostly in the cases of Adrian Năstase and Dan Voiculescu, 
is that the Romanian press has a serious problem related to journalists` ethics. The topic 
occupies a small place in the reporting of the Romanian press despite the information being 
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available and the journalists acting unethically being named and presented together with their 
deeds.  
There are, however, a few differences between the researched cases. The first difference 
is provided by the nature of Microsoft – EADS case. It does not focus on just one politician, at 
the highest of lowest point of their political career, but it provides the image of a corrupt 
practice comprising an entire political class. This case is important as it shows that the problem 
of political corruption in Romania does not lie only in the politicians who temporarily occupy 
a position until the next election, but in an obscure group of business people behind politicians, 
who managed to survive and thrive over time no matter what party formed the Government or 
Opposition.  
The second difference is that coverage of the Microsoft – EADS case is very similar 
throughout the Romanian press. This is due probably to the fact it affected politicians from all 
the important political parties and brought forward the business characters that are behind them. 
The third difference in the results of the researched case studies is the presence of 
suggestions about ways to think about the problem of political corruption. Thematic units in 
the case of Dan Voiculescu suggest that corruption is part of the Romanian collective mind and 
change has to start with each member of society. The case of Microsoft-EADS suggests that 
political corruption in Romania does not just appear in single cases of politicians who lost 
power, such as Năstase, or have become so toxic that the legal system feels compelled to do 
something about it as in the case of Voiculescu. It is a pervasive phenomenon that spreads over 
decades, has its own mechanism of survival and reproduces itself in the same manner. The 
survival mechanism is based on corrupted businessmen available to be on good terms with 
everyone in the political arena and corruptible characters that become ministers and allow 
themselves to continue using corrupt practices.  
However, suggesting ways to think about the problem of political corruption is not 
enough in a country characterised by endemic corruption. One potential solution would be to 
frame political corruption as an emergency that should be a priority to the public and political 
elite. Unfortunately, this is something the Romanian press has been constantly failing to do. 
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8.2.2. External Factors with Impact on Media Reportage of Political Corruption (The 
Relationship Media Ownership - Political Realm and the Condition of the Romanian 
Journalist) 
 
The relationship between media ownership and the political realm was indicated by the 
interviews conducted with journalists as a key element and one of the main causes of low 
quality of media reporting of political corruption. This relationship is presented as a barter of 
mutual support between media owner and politician to achieve political and business purposes. 
This relationship is facilitated by a media landscape which is dominated by more or less visible 
but strong local media owners. Most of these owners are outsiders who acquired media assets 
by using financial resources obtained from irregular enterprises. As such, the newly acquired 
media assets are used to protect themselves from being made accountable for their irregular 
deeds, as well as to obtain access to state contracts for their other businesses.  
As the media asset is used just as an instrument for their personal affairs, the reporting 
of political corruption is consequently distorted. The interviews describe the corruption 
scandals that get to the media as the direct result of the intervention of the media owners, who 
pass to their newspaper dossiers about their adversary that need to be published without being 
properly investigated. As journalist Ion Cristoiu underlines, the cases of corruption 
“discovered” by the Romanian press are those meant to be discovered, so the correct way of 
approaching a corruption scandal in Romania is not to wonder if the information is true but to 
wonder what the purpose of the scandal is (Cristoiu, 2012).  
Another source of distorted reporting of political corruption is the condition of the 
Romanian journalist within this particular media landscape.  
The professional autonomy of the Romanian journalist is severely limited. With a few 
exceptions, the journalist has to execute the directions from the media owner who puts a lot of 
pressure to achieve that.  
The journalistic daily practice is described as “slavery”. The Romanian journalist is 
overworked and underpaid, put under considerable financial pressures. The richness of 
available human resource, combined with a lack of proper training and support, make the 
Romanian journalist vulnerable in front of the media owner, who treats them as he pleases.  
Lack of ethics is a too common occurrence among the Romanian journalists. As an 
example, it was only last year that the British branch of the Association of European Journalists 
asked for my advice concerning the Romanian freelance, investigative journalist Stelian 
Negrea. He was persecuted together with his wife by two journalists, Mircea Badea and Mihai 
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Gâdea, of the media trust “Intact”, belonging to Dan Voiculescu (Arvunescu, 2015). The 
Association of European Journalists supported Negrea publicly and signed a petition together 
with other Romanian NGOs as a sign of protest. In the Autumn, the same organisation trusted 
him to collect the sponsorship money to organise the Congress of the organisation in Sibiu, 
Romania.  This year, the same organisation expelled Stelian Negrea from his members and 
sued him for fraud with sponsorship money (Tudor, 2016). 
Lack of ethics becomes a challenge in view of the context aggravated by the fact that both 
politicians and media owners know politicians act directly through the media owner to solve 
their problems. As such, as shown by interviews, journalists easily become the victims of the 
idea often promoted by politicians that all the Romanian journalists are unprofessional, corrupt 
and serving obscure interests. And the fact that the Romanian press shows little concern and 
reflection about the lack of ethics affecting the journalists reporting political corruption makes 
it even more difficult in this context to have a correct and coherent debate about political 
corruption and reforms in the field.  
The general image of the Romanian media as depicted by this research is that of a field 
passing through a continuous professional crisis, a dysfunctional system eluding the principles 
of demand and supply specific to an open market and stripped of any financial power to declare 
a minimum of independence. Used as a mere blackmail instrument, it is described as well as 
lacking any moral content or deontological line.  
The topic of media regulation is a very sensitive one. The views regarding the reliability 
of the existing norms as well as concerning the necessity and effectiveness of new ones are 
mixed. The current norms governing the activity of journalists are seen as being the product of 
a political class that is afraid of journalists and which does anything to maintain its control over 
this professional branch. In-depth reforms are needed, but before that Romania still has to pass 
through an education in political correctness so that reforms would not come up against a 
hostile, unprepared environment. 
Although reflecting the major challenges facing Romanian society and its political class, the 
Romanian press is considered, despite all its shortcomings, the only guardian of democracy in 
Romania.  
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8.3 Contribution to Existing Knowledge 
 
8.3.1 Contribution to the understanding of the problem of the media reporting political 
corruption in Romania 
 
The present thesis is researching just a small slice of the Romanian media in an attempt 
to exemplify and explain some of its shortcomings. It shows that the reporting of corruption by 
the mainstream press is in fact void of meaningful content despite the quantities of information 
let out, a mere reporting of information released by official channels. It shows that investigative 
journalism, one of the main instruments to uncover corruption, is missing. Journalists restrain 
themselves or do not have the necessarily means and support to investigate political corruption 
and do not approach the subject of corruption per se in a proper debate.  
 The analysis indicates that the source of the absence/low quality of reporting political 
corruption lies in the relationship between media owners and the political realm.  Their 
inappropriate dealings have a direct impact on the quality of the journalists and their work. For 
example, the reporting of political corruption is empty of meaningful content most of the time 
due to the lack of investigations and inquiries about corruption, according to the interests of 
the media owners. 
 What separates the Romanian media from the media in Western democracies is the 
human fabric embodied as media owners. Most of them are undesirable characters who are not 
interested in expanding their media empire with the purpose of making money and having a 
power ascendant over politicians. Their aims are short term, focused on getting public contracts 
for their other businesses and friends and on being protected from potential legal enquires about 
their past activities.   Thus, who becomes a media owner is a particular area that needs to be 
addressed urgently if the Romanian media is to start curbing its corruption problems. 
According to the rules of a free market, whoever wants to become a media owner must be 
allowed to do so. But given the situation of the media ownership in Romania, it is clear that the 
classical instruments for keeping it accountable are not enough. A joint effort between state 
institutions and civil society, as in the case of would be MPs, could possibly be a solution. 
  For example, the National Agency for Integrity in Romania is a public body that was 
set up in 2007 with the purpose of checking the suitability of the candidates for the Romanian 
Parliament. These are checked regarding wealth acquired while in public office, conflicts of 
interest and incompatibilities. It is the administrative instrument the Romanian state is using to 
cut down on corruption, and it is led by a board largely representative for the Romanian 
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political administration95. Perhaps such a body should be set up to make sure that would-be 
media owners are morally fit to take on such an important enterprise.  
However, ownership is not the only problem. The Romanian media has never reached 
the stage of a fully functional market economy.  The interviews indicate that the principles of 
demand and supply specific to open markets are completely evaded by the Romanian media 
owner. In view of the absence of a genuine market to indicate the needs and the wants of the 
public in the matters of reporting, the audience gets what the media owner wants. As shown by 
the interviews, the public generally gets doubtful products promoting the interest of a small 
group, without any consideration for the public agenda. The Romanian media has been 
confronting severe financial challenges which reduce the professional and ethical quality of 
journalists, and the public trust in the Romanian media is slowly eroded.  
It would be simplistic to suggest that the solution for the Romanian media would be to 
just expose it to the real demands and rigours of an open market. After all, in an open market 
the business owners could pump in as much investment as they wished without this generating 
any profit at all. The Romanian media owner does not care too much about profitability. The 
profits come from the dealings they obtain as a result of artificially keeping alive their media. 
A difference could be made only by imposing certain standards of profitability for a media 
enterprise to be allowed to exist on the market, coupled with a clear ethical code.  
The research shows that the Romanian press has been passing not just through a 
professional crisis but as well through an ethical one. The subject of ethics in reporting political 
corruption is missing almost completely from the Romanian press, although there are a few 
indications of reflection on this matter.  
A robust code of ethics, enforced by a joint cooperation between representatives of 
public administration and civil society, including organisations of journalists, which would 
address the relationship between the media owners and politicians as well as between media 
owners and journalists is necessary if the Romanian media is to start performing according to 
higher standards. And it might be the case that in the end what the Romanian media needs is a 
trade union, a strong body to address the problems and promote the interests of journalists. 
                                                          
95 The board is formed of: a representative of each parliamentary group in the Romanian Senate plus a 
representative of the group of national minorities in the Chamber of Deputies, a representative of the Ministry 
of Justice, a representative of the Ministry of Public Finances, a representative of local administration from 
each of Romania`s 41 counties, a representative of all the towns in Romania, a representative of all the cities in 
Romania, a representative of all the higher public servants, a representative of the associations of judges and 
prosecutors, a representative of the civil society organisations focused on human rights,  economic-financial 
and judicial matters. 
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8.3.2 Contribution to the understanding of the problem of corruption in Romania 
& Scope for Future Research 
 
To have a comprehensive image of the state of the Romanian media reporting political 
corruption, the model of the present research should be applied to the local and regional media 
where often the pressures and the challenges affecting the mainstream media, are felt much 
earlier and more acutely. 
The present research puts the problem of corruption in context. The Romanian media 
is reporting political corruption but its output is equally affected by it. The analysis of the case 
studies presents the image of political corruption as a sum of practices which touch individuals 
irrespective of their political colour and get inherited as the public office gets new inhaBiţănts 
at each new electoral cycle.   
The analysis done by Dutch and Romanian analysts (TRMJ & MFAN, 2015) indicate 
that corruption is so embedded in the psyche of the Romanian public servant that, although 
they do not actively ask for bribes, they do not refuse when offered and have difficulties in 
finding a reason for doing it. Overall the Romanian politician and public servant lack any 
reflectivity regarding their corrupt deeds. This points towards corruption in Romania as a 
problem of political culture and Romania lacks any significant study on this matter.  If this is 
the case, then a future study on the Romanian media reporting political corruption should 
perhaps begin with a research of the culture of corruption it is based on. This need is 
acknowledged as well by the Romanian researcher and political analyst, Vladmir Tismăneanu 
and by German researcher Peter Gross. 
Tismăneanu thinks that studies and reports about emerging markets and Western-style 
institutions do not take into account the role of political culture understood as political 
traditions, memories and deeply entrenched attitudes (Tismăneanu, 1998:5). Gross considers 
that a study of the media system such as Romania`s must start with the study of history and 
cultural patterns affecting political and economic systems and cultures (Gross, 2008:136). This 
is the only way, Gross thinks, that the Romanian overall institutional culture could be 
understood as well as the manner in which it shapes the media and the media culture and 
defining this way the professional culture in Romania (Gross, 2008:138).  
 As a self-reflection, I consider that the work done offers an insight into media reporting 
of corruption and emphasizes the necessity of a real dialog and a real debate within Romanian 
society about the manner in which the media approaches the problem of political corruption. It 
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is not a surprise that such debates do not take place. Despite political corruption producing 
significant consequences, despite being around for centuries, Romania lacks any scientific 
studies of the phenomenon. There is no study to explain the culture of kleptocracy or its 
consequences in this modern European country. Being corrupt is part of everyday life and 
corruption seems to be a way of life Romanians find difficult to part with, despite its horrendous 
consequences.  
 The drama generated by the fire in the nightclub “Colectiv” in Bucharest on the 
Halloween night last year angered Romanians enough to generate street protests which brought 
down a very corrupt government (Clej, 2015). But the anger stopped short of pushing things 
towards the real solution: the resignation of all the MPs accused of corruption and under 
investigation. By-elections would have been a clear sign that corruption is not tolerated 
anymore. Instead Romanians accepted a politically independent government of technocrats 
which cannot pass any real reform as it does not have the political backing of the Parliament. 
Meanwhile, the MPs accused and under investigation for corruption conveniently continue to 
hide and conduct their dishonest businesses under the protection of their parliamentary 
immunity. And to prepare for the general elections in the summer. “Corruption kills!” has 
become Romania`s most recent slogan but it is not strong enough to make Romanians say: 
“Stop corruption!”. 
 As concerning the media, on the 10th of March the Special Committee of the Romanian 
Senate (the inferior Chamber of Parliament) met to evaluate democracy and the state of law in 
Romania with a focus on the link between democracy and the freedom of mass-media. As a 
conclusion of the meeting, Ioana Avădani bitterly asked herself on Facebook: “Only my 
colleague, Alex Giboi, and I still believe in education for the mass-media. The general opinion 
at this debate is that democracy and the freedom of mass-media would mean to just teach people 
what TV station to watch. Depressing!” (Avădani, 2016).  
 Avădani`s conclusion might be depressing indeed but it just shows how big is the need 
for Romania to have a proper public debate about the role of the media in guarding democracy 
by exposing the wrong-doing of the elected politicians. Unavoidably such a debate should 
touch sensitive points: the moral fitness of those who become media owners, how do the media 
owners use their assets, how should be the relationship between the media owner and the 
political realm, how could this relationship be kept accountable to the public, how should be 
the relationship between media owner and journalists?  Equally important is to find an answer 
to the question of how could be implemented the ethical standards missing in the Romanian 
media? But the most important question the Romanian media has to answer to is related to its 
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vision for the future as a profession in the service of a public which needs to be correctly 
informed, involved in the public debate about relevant issues for society and educated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 207 
 
Bibliography 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Primary Material 
 
Avădani, I., 2012. Manager of the Independent Centre for Journalism, Bucharest. Interview 
with Lorela Broucher, London, May 2012. 
Băcanu, P., M., 2011. Romanian Journalist and former Executive Director of `Romania 
Libera` newspaper. Telephone conversation with Lorela Broucher, Bucharest, November 
2011. 
Cristoiu, I., 2012. Romanian Journalist and former owner and Managing Director of 
`Evenimentul Zilei` newspaper. Interview with Lorela Broucher, Bucharest, April 2012. 
Diamandi, I., 2012. Romanian Journalist. Interview with Lorela Broucher. Bucharest, March 
2012. 
Elefteriu, G., 2015. Traian Băsescu is, technically speaking, the most skilful Romanian 
politician since 1989: “The former Head of State has a quality which completely lacks in the 
Romanian politics – he is a leader” (online). Bucharest: B1TV. Available at: 
http://m.b1.ro/stiri/politica/traian-basescu-este-tehnic-vorbind-cel-mai-abil-politician-roman-
de-dupa-1989-fostul-presedinte-are-acea-calitate-care-lipseste-complet-din-restul-politicii-
romanesti-este-un-lider-127587.html (accessed on October 6, 2016). 
Horsley, W. (wh@williamhorsley.com ), 2012. BBC Journalist. Interview for PhD Research, 
01 November. Email to Lorela Broucher (corbeanu.lorela@gmail.com ). 
McInthyre, C.(mcintyrewlotzka@blueyonder.co.uk), 2012. Correspondent and sub-editor, 
Reuters. Interview for PhD Research, 29 December. Email to Lorela Broucher 
(corbeanu.lorela@gmail.com ) 
Păcuraru, C. (cosmin_Păcuraru@yahoo.com), 2011. Romanian Journalist. Interview for PhD 
Research, 11 November. Email to Lorela Broucher (corbeanu.lorela@gmail.com ). 
Pro TV, 2014. The National Committee for the Study of the Archives of the Communist Security 
(CNSAS) released a new document regarding the link between President Traian Băsescu and 
the Communist Security (online). Bucharest: Pro TV. Available at: 
http://stirileprotv.ro/stiri/actualitate/cnsas-a-eliberat-un-nou-document-despre-legatura-
presedintelui-traian-basescu-cu-fosta-securitate.html (accessed on October 6, 2016). 
 
 208 
 
 
CNSAS a eliberat un nou document despre legatura presedintelui 
Traian Basescu cu fosta Securitate 
 
Rogozanu, C. (rogozanu@gmail.com), 2012. Romanian Journalist. Interview for PhD 
Research, 22 November. Email to Lorela Broucher (corbeanu.lorela@gmail.com ) 
Savaliuc, R. (rsziua@yahoo.com ), 2012. Romanian Investigation Journalist. Interview for 
PhD Research, 8 April. Email to Lorela Broucher (corbeanu.lorela@gmail.com ).  
Țăranu, A., 2011. Romanian Political Analyst. Interview with Andrei Țăranu. Lorela 
Broucher, November 2011. 
Tatulici, M., 2012. Romanian Journalist and Director of Programmes, Realitatea TV: 
Interview Mihail Tatulici. Lorela Broucher, Bucharest, March 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
Secondary Material 
 
Active Watch, 2015. FreeEx Report. Freedom of Press in Romania 2014 – 2015 (online). 
Bucharest: Active Watch. Available at: http://www.activewatch.ro/ro/freeex/publicatii/raport-
freeex-2014-2015-video/ (Accessed on September 30, 2015). 
Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei, 2001 – 2002.  Condiţia Libertăţii Presei in România. 
Cazuri de hărţuire a jurnalistilor in perioada 2001 – 2002 (online). Bucharest:  FreeEX 
PROGRAM. Available at http://www.activewatch.ro/stiri/FreeEx/Rapoarte-anuale-FreeEx-
79.html (accessed on January 6, 2012). 
Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei, 2002, Condiţia Libertăţii Presei in Romani. Cazuri de 
hărţuire a jurnaliştilor in perioada 2001 – 2002 (online). Bucharest: FreeEX PROGRAM, 
http://www.activewatch.ro/stiri/FreeEx/Rapoarte-anuale-FreeEx-79.html, last accessed on 6h 
of January 2012. 
Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei, 2003. Freedom of the Media in Romania 2003 (online). 
Bucharest: FreeEx PROGRAM. Available at: 
 209 
 
http://www.activewatch.ro/stiri/FreeEx/Rapoarte-anuale-FreeEx-79.html (accessed on 
January 7, 2012). 
Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei (2004), Freedom of the Media in Romania 2003 (online). 
Bucharest: FreeEx PROGRAM, http://www.activewatch.ro/stiri/FreeEx/Rapoarte-anuale-
FreeEx-79.html, last accessd o 7th of January2012. 
Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei (2004), Freedom Press in Romania 2004 (online). 
Bucharest: FreeEx PROGRAM, http://www.acivewatch.ro/stiri/FreeEx/Rapoarte-anuale-
FreeEx-79.html, last accessed on 7th of January 2012. 
Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei, 2005/2006. Press Freedom in Romania 2005 (online). 
Bucharest: FreeEx PROGRAM. Available at: 
http://www.activewatch.ro/stiri/FreeEx/Rapoarte-anuale-FreeEx-79.html (accessed on 
January 7, 2012). 
Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei (2006/2007), Press Freedom in Romania 2006, FreeEx 
PROGRAM , http://www.activewatch.ro/stiri/FreeEx/Rapoarte-anuale-FreeEx-79.html, last 
accessed on 8th of January 2012 
Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei (2007), Press Freedom in Romania 2007, FreeEx 
PROGRAM , http://www.activewatch.ro/stiri/FreeEx/Rapoarte-anuale-FreeEx-79.html, last 
accessed on 9th of January 2012. 
Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei (2008), Press Freedom in Romania 2008 (online). 
Bucharest: FreeEx PROGRAM. Available at: 
http://www.activewatch.ro/stiri/FreeEx/Rapoarte-anuale-FreeEx-79.html (accessed on 
January 9, 2012). 
Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei (2009/2010), Press Freedom in Romania 2009, FreeEx 
PROGRAM , http://www.activewatch.ro/stiri/FreeEx/Rapoarte-anuale-FreeEx-79.html, last 
accessed on 10th of January 2012 
Agenţia de Monitorizare a Presei (2010/2011), Press Freedom in Romania 2010, FreeEx 
PROGRAM , http://www.activewatch.ro/stiri/FreeEx/Rapoarte-anuale-FreeEx-79.html, last 
accessed on 10th of January 2012 
Allan S., 2004. News Culture. Second Edition. Berkshire, McGraw-Hill Professional 
Publishing.  
Alexandrescu, R., 2014.  Victor Ponta and Klaus Johannis, a sketch of Presidential candidates 
(online). Bucharest: Revista 22. Available at: http://www.revista22.ro/victor-ponta-si-klaus-
iohannis--crochiu-de-candidati-49598.html (accessed on December 9, 2014). 
 210 
 
Almond, G., A., and Verba, S., 1965. The Civic Culture. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and 
Company. 
Andrei M., 2015. Caragiale – Caion Trial. From Literary Duel to Plagiarism Accusations 
(online). Bucharest: Metropolis Newspaper. Available at 
http://www.ziarulmetropolis.ro/procesul-caragiale-caion-de-la-duel-literar-la-acuze-de-
plagiat/ (Accessed on August 13, 2015).  
Andronache, C., M., 2012. Romanians Don`t Trust the Government but Trust the Media 
(online). Bucharest: Pagini de Media. Available at: http://www.paginademedia.ro/2012/01/27-
ianuarie-romanii-nu-au-incredere-in-guvern-dar-se-incred-in-mass-media (accessed on 
February 29, 2016).  
Andronic, D., 2014. Why aren`t Romanians taking the streets to defend Dan Voiculescu. 
August 5, 2014 is the end of an era (Online). Bucharest: Evenimentul Zilei. Available at: 
http://www.evz.ro/de-ce-nu-ies-romanii-in-strada-ca-sa-l-apere-pe-dan-voiculescu-5-august-
2014-finalul-unei-epoci.html (Accessed on November 10, 2014).  
Antena 3, 2011. Antena 3 Has Become the Only News TV in Romania Affiliated to CNN 
Network. Antena 3 (online). Bucharest: Antena 3. Available at: 
http://www.antena3.ro/actualitate/media/antena-3-a-devenit-singura-televiziune-de-stiri-din-
romania-afiliata-retelei-cnn-140918.html ( Accessed on October 1, 2015).  
Antohe, C., 2014. Did Former SIE Officers Try to Manipulate the Romanian Press via an 
Article Published in Germany? (online). Bucharest: Evenimentul Zilei. Available at: 
http://www.evz.ro/incercare-de-manipulare-a-presei-romanesti-in-scandalul-eads.html 
(accessed on December 2, 2014). 
Arvunescu, V., (2015). Mircea Badea and Mihai Gâdea Publicly Condemned by the 
Association of European Journalists for the “Cruel and Insulting Verbal Abuse” (online). 
Bucharest: Adevărul. Available at: http://Adevărul.ro/entertainment/tv/mircea-badea-mihai-
Gâdea-condamnati-public-asociatia-jurnalistilor-europeni-abuzul-verbal-crud-insultator-
1_552e9290448e03c0fdada101/index.html (accessed on March 18, 2016).   
Attila, B., 2014. The motivation of the Court in Zambaccian File: Adrian Năstase had no 
hesitation to act in the purest mobster way (online). Bucharest: Gândul. Available at: 
http://www.Gândul.info/stiri/motivarea-instantei-in-dosarul-zambaccian-inculpatul-Năstase-
nu-a-avut-nicio-retinere-de-a-actiona-in-cel-mai-pur-stil-mafiot-12889299 (accessed on 8 
October 2014). 
Attila B., 2014. Mega-dossier of corruption: Suspicious contracts worth Euro 1 billion. See 
preliminary list of politicians who have signed procurement (online). Bucharest: Gândul. 
 211 
 
Available at: http://www.gandul.info/stiri/megadosar-de-coruptie-contracte-suspecte-in-
valoare-de-1-miliard-de-euro-vezi-lista-preliminara-a-politicienilor-care-au-semnat-
achizitiile-12922814 (accessed on October 6, 2016).  
Attila, B., 2015. The File of Bankruptcy Frauds. Adamescu Accused of Corruption the Judges. 
His Barristed Committed Suicide After `Snitching` Him (online). Bucharest: Gândul 
Newspaper. Available at: http://www.Gândul.info/stiri/dosarul-falimentelor-fraudate-
adamescu-acuzat-de-coruperea-judecatorilor-avocatul-sau-s-a-sinucis-dupa-ce-l-a-turnat-
12644031 (Accessed on September 30, 2015).   
Avădani, I. (2016). The Meeting of the Special Committee of Senate to Evaluate the State of 
Democracy and of State of Right in Romania. Facebook. 10 March. Available at: 
https://www.facebook.com/ioana.Avădani?fref=ts (accessed on March 18,2016). 
Avram, E., 2013. Zambaccian File – seven years of lawsuits for Adrian Năstase (online). 
Bucharest: Romania Libera. Available at: 
http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/dosarul-zambaccian--sapte-ani-de-
procese-pentru-adrian-Năstase-321076 (accessed on 11 August 2014). 
Avram, E., 2014. What politicians say about Năstase`s condemnation (online). Bucharest: 
Romania Libera. Available at: http://www.romanialibera.ro/politica/institutii/ce-spun-
politicienii-despre-condamnarea-lui-adrian-Năstase-322115 (accessed on 19 August 2014). 
Badea, C., Copoeru, I., 2010. “The citizens` perception of corruption in public institutions: 
causes, practices, prevention”(online). Bucharest: The Association “Assistance and 
Programmes for Durable Development – Agenda 21 and the National Agency of Public 
servants”. Available at: 
http://www.agenda21.org.ro/download/Studiu%20perceptia%20cetatenilor%20asupra%20cor
uptiei%20din%20institutiile%20publice.pdf (accessed on February 29, 2016).  
Badea, C., 2014. Corruption at Romanians: Hand in Hand with Faith.Interview with Marius 
Vasileanu(online). Bucharest:  Ziare.com. Available at 
http://www.ziare.com/social/religie/coruptia-la-romani-mana-in-mana-cu-credinta-interviu-
cu-marius-vasileanu-1299745 (Accessed on August 2015, 17).  
Bădică, P., 2014. The History of Corruption in Romania. There were Romanian Barons 
between the Two World Wars (Interview with Journalist Petre Bădică) (online). Bucharest: 
Romania Libera. Available at: http://www.romanialibera.ro/special/documentare/istoria-
coruptiei-la-romani--existau-baroni-locali-in-interbelic--333150 (Accessed on August 12, 
2015).  
 212 
 
Băiaş, I., 2014.  VIDEO. The Advice of Sorin Ovidiu Vântu for the Facebook Generation: You 
are the “I cannot afford generation! You have not got anything. You cannot afford a house, 
you do not have a car. You cannot afford not even prostitutes. You will continue to be our 
slaves” (online). Bucharest: HotNews. Available at: http://m.hotnews.ro/stire/18781988 
(accessed on December 9, 2014). 
Balkin, J.,M., 1998. How Mass Media Stimulates Political Transparenc (online). Connecticut: 
Yale University, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/articles/media01.htm, last accessed on 
December 15, 2014. 
Barr, A., 2010. Corruption and Culture: An Experimental Analysis. Journal of Public 
Economics, 94(11), pp: 813-1122. 
Barsukova, S., 2009. Corruption. Russian Politics and Law, 47(4), pp 8-27. 
Băsescu, T., 2014.  Sebastian Ghiţă, a type of mogul more dangerous that Voiculescu who is 
a rotten informer (online). Bucharest: Romania Libera. Available at: 
http://www.romanialibera.ro/politica/institutii/Băsescu--Ghiţă-este-un-tip-de-mogul-mai-
periculos-decat-voiculescu--care-e-un-turnator-nenorocit-332140 (Accessed on November 10, 
2014). 
Baysha, O., Hallan, K., 2003. Media Framing of the Ukrainian Political Crisis, 2000-2001. 
Journalism Studies, 5(2), pp.  233 – 246. 
Bechir, M., 2014. The criminals behind the Presidential candidates. Ponta and PSD are at the 
top (online). Bucharest: Revista 22. Available at: http://www.revista22.ro/penalii-din-spatele-
candidatilor-la-prezidentiale-in-top-ponta-si-psd-49421.html (accessed on December 9, 2014). 
Besley, T., and McLaren, J., 1993.  Taxes and bribery: the role of wage incentives. Economic 
Journal, 103 (416), pp: 119–141. 
Biţă, D., 2014. Ponta says he is not involved in the acquisitions in the Microsoft file (online). 
Bucharest: Romania Libera. Available at: 
http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/video--ponta-sustine-ca-nu-are-legatura-
cu-achizitiile-din-dosarul-microsoft-351658 (accessed on December 9, 2014). 
Biţă, D., 2014. Băsescu says the information in Microsoft file do not start from millionaire 
Alexandru Bittner. Nobody looked for him in the US (online). Bucharest: Romania Libera. 
Available at: http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/Băsescu-spune-ca-
informatiile-in-dosarul-microsoft-nu-pornesc-de-la-milionarul-alexandru-bittner--nu-l-a-
cautat-nimeni-prin-sua-352114 (accessed on December 2, 2014).  
Biţă D., 2014. Former Minister, Gabriel Sandu, investigated by DNA in Microsoft File 
(online). Bucharest: România Liberă. Available at: 
 213 
 
http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/fostul-ministru-gabriel-sandu--audiat-la-
dna--in-dosarul-microsoft-354045 (accessed on October 6, 2016). 
Botezatu, C., 2014. Each time Adrian Năstase passed through difficult moments, Victor Ponta 
lost his temper (online). Bucharest: Evenimentul Zilei. Available at:  http://www.evz.ro/sorina-
matei-de-fiecare-data-cand-adrian-Năstase-a-trecut-prin-momente-delicate-victor-p-
1075559.html (accessed on 19 August 2014). 
BRAT, 2015. Evenimentul Zilei (online). Bucharest: BRAT Available at: 
http://www.brat.ro/audit-tiraje/publicatie/evenimentul-zilei/  (Accessd on September 17, 
2015).  
BRAT a, 2015. Romania Liberă(online). Bucharest: BRAT. Available at: 
http://www.brat.ro/audit-tiraje/publicatie/romania-libera/ (Accessd on September 17, 2015).  
BRAT b, 2015. HotNews.ro (online). Bucharest: BRAT. Available at: 
http://www.brat.ro/sati/site/hotnews-ro-1/trafic-total/ (Accessed on October 1, 2015).  
BRAT, 2016. Circulation Figures (online). Bucharest: The Romanian Authority for the Audit 
of Circulation of Publications. Available at: http://www.brat.ro/audit-tiraje/cifre-de-
difuzare/letter/a/year/2015/trimester/7-9/order_by/name/order/asc/page/1 (Accessed on 
February 29, 2016). 
Breazu, S., 2013.  Oreste about the practices of Dan Voiculescu: The Zombie Factory Went 
Bankrupt. Plus: Why Varanus Sent Gâdea to America (online). Bucharest: Evenimentul Zilei. 
Available at: http://www.evz.ro/oreste-despre-practicile-lui-dan-voiculescu-fabrica-de-
produs-zombie-intra-in-faliment-1063146.html (accessed on November 10, 2014). 
Brunetti, A. and Weder, B., 2003. A Free Press Is Bad News for Corruption.  Journal 
of Public Economics, 87 (2003), pp. 1801–1824. 
Buzaş, A., 2009. Top 300 Capital: Voiculescu family and Dinu Patriciu – the richest Romanins 
involved in mass-media (online). Bucharest: Capital Magazine. Available at: 
http://www.mediafax.ro/cultura-media/top-300-capital-familia-voiculescu-si-dinu-patriciu-
cei-mai-bogati-romani-din-mass-media-4988595 (accessed on November 4, 2014).  
Buzaş, A., 2009. Focus: 20 years of newspapers – Between the Idealism Provided by Freedom 
and Business, in Capitalism (online). Bucharest: Mediafax. Available at: 
http://www.mediafax.ro/cultura-media/focus-20-de-ani-de-ziare-intre-idealismul-dat-de-
libertate-si-afacere-in-capitalism-5201723 (accessed on February 29, 2016). 
Călin, D., 2014. The Theatre Play which “Impeccably Countours the Image of Today 
Romania” Impressed at the International Festival of Theatre in Avignon (online). Bucharest: 
Descopera.ro Blog. Available at http://www.descopera.ro/dnews/12948745-piesa-care-
 214 
 
contureaza-implacabil-imaginea-romaniei-din-prezent-impresioneaza-la-festivalul-
international-de-teatru-din-avignon (last accessed on August 17, 2015). 
Câmpeanu, C., 2012. A suicide as a plagiarism. Năstase`s cowardice (online). Bucharest: 
Romania Liberă. Available at: http://www.romanialibera.ro/opinii/editorial/o-sinucidere-cat-
un-plagiat--lasitatea-lui-adrian-Năstase-268231 (accessed on 8 October 2014).  
Câmpeanu, C., 2013. Public obscenity with Adrian Năstase (online). Bucharest: Romania 
Liberă. Available at: http://www.romanialibera.ro/opinii/editorial/obsceNiţătea-publica-cu-
adrian-Năstase-299624 (accessed on 19 August 2014).  
Castells, M., 2013. Communication Power. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Centrul de Investigatii Media, 2013. Dan Voiculescu, June 13, 2006, declaration to CNSAS: 
I am Felix… (online). Bucharest: Centre for Media Investigations.Available at: 
http://www.investigatiimedia.ro/dan-voiculescu-in-13-iunie-2006-in-declaratia-data-cnsas-
felix-sunt-eu/ (accessed on November 4, 2014).  
Chilton, P.a, 1987. Metaphor, Euphemism and the Militarization of Language, Current 
Research on Peace and Violence, 10 (1) 7-10. Cynicism, p.7, London, Sage. 
Chilton, P.b, 1987. Critical discourse Moments and Critical Discourse Analysis: Towards a 
Methodology (online), in Skelly, J., M., ed., Working paper No. 7, First Annual Conference on 
Discourse, peace, Security and International Society, Ballyvaughn, Ireland. Available at: 
http://www.bakerinstitute.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/IGCC-Critical-Discourse-
Moments-and-Critical-Discourse-Analysis-Towards-a-methodology-Aug-1987.pdf (accessed 
on October 2015).  
Chomsky, N., & Herman, E.S., 1988. Manufacturing Consent: the Political Economy of the 
Mass Media. Pantheon Books: New York. 
Christopher, C., 2005. Dan Voiculescu`s Tainted Past Dogs Humanist Party in Romania 
(online). History News Network. Available at:  http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/9594 
(accessed on November 4, 2014). 
Cincea, M., 2014. The collapse. From Năstase to Voiculescu (online). Bucharest: Romania 
Libera. Available at: http://www.romanialibera.ro/opinii/comentarii/prabusirea--de-la-
Năstase-la-voiculescu-343831 (accessed on 8 October 2014). 
Ciobanu, M., 2007. Romania`s Travails with Democracy and Accession to the EU. Europe-
Asia Studies, 59 (8), pp. 1429 – 1450. 
Ciocan O., 2014. Cătălin Harnagea, the former Head of the Romanian External Intelligence 
Services (SIE) explains why DNA visited him home: He is linked to EADS file (online). 
Bucharest: Gândul. Available at: http://www.gandul.info/stiri/catalin-harnagea-fostul-sef-al-
 215 
 
sie-explica-ce-a-cautat-dna-la-el-acasa-are-legatura-cu-eads-13402638 (accessed on October 
6, 2016).  
Ciupercă, C. a, 2012. Adrian Năstase goes to prison. Politicians pity him (online). Bucharest: 
Romania Libera. Available at: http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/adrian-
Năstase-merge-la-inchisoare--politicienii-ii-plang-de-mila-268180 (accessed on 8 October 
2014). 
Ciupercă, C. b, 2012. Motivation of why was Năstase sentenced: Quality Trophy, a PSD 
business meant to collect funds for the former Prime Minister (online). Bucharest: Romania 
Libera. Available at: http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/motivare-de-ce-a-
fost-condamnat-adrian-Năstase--trofeul-calitatii--o-afacere-a-psd-meNiţă-sa-stranga-
fonduri-pentru-fostul-premier-258826 (accessed on 8 October 2014). 
Clej, P., (2015). Romania Protesters Prompt PM Ponta`s Fall After Nightclub Fire (online). 
London: BBC. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34720074 (accessed on 
March 20, 2016). 
Coman, M., 2004. Media Burgeoisie and Media Proletariat in Post-Communist Romania, 
Journalism Studies, 5(1), pp. 45 – 58. 
Coman, M., 2010. Journalistic Elites in Post-Communist Romania. Journalism Studies, 11(4), 
pp. 587-595. 
Contributors.ro, 2015. About (online). Bucharest: Contributors.ro. Available at: 
http://www.contributors.ro/despre (accessed on November 24, 2015). 
Cozmei, V., 2014. ICA file in numbers: 2,073 days of Court trials, 67 years of prison (online). 
Bucharest: Hotnews. Available at: http://anticoruptie.hotnews.ro/stiri-anticoruptie-17848514-
dosarul-ica-dan-voiculescu-cifre-2073-zile-judecata-67-ani-inchisoare.htm (accessed on 
November 8, 2014). 
Cristoiu, I., 2013. Cristoiu`s Romania. Năstase`s sufferings inside and outside prison cried 
for on TV by Mihai Gâdea! (online).  Bucharest: Evenimentul Zilei. Available at: 
http://www.evz.ro/suferintele-lui-adrian-Năstase-la-puscarie-si-in-afara-ei-plinse-tv-de-
mihai-Gâdea-1033596.html (accessed on 19 August 2014). 
Cristoiu, I., 2014.  Cristoiu`s Romania: The blow received by the anti-Justice couple Victor 
Ponta – Dan Voiculescu (online). Bucharest: Evenimentul Zilei. Available at: 
http://www.evz.ro/lovitura-primita-de-cuplul-anti-justitie-victor-ponta-dan-voiculescu.html 
(last accessed on November 10, 2014). 
Critic Atac, 2015. About Us. Bucharest: Critic Atac. Available at: 
http://www.criticatac.ro/despre-noi/ (accessed on November 24, 2015).  
 216 
 
Curran, J., 2002. Media and Power. London: Routledge. 
Curran, J., Shanto, I., Anker, B., & Inka, S., M., 2009. Media System, Public Knowledge 
and Democracy. A Comparative Study. European Journal of Communication, 24(1), pp: 5-26. 
Deacon, D., et al., 2007. Researching Communications. A Practical Guide to Methods in 
Media and Cultural Analysis. 2nd Edition. London: Hodder Education. 
Deacon, D., Pickering, M., Golding, P., & Murdock, G., 2007. Researching 
Communications. A Practical Guide to Methods in Media and Cultural Analysis, London, 
Hodder Education. 
Dean, M., 1999. Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. London: Sage. 
Digi 24 HD, 2015. Sorin Oprescu Has Been Arrested Pre-emptively. An Indicter Says He Gave 
Oprescu €1 Million (online). Bucharest: Digi 24 HD. Available at: 
http://www.digi24.ro/Stiri/Digi24/Actualitate/Justitie/Primarul+Sorin+Oprescu+retinut+de+
DNA (accessed on September 24, 2015).  
Domnişoru, C., 2014. Adrian Năstase tried to kill himself. Five pensioners managed to do it 
(online). Bucharest: Vox Publica. Available at: http://voxpublica.realitatea.net/politica-
societate/adrian-Năstase-a-incercat-sa-se-sinucida-cinci-pensionari-au-reusit-107302.html 
(accessed on 8 October 2014).  
Dumitru, A., 2014. Dan Voiculescu attacks Laura Codruta Kovesi (online). Bucharest: 
Romania Liberă . Available at: http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/dan-
voiculescu-ii-cere-socoteala-procurorului-sef-al-dna-339003 (accessed on November 7, 2014).  
Eminescu, M., 1985. Works XIII. Bucharest: The Academy Print. 
Ene, E., 2013. Adrian Năstase`s first interview after release from prison: Traian Băsescu is 
like a shot fox from which fleas are fleeing (online). Bucharest: Romania Liberă. Available at: 
http://www.romanialibera.ro/politica/institutii/adrian-Năstase--primul-interviu-in-libertate--
Băsescu-este-ca-o-vulpe-impuscata-de-vanator-de-pe-care-fug-puricii-299547 (accessed on 
19 august 2014). 
European Commission, 2002. Regular Report on Romania`s Progress Towards Accession 
(online). Brussels: Commission of the European Communities. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2002/ro_en.pdf (Accessed on 
September 3, 2015).  
European Commission, 2003. Regular Report on Romania`s Progress Towards Accession 
(online). Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2003/rr_ro_final_en.pdf  
(Accessed on September 3, 2015).  
 217 
 
European Commission, 2004. Regular Report on Romania`s Progress Towards Accession 
(online). Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/rr_ro_2004_en.pdf    
(Accessed on September 3, 2015).  
European Commission, 2007.  Key Findings of the progress report on the Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism with Romania (online). Brussels: European Commission. Available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-07-262_en.htm (Accessed December 10, 2014). 
European Commission, 2008.  Report on Progress on Romania under the Co-operation and 
Verification Mechanism (online). Brussels: European Commission. Available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-520_en.htm (Accessed December 10, 2014). 
European Commission, 2010.  Interim Report of European Commission towards European 
Parliament and Council concerning the progress made by Romania within the Mechanism of 
Cooperation and Verification (online). Brussels: European Commission. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/progress_reports_en.htm (Accessed July 29, 2015). 
European Commission, 2011. Report on Progress on Romania under the Co-operation and 
Verification Mechanism (online). Brussels: European Commission. Available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-528_en.htm (Accessed on December 10, 
2014). 
European Commission, 2013. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
The Council – On Progress in Romania under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism 
(online). Brussels: European Commission. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/docs/com_2013_47_en.pdf (Accessed April, 16, 2013). 
European Commission, 2014.  Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council on Progress in Romania under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism 
(online). Brussels: European Commission. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/docs/com_2014_37_en.pdf (Accessed December 10, 2014). 
European Court of Human Rights, 1992. Castells v. Spain, Application No. 11798/85, para. 
43, April 24. Strasbourg: European Court of Human Rights. Available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
57772#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-57772%22]} (Accessed June 15, 2015). 
Evenimentul Zilei, 2010. The Court of Appeal explains why Dan Voiculescu did political 
police (online). Bucharest: Evenimentul Zilei. Available at: http://www.evz.ro/curtea-de-apel-
dan-voiculescu-a-facut-politie-politica-897720.html (accessed on November 4, 2014).  
 218 
 
Fati, S., 2011. US Embassy Dispatches (online). Bucharest: Romania Liberă. Available at: 
http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/international/telegrame-ambasada-sua---top-cinci--
oligarhi-din-romania-220693 (accessed November 5, 2014). 
Fenton, N., 2011. Deregulation or Democracy? New Media, News, Neoliberalism and the 
Public Interest. Journal of Media and Cultural Studies, 25(1), pp. 63-72. 
Ficeac B., 2013. The “Culture of Corruption” in the Post-Communist space. Economic 
Indicators, Transition Indices and Cultural Dimensions Vs. Perception of Corruption. The 
Journal of Research and Social Intervention (1583-3410), Vol. 43, pp. 215-239.  
Filimon, P., Biţă, D., Simion, D., 2004. Video. Update. Victoria Neuland to an “European 
leader”: How Can You Sleep Restfulness Under the NATO Puff While You Are Protecting the 
Corrupts Against the Legal System? (online). Bucharest: Romania Liberă. Available at: 
http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/victoria-nunland--catre-un--lider-
european---de-ce-i-protejati-pe-coruptii-din-justitie--352001 (accessed on December 3, 2014).  
Foucault, M., 2007. Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977-
1978. Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke. 
Freedom House a, 2015. About Us, www.freedomhouse.org, available at 
https://freedomhouse.org/about-us#.VXqT_UYy6GA (Accessed June 12, 2015). 
Freedom House b, 2015. Nations in Transit (online). New York: Freedom House. Available 
at https://freedomhouse.org/article/nations-transit-2015-democracy-defensive-europe-and-
eurasia#.VYliDEYy6GB (Accessed June 23, 2015). 
Galbraith, R., J., 1973. Designing Complex Organizations. Boston, MA, USA: Addison-
Wesley Longman Publishing Co.  
Gamson, W.,A., 1992. Talking Politics, p.197, Cambridge, Press Syndicate of the University 
of Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Gamson, W.,A., & Modigliani, A., 1989. Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear 
Power: A Constructivist Approach, 1-10, The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 95. 
Garnham, N., 1979. Contribution to a Political Economy of Mass Communication. Media, 
Culture and Society, 1 (2), pp. 123 – 146. 
Garnham, M., & Fuchs, C., 2014. Revisiting the Political Economy of Communication. Triple 
C: Communication, Capitalism & Critique, 12 (1), pp.102-141. 
Gherguţ, O., 2011. How Russians lost control because Năstase lost elections (online). 
Bucharest: Romania Liberă. Available at: 
http://www.romanialibera.ro/special/investigatii/cum-au-pierdut-rusii-controlul-din-cauza-ca-
adrian-Năstase-nu-a-ajuns-presedinte-231594 (accessed on 12 August 2014).  
 219 
 
Gherguţ, O. a, 2014.  EXCLUSIVE. PHONE TAPPING. How Judge Mustaţă obliged Meme 
Stoica to give him bribe if he wanted to get out of prison (online). Bucharest: Romania Liberă. 
Available at:  http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/interceptari--cum-l-a-
obligat-judecatorul-Mustaţă-pe--meme-stoica-sa-i-dea-mita-daca-vroia-sa-iasa-din-puscarie-
333739 (accessed on November 10, 2014).  
Gherguţ, O. b, 2014. The Trio Niro – Cocoş – Pinalti in the undergrounds of Microsoft – 
EADS business (online). Bucharest: Romania Liberă. Available at: 
http://www.romanialibera.ro/special/investigatii/rolul-tripletei-niro-Cocoş-pinalti-in-afacerea-
microsoft-eads-354953 (accessed on December 2, 2014). 
Golea, G., 2014. The Informers from the High-Up Society Are Fashionable (online). 
Bucharest: Jurnalul Naţional. Available at: http://m.jurnalul.ro/stiri/observator/la-moda-
turnatorii-din-lumea-grangurilor-681190.html (accessed on December 3, 2014).  
Gross, P. 2008. Dances with Wolves: A Meditation on the Media and Political system in the 
European Unions`s Romania in Jakubowicz, K., and Sukosd, M., eds. Finding the Right Place 
on the Map. Central and Eastern European Media Change in a Global Perspective, 2008, pp. 
125-143. 
Guran, M., 2013. The Knights of the Criminal Apocalypse (online). Bucharest: România 
Curată. Available at:  http://romaniacurata.ro/cavalerii-apocalipsei-penale/ (accessed on 8 
October 2014). 
Gurevitch, M. & Blumler, J. G., 1990. Political communication systems and democratic 
values. In: Lichtenberg, J. (ed). Democracy and the mass media. Cambridge: University Press. 
Habermas, J., 1964. The Public Sphere, in Armand Mattelart and Seth Siegelaub (eds.) (1979) 
Communication and Class Struggle, Vol. 1: Capitalism, Imperialism, New York, NY: 
International General. 
Haraga Otilia, 2013.  “Lack of ethics” most pressing challenge facing local media (18th of 
February 2013 (online). Bucharest: Business Review Romania. Available at: 
http://www.business-review.ro/featured/lack-of-ethics-most-pressing-challenge-facing-local-
media/, accessed on the 16th of April 2013.  
Hobbes, T., 1651. Leviathan (online). The Project Gutenberg. Available at, 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm (Accessed June 12, 2015). (Project 
Gutenberg release date October 11, 2009). 
Hodess, R., 2004. Introduction to Political Corruption in Global Corruption Report 2004, 
Transparency International (online). Germany: Transparency International. Available at:  
 220 
 
http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr_2004#download, accessed on 28th of May 
2010. 
Hofstede G., 2011. Dimensionalising Cultures: The Hofstede Model in Context, Online 
Readings in Psychology and Culture (online), 2(1) available at http://dx.doi.org/10.9707/2307-
0919.1014 (Accessed on April 13, 2015). 
Hopia, H., 2013. Decline of the media, decline of democracy? European View (2013), 12, pp. 
41–49. 
Hotnews, 2009. Final Debate Băsescu – Geoană (online). Bucharest: HotNews. Available at: 
http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-6608921-Băsescu-chemat-Vântu-aseara-acasa-cand-
aflat-fost-arestat-nicolae-popa-Geoană-fost-aseara-Vântu-Geoană-afirma-nu-aduce-aminte-
revolutie-pentru-era-prea-tanar.htm (Accessed on January 20, 2015). 
HotNews a, 2014. Victor Ponta: Adrian SârbuSârbu was in My Office to Ask If I Could Stop 
Some Checks Done by the National Authority for Fiscal Administration (ANAF), I Told Him I 
Couldn`t (online). Bucharest: HotNews. Available at: http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-
17630574-victor-ponta-adrian-Sârbu-fost-mine-birou-intrebe-daca-pot-opri-niste-controale-
anaf-spus-nu-pot.htm (Accessed on October 1, 2015).  
Hotnews b, 2014. Aunt Tamara File – File completed 2931 days after the start of criminal 
investigation (online). Bucharest: HotNews. Available at: 
http://anticoruptie.hotnews.ro/ancheta-7644999-dosarul-MătuşaMătuşa-tamara-adrian-
Năstase.htm (accessed on 11 August 2014). 
Hotnews a, 2014. Portrait: Dan Voiculescu, the rise and the fall of a mogul. From the power 
broker who suspended a Head of State to 10 years in jail (online). Bucharest: Hotnews. 
Available at: http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-17848790-portret-dan-voiculescu-marirea-
decaderea-unui-mogul-brokerul-putere-care-suspendat-presedintele-romaniei-zece-ani-
puscarie.htm (accessed on November 7, 2014). 
Hotnews b, 2014.  Case finalised 2,230 days after the debut of criminal research. ICA File – 
Dan Voiculescu (online). Bucharest: Hotnews. Available at: 
http://anticoruptie.hotnews.ro/ancheta-7475495-dosarul-dan-voiculescu.htm (accessed on 
November 5, 2014). 
Hotnews c, 2014. Laura Kovesi: Bribes for contracts with Microsoft and EADS, around 60 
million euros (online). Bucharest: Hotnews. Available at: http://revistapresei.hotnews.ro/stiri-
radio_tv-17869591-laura-codruta-kovesi-mita-pentru-contractele-microsoft-eads-jur-60-
milioane-euro.htm (Accessed on October 6, 2016).  
 221 
 
HotNews a, 2015. Corruption Files (online). Bucharest: HotNews. Available at: 
http://anticoruptie.hotnews.ro/ (Accessed on October 1, 2015).  
HotNews, 2015. Victor Ponta Was Sent to Court by the National Anti-Corruption Authority 
together with Dan Şova in Turceni-Rovinari File (online). Bucharest: HotNews. Available at: 
http://anticoruptie.hotnews.ro/stiri-anticoruptie-20431777-breaking-news-victor-ponta-trimis-
judecata-dna.htm (Accessed on September 24, 015).  
Hurdubaia, C., 2005. The Image of Năstase`s Ministers Costed Us One Mercedes per Day 
(online). Bucharest: Cotidianul. Available at: http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-arhiva-1237549-
imaginea-ministrilor-lui-Năstase-costat-mercedes.htm (accessd on February 29, 2016).  
INSCOP – Adevărul, 2015. INSCOP-Adevărul Public Opinion Barometer about Romania 
April-May 2015 (online). Bucharest: INSCOP – Adevărul. Available at: 
http://www.inscop.ro/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/INSCOP-05.2015.-Incredere-in-
institutii.pdf (Accessed on September, 11, 2015).  
Intact Media Group, 2014. Our divisions (Online). Bucharest: Intact Media. Available at: 
http://www.intactmediagroup.ro/diviziile-noastre/ (accessed on November 5, 2014). 
Intact Media Group, 2015. Our Divisions (online). Bucharest: Intact Media Group. Available 
at: http://www.intactmediagroup.ro/diviziile-noastre/ (Accessed on October 1, 2015).  
Jakubowicz, K. and Sukosd, M., 2008. Twelve concepts Regarding Media System Evolution 
and Democratization in Post-Communist Societies in Jakubowicz, K., and Sukosd, M., eds. 
Finding the Right Place on the Map. Central and Eastern European Media Change in a Global 
Perspective, 2008, pp. 9-41. 
Jensen, K.,B., 1986. Making sense of the news: towards a theory and an empirical model of 
reception, p.22, Aarhus University Press. 
Jurnalul Naţional a, 2013. Doru Buşcu: Adamescu at the Bakery or How to Count Correctly 
the Distribution Numbers of Romania Libera (online). Bucharest: Jurnalul National. Available 
at: http://jurnalul.ro/stiri/observator/adamescu-la-brutarie-sau-cum-se-numara-corect-tirajul-
romaniei-libere-647325.html (Accessed on September 30, 2015). 
Jurnalul Naţional b, 2013. Bitter-Sweet Victory for Adrian Năstase (online). Bucharest: 
Jurnalul National. Available at: http://jurnalul.ro/stiri/observator/victorie-dulce-amara-pentru-
adrian-Năstase-639471.html (accessed on October 23, 2015).  
Kalenborn, C. and Lessamnn C., 2013. The impact of Democracy and Press Freedom on 
Corruption: Conditionality Matters. Journal of Policy Modeling, 35 (6), pp. 857 – 886. 
Kinder D., R, 1998. Communication and Opinion. Annual Review of Political Science, Vol 1: 
167 – 197. 
 222 
 
Kitschelt, H., 2001. Divergent Paths of Post-Communist Democracies, in Diamond, L. & 
Gunther, R. (eds) (2001), Political Parties and Democracy (Baltimore, The John Hopkins 
University Press).  
Kiltgaard, R., (1998). International Cooperation against Corruption. IMF/World Bank. 
Finance and Development, 35(1), pp: 3 -6. 
Kollmorgen, R., 2013. Theories of Postcommunist transformation. Approaches, debates and 
problems of theory building in the second decade of research. Studies of Transition States and 
Societies, 5 (2), pp.  88-105. 
Ledeneva, A., V., 1998. Russia's Economy of Favors: Blat, Networking and Informal 
Exchange. Cambridge Russian, Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies. Cambridge University Press. 
Legal Adviser, 2015. Ion Luca Caragiale (online). Bucharest: Legal Adviser Blog. Available 
at http://www.legaladviser.ro/article/19932/Ion-Luca-Caragiale/1 (Accessed on August 13, 
2015). 
Leveson, J., 2012.  An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press. Executive 
Summary and Recommendations. London: The Stationary Office, the House of Commons. 
Libertatea, 2015. The paper demanding the extension of the preventive arrest of Elena Udrea 
refers to the `party postaci`, which were paid from bribes to comment on Internet (online). 
Bucharest: Libertatea Newspaper, www.libertatea.ro. Available at: 
http://www.libertatea.ro/detalii/articol/postaci-internet-spaga-udrea-pdl-dna-528908.html 
(Accessed on September, 30, 2015).  
Locke J., 1689a. Second Treatise of Government (online). The Project Gutenberg. Available 
at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm (Accessed June 12, 2015). (Project 
Gutenberg release date January 2005).  
Locke, J., 1689b. Two Treaties of Government (online). McMaster University Archive of the 
History of Economic Thought. Available at 
http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/government.pdf (accessed June 12, 
2015), London. 
London, S., 1993. How the media frames political issues (online).  Santa Barbara: Scott 
London Website. Available at: http://www.scottlondon.com/reports/frames.html , last accessed 
on December 15, 2014. 
Lupea, I., 2013. MPs modify laws in order to get rid of sentences for corruption (online). 
Bucharest: România Curată. Available at: http://romaniacurata.ro/parlamentarii-modifica-legi-
ca-sa-scape-de-condamnarile-pentru-coruptie/ (accessed on 8 October 2014).  
 223 
 
Macarie, A., 2014. What would journalist Cristian Tudor Popescu like to ask Adrian Năstase 
if met face to face: Do you intend to kill yourself again? (Online). Bucharest: Gândul. Available 
at: http://www.Gândul.info/stiri/ce-ar-vrea-cristian-tudor-popescu-sa-l-intrebe-pe-adrian-
Năstase-daca-ar-fi-fata-in-fata-aveti-de-gand-sa-va-mai-sinucideti-si-acum-11858473 
(accessed on 8 October 2014). 
Marin, D., 2014. The Most Secure Insurance Company in Romania Consolidated in 2013 
(online). Bucharest: Romania Liberă. Available at: 
http://www.romanialibera.ro/economie/companii/cea-mai-mare-firma-de-asigurari-din-
romania-s-a-consolidat-in-2013-325517 (accessed on September 30, 2015). 
McChesney, R., 2001. Global Media, Neoliberalism and Imperialism. Monthly Review, 52 
(10), pp: 1-19. 
McChesney, R., W., 2008. The Political Economy of Media. Enduing Issues, Emerging 
Dilemmas. Monthly Review Press: US. 
McCombs, M.L. & Shaw, D. L., 1972. The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media. The 
Public Opinion Quaterly, 36(2), pp. 176-187. 
McQuail, D., 2010. McQuail`s Mass Communication Theory. 6th edition. London: Sage. 
Mervin, D., 1998. The News Media and Democracy in the United States. Democratization, 
(5)2, pp.6 – 22. 
Mihu, L., 2013. The key of Năstase`s release. Bucharest: Romania Liberă. Available at:  
http://www.romanialibera.ro/opinii/editorial/cheia-eliberarii-lui-adrian-Năstase-296468 
(accessed on 19 August 2014). 
Mihu, L., 2014. Ponta and Şova can`t avoid Năstase`s destiny (online). Bucharest: Romania 
Liberă. Available at: http://www.romanialibera.ro/opinii/editorial/ponta-si-%C5%9Eova-nu-
pot-evita-soarta-lui-Năstase-si-becali-335394 (accessed 19 August 2014). 
Mill, J.S., 1859. On Liberty (online). The Project Gutenberg. Available at 
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/34901/34901-h/34901-h.htm (Accessed June 12, 2015). 
(Project Gutenberg release date January 10, 2011). 
Montesquieu, B. and Secondat, C., 1748. The Spirit of Laws, 2001 Edition, Batoche Books, 
Ontario, Canada. 
Mungiu-Pippidi, A., 1997. Crime and Corruption after Communism. Breaking Free at Last: 
Tales of Corruption from the Postcommunist Balkans. East European Constitutional Review, 
6 (4). Available at http://www3.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol6num4/feature/breakingfree.html, 
accessed July 29, 2015. 
 224 
 
Murdock, G. and Golding, P., 2005. Culture, Communications and Political Economy in 
Curran, G. and Gurevitch, M., eds. Mass Media and Society, 2005, pp. 60-83 
Murdock, G. and Golding, P., 1973. For a political economy of mass communications. The 
Socialist Register, Vol. 10. Available at 
http://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/5355/2256#.VRKCVuEkqGA 
(Accessed March 25, 2015). 
Murphy, K.M., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R.W., 1993. Why is rent seeking so costly to growth? 
The American Economic Review, 83(2), pp: 409-414. 
Muşat, A., 2013. Gâdea got a “break” when Nistorescu destroyed his talk-show (online). 
Bucharest: Evenimentul Zilei. Available at: http://www.evz.ro/Gâdea-a-bagat-pauza-cand-
nistorescu-a-inceput-sa-i-strice-emisiunea-1028777.html (accessed on 19 August 2014).   
National Agency for Civil Servants, Support Programs for Sustainable Development 
Association, 2010. The citizens` perception of corruption in public institutions: causes, 
practices, prevention (online). Bucharest: Support Programs for Sustainable Development 
Association – Agenda 21: www.agenda21.org.ro, Available at: 
http://www.agenda21.org.ro/download/Studiu%20perceptia%20cetatenilor%20asupra%20cor
uptiei%20din%20institutiile%20publice.pdf (Accessed on September 11, 2015).  
Neferu A., 2013. 15 Years of Financial Newspaper: Europe`s Laggards, Romania Has Built 
Only 435 Kimlometers of Motorways (online). Bucharest: Ziarul Financial, November 2013, 
21, http://www.zf.ro/zf-24/zf15-ani-codasii-europei-romania-a-construit-doar-435-km-de-
autostrazi-11710460, last accessed on December 12, 2014. 
Nelson, N.D., 1990. Romania. Electoral Studies, 9 (4), pp. 355-366. 
Nicolau, R., 1999. TVR is a Sick Institution, in Marinescu, P. (ed.), The Management of Press 
Institutions in Romania, Iaşi: Polirom, pp: 116 – 21. 
Nicoleanu, A., 2012. Doru Buşcu: The Head of State Has Involved with Much Energy in 
Destroying the Press (online). Bucharest: Jurnalul Naţional Website. Available at: 
http://jurnalul.ro/bani-afaceri/doru-Buşcu-presedintele-tarii-s-a-implicat-cu-multa-energie-in-
distrugerea-presei-601520.html (Accessed on September 30, 2015).  
Ngoa, S.N.O., 2010. Functional Democracy and Mass-Media: A Critique. Global Media 
Journal, African Edition, 4 (2), pp. 132 – 150. 
Oprea, H., D., 2010. Mircea Eliade about the Romanian Political Class – 1937 (online). 
Bucharest:  Istorii Regăsite (Re-discovered Histories) Blog. Available at 
https://istoriiregasite.wordpress.com/2010/09/25/mircea-eliade-despre-clasa-politica-
romaneasca-1937/ (accessed on August 13, 2015).  
 225 
 
Osan, A., 2015. Theater Play at National Theatre in Timisoara about Corrupts and Masked 
Raids (online). Bucharest: Mediafax News Agency. Available at 
http://www.mediafax.ro/cultura-media/piesa-de-teatru-despre-corupti-si-descinderi-ale-
mascatilor-la-teatrul-national-din-timisoara-foto-14085121 (Accessed on August 17, 2015).  
OSCE, 2012. Romania. Parliamentary Elections. 9 December 2012 (online). Warsaw: 
OSCE/ODIHR Election Expert Team. Available at: 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/98757?download=true (accessed on February 29, 2016).  
Pagina De Media, 2015. Tabloid vs. Quality. Click! Is the most sold newspaper in Romania, 
over 100,000 copies. The most sold quality newspaper registered only 13,000 copies (online). 
Bucharest: Pagina de Media. Available at: http://www.paginademedia.ro/2015/06/tabloid-
versus-calitate-click-cel-mai-vandut-ziar-din-romania-cu-peste-100-000-de-exemplare-cel-
mai-vandut-ziar-de-calitate-o-medie-de-doar-13-000-de-exemplare/ (accessed on September 
30, 2015).  
Persson, T., Tabellini, G., and Trebbi, F., 2003. Electoral rules and corruption. Journal of 
the European Economic Association, 1, pp. 958–989. 
Pippidi Mungiu, A. a, 2014. An awful verdict, a correct one (online). Bucharest: Romania 
Liberă. Available at: http://www.romanialibera.ro/opinii/comentarii/Năstase--o-condamnare-
ingrozitoare--dar-justa-322166 (accessed on 19 August 2014). 
Pippidi Mungiu, A. b, 2014. How can we keep our heads up in the world? (online). Bucharest: 
România Curată. Available at: http://romaniacurata.ro/cum-mai-putem-noi-tine-capul-sus-
in-lume/ (accessed on 19 August 2014). 
Pleşu, A., 1996. Post-Totalitarian Pathology: Notes on Romania Six Years after December 
1989. Social Research, 63 (2), pp. 559-571. 
Poenariu, A., (2015). Romania: Questions Raised Over Graft and Incompetence in Tragic 
Nightclub Fire. Bucharest: Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project. Available at: 
https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/4564-romania-questions-raised-over-graft-and-incompetence-
in-tragic-nightclub-fire (accessed on November 22, 2015). 
Popescu, A. a, 2012. How Judges motivate Năstase`s condemnation. A strong signal of alarm 
for all the corrupt politicians (online). Bucharest: România Curată. Available at: 
http://romaniacurata.ro/cum-motiveaza-judecatorii-condamnarea-lui-adrian-Năstase-un-
puternic-semnal-de-alarma-pentru-toti-politicienii-corupti/ (accessed on 20 August 2014). 
Preoteasa, L., 2004. Romania in Brankica, P., Klougart, S. and Vukovic, O., eds, Media 
Ownership and Its Impact on Media Independence and Pluralism, 2004, pp. 403-424. 
 226 
 
Presidential Commission for Analysing the Communist Dictatorship in Romania, 2006. 
Final Report (online). Bucharest: Presidential Administration of Romania. Available at 
http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/RAPORT_FINAL_CPADCR.pdf (Accessed January 
16, 2015) 
Pridham G., 2002.  EU Enlargement and Consolidating Democracy in Post-Communist States 
– Formality and Reality. JCMV: Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (3), pp:  935-973.  
Prisăcariu, C., 2014. Adrian Năstase allowed Dan Voiculescu to premeditate the illegal 
privatisation of the Institute for Food Research (ICA) (online). Bucharest: Romania Liberă. 
Available at: http://www.romanialibera.ro/special/investigatii/adrian-Năstase-i-a-permis-lui-
dan-voiculescu-sa-premediteze-privatizarea-ilegala-a-ica-323885 (accessed on 12 August 
2014).  
Pye W., L., 1968. Political Culture (online). International Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Sciences, www.encyclopedia.com: International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences. Available 
at: http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Political_culture.aspx (Accessed on August 12, 2015). 
Radio România, 2010. Emil Constantinescu (online). Bucharest: Radio România. Available 
at http://www.politicaromaneasca.ro/emil_constatinescu-170 (Accessed on January 16, 2015). 
Randi L.S., Baiyun G., and Ruppel, P., C., 2012. A Contingency Theory of Corruption: The 
Effect of Human Development and National Culture. The Social Science Journal, 49(1), pp. 
90-7. 
Reporter Virtual, 2013. Marius Tucă, A Kind of Bank for the Journalists from Jurnalul Naţional 
(online). Bucharest: Reporter Virtual. Available at: 
http://www.reportervirtual.ro/2013/02/marius-tuca-un-fel-de-banca-pentru-ziaristii-de-la-
jurnalul-national.html ( Accessed on October 4, 2016). 
Reporters without Borders, 2007. Dismay at Constitutional Court`s Decision to Reinstate 
Press Offences as Crimes 9online). Paris: Reporters Without Borders. Available at: 
http://en.rsf.org/romania-dismay-at-constitutional-court-s-02-02-2007,20904.html, (Accessed 
on December 9, 2014. 
Reporters Without Borders, 2009. Government Tries to Rush Through Civil and Criminal 
Codes Reform Curtailing Right to Information. Paris: Reporters without Borders. Available at: 
http://en.rsf.org/romania-government-tries-to-rush-through-24-03-2009,30652.html, last 
accessed on December 10, 2014. 
Reporters without Borders, 2010. Defence Strategy Review Sees Press as Threat to National 
Security (online). Paris: Reporters without Borders. Available at:  http://en.rsf.org/romania-
 227 
 
defence-strategy-review-sees-press-29-06-2010,37840.html, last accessed on December 10, 
2014. 
Reporters without Borders, 2011. Disturbing Panorama of Continuing Media Decline 
(online). Paris: Reporters without Borders. Available at: http://en.rsf.org/roumanie-disturbing-
panorama-of-continuing-21-07-2011,40670.html, last accessed on December 10, 2014. 
Rhoden, T.F., 2015. The Liberal in Liberal Democracy. Democratisation, 22 (3), p.564. 
România Curată, 2015. The Map of County Corruption (online). Bucharest: România Curată. 
Available at: http://www.romaniacurata.ro/harta-coruptiei/ (Accessed on September 24, 2015).  
România Curată a, 2015. Liste Negre (online). Bucharest: România Curată. Available at: 
http://www.romaniacurata.ro/liste-negre/ (Accessed on September 24, 2015).  
România Curată b, 2015. Monitorizăm Statul (online). Bucharest: România Curată. Available 
at: http://www.romaniacurata.ro/monitorizam-statul/  (Accessed on September 24, 2015).  
România Liberă, 2007. Third Place in the Top Quality Newspapers (online). Bucharest: 
România Liberă. Available at: http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/locul-trei-
in-topul-ziarelor-de-calitate-107177 (Accessed on September 30, 2015).  
România Online, 2007. Băsescu: Voiculescu, Vântu and Patriciu use media trusts in political 
battles (online). Bucharest: Stirile România Online. Available at http://stirile.rol.ro/Băsescu-
Voiculescu-Vintu-si-Patriciu-utilizeaza-trusturile-media-in-batalia-politica-34889.html 
(accessed November 4, 2014). 
România Liberă, 2013. Adrian Năstase`s warning for Ponta`s government (online). 
Bucharest: Romania Liberă. Available at: 
http://www.romanialibera.ro/politica/institutii/avertismentul-lui-adrian-Năstase-pentru-
guvernul-ponta-303961 (accessed on 19 August 2014). 
România TV, 2014. Ponta: Adrian Sârbu Asked Me If I wanted Him to Make Me Head of 
State. I Told Him to Pay His Taxes (online). Bucharest: Romania TV: www.romaniatv.net. 
Available at: http://www.romaniatv.net/ponta-adrian-SârbuSârbu-m-a-intrebat-daca-vreau-sa-
ma-faca-presedinte-i-am-spus-sa-si-plateasca-taxele_151002.html (Accessed on October 1, 
2015). 
Rose-Ackerman, S., 1978. Corruption: A study in political economy. New York: Acad. Press. 
Rose, R., Mishler, W. & Haerpfer, C. (1998). Democracy and its Alternatives: 
Understanding Post-Communist Societies. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Saeed, S., 2009. Negotiating Power: Community Media, Democracy and the Public Sphere. 
Development in Practice, 19 (4/5), pp 466-478. 
Sandholtz, W., and Rein T., 2005. Corruption, culture, and communism. International 
 228 
 
Review of Sociology, March, 15(1), pp. 109-131. 
Scott, W., R., 1992. Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems. Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall.  
Smith, A. and Pickles, J., 1998. Introduction. Theorising Transition and the Political 
Economy of Transition in Smith, A. and Pickles, J., eds. Theorising Transition. The Political 
Economy of Post-Communist Transformations, 1998, pp. 1-22 
Sparks, C., 1998. Communism, Capitalism and the Mass Media. London: Sage Publications. 
Sparks, C., 2000. Media Theory after the Fall of Communism: Why the Old Models from East 
and West Won`t Do Any more in Curran, J., and Park, M., 2000. De-Westernising Media 
Studies. London: Routledge. 
Stapenhurst, R., 2000. The Media's Role in Curbing Corruption. Washington DC: World 
Bank Institute. 
Stoica, I. a, 2013. Update Zambaccian. Anti-corruption Department (DNA) accused the expert 
who analysed the double glazing at Cornu farm (online). Bucharest: Evenimentul Zilei. 
Available at: http://www.evz.ro/dosarul-zambaccian-adrian-Năstase-il-recuza-pe-judecatorul-
ionut-matei-cererea-a-fost-re-1070444.html (accessed on 8 October 2014). 
Stoica, I. b, 2013. Evenimentul Zilei exclusivity. ICE Dunărea files. Voiculescu`s mission in 
Securitate`s businesses. Failed transaction with tanks (online). Bucharest:  Evenimentul Zilei. 
Available at: http://www.evz.ro/dosarele-ice-Dunărea-misterele-fabricii-de-bani-a-securitatii-
si-misiunea-lui-dan-voicule-10309.html#ixzz2PNNMHmNA (accessed on November 4, 
2014). 
Stoica, I. a, 2014. Stenographs: Tapping in ICA case. Judge Stan Mustaţă accused of 
CORRUPTION wanted to give Dan Voiculescu a favourable sentence: “..if anything…there is 
room. Yes, yes, yes. YES!”(online). Bucharest: Evenimentul Zilei. Available at: 
http://www.evz.ro/judecatorul-stan-Mustaţă-discutii-despre-dosarul-lui-dan-voiculescu-tu-nu-
poti-sa-i-faci-la-dosarul-ala-vant-sa-nu-l-mai-ai-pai-asta-si-fac.html (accessed on November 
8, 2014).  
Stoica, I. b, 2014. Judge Stan Mustaţă revolted by the fraud committed by Dan Voiculescu. 
“To receive Euro 60 million for Euro 100 thousands? I would do it too!” (online). Bucharest: 
Evenimentul Zilei. Available at: http://www.evz.ro/judecatorul-stan-Mustaţă-revoltat-de-
frauda-lui-dan-voiculescu-60-de-milioane-sa-iei-cu-100-de-mii-as-lua-si-eu-.html (accessed 
on November 8, 2014). 
 229 
 
Supreme Council of National Defence, 2010. National Strategy of Defence. For a Romania 
Which Guarantees the Security and Prosperity of the Future Generations: Vulnerabilities. 
Supreme Council of National Defence: Bucharest. 
Tabacu, H., 2014. Cornered by the Legal System, Varanus Reacts Aggressively. Dan 
Voiculescu Sets his Dogs on Columnists (online). Bucharest: Evenimentul Zilei. Available at: 
http://www.evz.ro/dan-voiculescu-isi-asmute-dulaii-asupra-editorialistilor-evz.html (accessed 
on November 10, 2014). 
Tăpălagă, D., 2011. The portrait of the thug in its youth and its old age (online). Bucharest: 
HotNews. Available at: http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-opinii-8524501-portretul-golanului-
tinerete-batranete.htm (accessed on November 10, 2014).  
Tăpălagă, D. a, 2014. A few observations about Năstase`s condemnation (online). Bucharest: 
HotNews. Available at: http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-opinii-16360104-cateva-observatii-
despre-condamnarea-lui-adrian-Năstase.htm (accessed on 19 August 2014). 
Tăpălagă, D. b, 2014. Ghiţă and Voiculescu in action. The end of an era? (online). Bucharest: 
Romania Liberă. Available at: http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-opinii-17275633-Ghiţă-
voiculescu-actiune-sfarsit-epoca.htm (accessed on November 7, 2014).  
Țenea, A., 2011. Interview with Aurora Liiceanu About Bribery, Baksheesh, Brown Envelops, 
Relationships and Connections. Corruption is Linked to a Meta-Concept which in Fact Means 
Theft (online). Bucharest: România Curată. Available at http://www.romaniacurata.ro/interviu-
cu-aurora-liiceanu-despre-mita-bacsis-plic-relatii-si-pile-coruptia-este-legata-de-un-
metaconcept-care-inseamna-de-fapt-hotie/ (Accessed on August 17, 2015).  
The Leveson Inquiry, 2011. The Leveson Inquiry: Culture, Practice and Ethics of the Press 
(online). London: The Leveson Inquiry. Available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140122145147/http://www.levesoninquiry.org.u
k/ (Accessed June 19, 2015). 
The Romanian Ministry of Justice & the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 
2015. The Opinion of the Persons Convicted for Corruption Concerning the Causes and 
Consequences of Corruption. A Study Concerning Corruption in Romania (online). Bucharest: 
HotNews Agency. Available at: http://media.hotnews.ro/media_server1/document-2015-04-
20-19969676-0-studiul-experiente-directe-fenomenul-coruptiei-ale-persoanelor-
condamnate.pdf (Accessed on April 24, 2014). 
Tismăneanu, V., 1998. Fantasies of Salvation. Democracy, Nationalism and Myth in Post-
Communist Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 230 
 
Tismăneanu, V. & Kligman, G. (2001), Romania`s First Post-Communist Decade: From 
Iliescu to Iliescu, East European Constitutional Review, 10(1), pp: 76-96. 
Tismăneanu, V. a, 2014. The Emperor of the Eggs: Contributions to the Portrait of Adrian 
Năstase (online). Bucharest: HotNews. Available at:  http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-opinii-
16366203-imparatul-oualor-contributii-portretul-lui-adrian-Năstase.htm (accessed on 8 
October 2014). 
Tismăneanu, V. b, 2014. Ceauşescu`s decedents: Iliescu, Năstase, Ponta (online). Bucharest: 
Evenimentul Zilei. Available at: http://www.evz.ro/Ceauşescu-nicolae-adrian-Năstase-
editorial-Tismăneanu-1080170.html (accessed on 19 August 2014). 
Toma, F., 2013. A careful suicide: Adrian Năstase (online). Bucharest: Evenimentul Zilei. 
Available at: http://www.evz.ro/un-sinucis-cu-grija-adrian-Năstase-1029296.html (accessed 
on 19 August 2014). 
Toqueville, A., 1835. Democracy in America –Vol. I (online). The Project Gutenberg. 
Available at https://www.gutenberg.org/files/815/815-h/815-h.htm#link2HCH0037 (Accessed 
July 28, 2015). (Project Gutenberg release date January 21, 2006). 
Transparency International (2002 – 2014), Corruption Perception Index (2007 – 2014) 
Online). Berlin: Transparency International. Available at: 
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview (Accessed on December 10, 2014).  
Transparency International Romania, 2004 – 2009: National Corruption Reports (Online). 
Bucharest: Transparency International. Available at 
http://www.transparency.org.ro/politici_si_studii/studii/national_coruptie/2009/index_en.htm
l (accessed on April 16, 2013). 
Transparency International, 2009. Global Corruption Barometer (online). Berlin: 
Transparency International. Available at: 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/global_corruption_barometer_20091 
(Accessed on October 2, 2015). 
Transparency International, 2011. What is Corruption and How Does CPI Measure 
it?(online). Berlin: Transparency International. Available at 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/in_detail (Accessed on April 7, 2015). 
Transparency International, 2014. Corruption Perception Index 2014: Results (online), 
Berlin: Transparency International.  Available at https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results 
(Accessed on August 17, 2015). 
Tudor, D., (2016). Stelian Negrea was Excluded for the Association of European Journalists. 
He Stole the Money of the Organisation (online). Bucharest: Revista 22. Available at: 
 231 
 
http://revista22.ro/70252506/stelian-negrea-exclus-din-azir-i-ar-fi-nsuit-fraudulos-banii-
organizaiei.html (Accessed on March 18, 2016). 
Udrea, M., 2013. The Unflattering Bribery in the History of Romanians (online). Bucharest: 
Historia Blog. Available at http://www.historia.ro/exclusiv_web/general/articol/ocaratoarea-
mita-istoria-romanilor (Accessed on August 17, 2015). 
UN (United Nations), 1948. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19. UN General 
Assembly Resolution 217 (III), December 10, Paris: UN. 
UN (United Nations), 1966. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 19, 
UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI), in force on March 23, 1976, Geneva: UN. 
UN General Assembly, 1946. Resolution 59 (I) – Calling of an International Conference on 
Freedom of Information (online). Geneva: UN. Available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/033/10/IMG/NR003310.pdf?OpenElement 
(Accessed June 15, 2015) 
UN Human Rights Committee, 1995. Tae-Hoon Parc vs. Republic of Korea (online. 
Communication No. 628/1995, para 10.3. Geneva: UN. Available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/session64/view628.htm (Accessed June 15, 2015). 
UN Human Rights Committee, 1996. General Comment 25 (57), General Comments under 
article 40, paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (online), 
adopted by the Committee at its 1510th meeting, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (1996), 
para 26. Geneva: UN. Available at https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/hrcom25.htm 
(Accessed on June 15, 2015). 
UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004. United Nations Handbook on Practical 
Anti-Corruption. Measures for Prosecutors and Investigators, Vienna: United Nations. 
Van Zoonen, L, The Personal, The Political and The Popular. A Woman`s Guide to Celebrity 
Politics (2006) in European Journal of Cultural Studies, Vol.9, No. 3, 287-301. 
Vântu, S., V., 2014. The Advice of Sorin Ovidiu Vântu for the Facebook Generation: You are 
the “I can`t afford generation! You haven`t got anything. You can`t afford a house, you do not 
have a car. You can`t afford not even prostitutes. You will continue to be our slaves (online). 
Facebook. December 6, 2014. Available at: 
https://www.facebook.com/SorinOvidiuVintu?fref=nf  
Vintilă, R., 2014. Happy Birthday Adrian Năstase! `For me happiness has a taste of freedom 
combined with the feeling of belonging` (online). Bucharest: Jurnalul National. Available at:  
22 June 2014, http://jurnalul.ro/special-jurnalul/astazi-e-ziua-ta-adrian-Năstase-671083.html 
(accessed on 8 October 2014).  
 232 
 
Vintilă, C., 2014.  Traian Băsescu: I Would Be Happy If EADS File Would Start. This File 
Presents As Well an X-ray of the Political Class (online). Bucharest: Evenimentul Zilei. 
Available at:  http://www.evz.ro/traian-Băsescu-m-as-bucura-daca-ar-iesi-si-eads-acest-dosar-
face-si-el-o-radiografie-a-clasei-politice.html (accessed on December 3, 2014). 
Vox Publica, 2015. Stelian Negrea (online). Bucharest: Vox Publica. Available at: 
http://voxpublica.realitatea.net/steliannegrea (Accessed on September 24, 2015).  
Wiards, H.J., 2002. Southern Europe, Eastern Europe and Comparative Politics: 
“Transitology” and the Need for New Theory. East European Politics and Societies, 15(3), pp. 
485-501. 
World Bank, 1997. Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World 
Bank (online). Washington: The World Bank. Available at:  
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/corrptn.pdf (Accessed on April 
7, 2015). 
World Bank, 2010. Literature Survey on State Capture, Grand Corruption and Political 
Corruption 1995 – 2010 (online), Washington: The World Bank. Available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/28574
1-1315337528748/LitSurveyAnticorruptionStateCapture.pdf (Accessed on April 16, 2015). 
Wring, D., & Deacon, D., 2010. Patterns of Press Partisanship in the 2010 General Election. 
British Politics, 5(4), pp: 436 – 454. 
Wring, D., 2012. It`s Just Business: the Political Economy of the Hacking Scandal. Media, 
Culture and Society, 34, (5), pp: 631-636. 
Yang, M., M., H., 1989. The Gift Economy and State Power in China. Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp: 47–48. 
Ziare.com, 2013. Journalists from Romania Liberă Went on Strike (online). Bucharest: 
Ziare.com. Available at: http://www.ziare.com/media/ziare/jurnalistii-de-la-romania-libera-
au-intrat-in-greva-1221400 (accessed on October 4, 2016) 
ZiareLive, 2015. Explosive! The Romanian Senators Said “No” To the Asset Confiscation of 
Criminals. Bucharest: ZiareLive.to. Available at: http://www.ziarelive.ro/stiri/exploziv-
senatorii-au-spus-nu-confiscarii-averilor-infractorilor.html (accessed on November 22, 2015). 
Ziarul Românesc, 2014. Dan Voiculescu, 10 years in prison: “I shall write books” (online). 
Bucharest: Ziarul Românesc. Available at: 
http://www.ziarulromanesc.net/focus/romania/3434-dan-voiculescu-10-ani-de-inchisoare-o-s-
scriu-cri.html (accessed on November 4, 2014).  
 233 
 
Zarojanu, T., C., 2002. Being A Journalist in Romania (online). Bucharest: Romania Literară. 
Available at: http://www.romlit.ro/a_fi_ziarist_n_romnia (accessed on March 2, 2016).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 234 
 
Annex – Actors Involved in EADS – Microsoft Case 
 
 
 
PROFILES 
 
 
 
Şerban Mihăilescu 
 
Source: https://www.senat.ro/FisaSenator.aspx?ParlamentarID=0231e907-5210-4737-857f-
2c1ef03986c1 
 
 Şerban Mihăilescu is one of Romania`s long standing Social- Democrat (PSD) MPs. 
He has had four mandates as a member of the Chamber of Deputies (1990 to 1992; 1996 to 
2000; 2000 to 2004 and 2008 to 2012) and three mandates as the member of the Senate (2004 
to 2008; 2008 to 2012; 2012 to 2016).  He was as well a Minister in charge of coordinating 
the Government`s General Secretariat between December 2000 and October 2003. His MP 
immunity has been suspended due to criminal investigation of corruption. 
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Ecaterina Andronescu 
 
 
Source: https://www.senat.ro/FisaSenator.aspx?ParlamentarID=e25601d1-bde1-4ee4-8b69-
f44f36662835 
 
Andronescu is a long standing PSD member of the Chamber of Deputies (1996 to 2000; 2000 
to 2004; 2004 to 2008) as well as a member of the Senate (2008 to 2012; and 2012 to 2016). 
She was the PSD Minister of Education in Năstase`s government (2000 to 2003) as well as in 
Emil Boc`s government (2008 to 2009).  
 
 
Valerian Vreme and Daniel Funeriu 
 
Source: 
http://www.cameradeputatilor.ro/pls/parlam/structura.mp?idm=405&cam=2&leg=2012&p
ag=0&idl=1  
 
Valerian Vreme is a Democrat Liberal member of the Chamber of Deputies (2008 to 2012; 
2012 to 2013; independent 2013 to 2016). He was the Minister of Communications between 
2010 and 2012.  
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Daniel Funeriu 
 
Source:http://anticoruptie.hotnews.ro/stiri-anticoruptie-18349478-daniel-funeriu-audiat-
dna.htm   
 
Daniel Funeriu was the Democrat-Liberal Minister of Education and Research between 2009 
and 2012.  
 
 
Dan Nica  
 
Source: http://www.dannica.ro/  
 
Nica has been one of Romania`s long standing Social Democrat Members of the Chamber of 
Deputies (1996 to 2000; 2000 to 2004; 2004 to 2008; 2008 to 2012). He was as well the 
Minister of Education between 2000 and 2004 and Deputy Prime Minister between 2008 and 
2009. He is currently a member of the European Parliament. 
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Alexandru Athanasiu 
 
 
Source: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/33994/ALEXANDRU_ATHANASIU_home.html 
 
Athanasiu has been a member of the Social Democrat party since 2001. He was one of 
Romania`s Prime Ministers on an interim basis from 13 to 22 December 1999. He was as well 
the Social-democrat Minister of Education between 2003 and 2005.  
 
 
Mihai Tănăsescu 
 
Source: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/parlam/structura.mp?idm=16&leg=2004&cam=2 
 
Tănăsescu is Romania`s representative at the IMF and the Vice-President of the European 
Investment Bank (EIB). He was the PSD Minister of Finance between 2000 and 2004 and an 
MP (member of the Chamber of Deputies) between 2004 and 2007.   
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Gabriel Sandu 
 
 
Source: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/parlam/structura.mp?cam=2&idm=101&leg=2004 
 
Sandu was a Liberal member of the Chamber of Deputies between 2004 and 2008 and the 
Liberal-Democrat Minister of Communications between December 2008 and September 2010. 
 
 
 
Adriana Țicău 
 
Source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/36281/SILVIAADRIANA_ȚICĂU_home.html 
 
Adriana Țicău was the PSD Minister of Communications between July and December 2004.   
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Victor Ponta 
 
Source: http://www.revista22.ro/victor-ponta-si-klaus-iohannis--crochiu-de-candidati-
49598.html 
 
 
 
Businessman Dorin Cocoş 
 
Source: http://ancheteonline.ro/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Cocoş1.jpg 
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Elena Udrea 
 
 
Source: http://liberinteleorman.ro/elena-udrea-romania-are-nevoie-de-un-presedinte-
puternic-implicat-si-capabil-sa-miste-tara-inainte/ 
 
 
 
Gheorghe Ştefan  
 
Source: http://www.Gândul.info/politica/gheorghe-pinalti-Ştefan-zvonurile-privind-plecarea-
a-20-de-primari-din-Neamţ-catre-opozitie-sunt-povesti-vanatoresti-9471964 
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Businessman Dumitru Nicolae (NIRO) 
 
Source: http://www.nasul.tv/2013/11/28/picatura-chinezeasca-niro/ 
 
 
 
Businessman Alexandru Bittner 
 
Source: http://www.ziuaconstanta.ro/diverse/stiri-calde/alexandru-bittner-s-a-retras-din-
pensiune-piscicola-srl-jurilovca-514946.html 
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Remus Truică 
 
Source: http://www.cotidianul.ro/patricia-kaas-fermecata-de-iubitul-ei-roman-milionarul-
remus-Truică-155060/ 
 
 
 
 
 
Adrian Petrache 
 
Source: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/parlam/structura.mp?idm=285&leg=2012&cam=2 
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Claudiu Florică 
 
Source: http://www.evz.ro/reteaua-spagilor-de-milioane-de-euro-mita-ministrilor-era-
platita-de-fapt-de-la-bugetul-de-stat.html 
 
 
 
Dinu Pescariu  
 
Source: http://www.cotidianul.ro/dinu-pescariu-600000-de-dolari-din-tenis-32-milioane-de-
dolari-din-trafic-de-coruptie-248300/ 
 
Doru Boştină 
 
Source: http://www.doruBoştină.ro/ 
